The impediments faced by Yemen in enforcing international arbitral awards: a legal analysis by Bawazir, Omar Saleh Abdullah
The copyright © of this thesis belongs to its rightful author and/or other copyright 
owner.  Copies can be accessed and downloaded for non-commercial or learning 
purposes without any charge and permission.  The thesis cannot be reproduced or 
quoted as a whole without the permission from its rightful owner.  No alteration or 
changes in format is allowed without permission from its rightful owner. 
 
THE IMPEDIMENTS FACED BY YEMEN IN ENFORCING 






















DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
2018
THE IMPEDIMENTS FACED BY YEMEN IN ENFORCING 























A thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government in 






PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for a Post Graduate degree 
from the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), I agree that the Library of this university 
may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying 
this thesis in any manner, in  whole  or  in  part,  for  scholarly  purposes  may  be  
granted  by  my  supervisor(s)  or  in  their absence, by the Dean of Ghazali Shafie 
Graduate School of Government where I did my thesis.  It  is  understood  that  any  
copying  or  publication  or  use  of  this  thesis or parts of it for financial gain shall not 
be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition 
shall be given to me and to the UUM in any scholarly use which may be made of any 
material in my thesis.  
Request for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis in whole 
or in part should be addressed to:  
 
Dean (Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government) 
UUM College of Law, Government and International Studies 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 












The importance of an award of international arbitral proceedings is considered to be 
of no value if the award is not enforceable. The enforcement of international arbitral 
award (IAA) depends on the national court of a nation. In Yemen, however, the 
enforcement of IAA by the national court is difficult because of the loopholes of the 
provisions of Yemeni Arbitration Act 1992 (YAA), tribalism and corruption. The 
objectives of this study are: firstly, to investigate the provisions of the enforcement of 
arbitration laws in Yemen; secondly, to study international provisions relating to the 
enforcement of arbitration laws; thirdly, to study the impact of tribalism on the court 
of appeal in the enforcement of IAA in Yemen; fourthly, to determine the impact of 
corruption on the court in the enforcement of IAA in Yemen; and finally, to make 
suggestions for the improvement of the enforcement of international arbitral awards in 
Yemen. This study employed two methods namely doctrinal legal research and socio-
legal research. The data were collected through face-to-face, semi-structured 
interview. The researcher applied purposive sampling by choosing expert persons from 
the Central Organization for Control and Auditing, Public Funds Prosecution, the 
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, academicians, arbitrator, 
Judicial Inspection Board member and the Court of Appeal judges who conduct 
arbitral cases. The collected data were analysed using content analysis method. This 
study found that YAA is unable to cope with issues relating to the enforcement of IAA. 
It failed to include some legal provisions that are related to the enforcement. The study 
also confirmed the adverse impact of tribalism and corruption on the court in enforcing 
the international arbitral awards. This is because the tribes dominate the government 
institutions. While, the corruption impedes the judicial operations. Therefore, the 
suggestions to overcome the impediments are: firstly, the amendment of YAA; 
secondly, ratification of New York Convention 1958; thirdly, development of 
strategies to civilize the tribes by the government; and finally, the independence of the 
judiciary must be enforced. 
 







Kepentingan satu ‘award’ prosiding penimbangtaraan antarabangsa dianggap tidak 
ada nilai jika ‘award’ itu tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. Penguatkuasaan ‘award’ 
penimbangtaraan antarabangsa (IAA) bergantung pada mahkamah sesebuah negara. 
Akan tetapi, penguatkuasaan ini sukar dilaksanakan oleh mahkamah di Yaman kerana 
halangan-halangan seperti kelemahan di dalam Akta Timbangtara Yaman 1992 
(YAA), tribalisme dan rasuah. Kajian ini mempunyai lima objektif iaitu: pertama, 
menyiasat peruntukan penguatkuasaan undang-undang penimbangtaraan di Yaman; 
kedua, mengkaji peruntukan antarabangsa berkaitan penguatkuasaan undang-undang 
penimbangtaraan; ketiga, mengkaji impak tribalisme ke atas mahkamah rayuan dalam 
penguatkuasaan IAA di Yaman; keempat, menentukan impak rasuah ke atas 
mahkamah dalam penguatkuasaan IAA di Yaman; dan terakhir, memberi cadangan ke 
atas penambahbaikan penguatkuasaan IAA di Yaman. Metodologi kajian yang diguna 
pakai ialah kaedah penyelidikan undang-undang doktrinal dan kajian sosio-
perundangan. Manakala data pula dikumpul melalui kaedah temu bual separa struktur 
secara bersemuka. Kajian mengguna pakai pensampelan bertujuan dengan memilih 
pakar dalam bidang tertentu daripada Central Organization for Control and Auditing 
(COCA), Public Funds Prosecution (PFP), Supreme National Authority for Combating 
Corruption  (SNACC), ahli akademik, ahli penimbang tara, ahli Judicial Inspection 
Board (JIB) dan hakim mahkamah rayuan yang mengendalikan kes penimbangtaraan. 
Data yang dikumpul telah dianalisis menggunakan kaedah analisis kandungan. Kajian 
mendapati YAA tidak berupaya untuk menghadapi isu berkaitan dengan 
penguatkuasaan IAA. Ia gagal untuk memasukkan beberapa peruntukan undang-
undang yang berkaitan dengan penguatkuasan. Kajian juga mengesahkan terdapat 
impak buruk tribalisme dan rasuah ke atas mahkamah dalam penguatkuasaan IAA. Ini 
kerana suku kaum mendominasi institusi-institusi kerajaan. Manakala, rasuah pula 
menjejaskan operasi kehakiman. Oleh sebab itu, cadangan-cadangan bagi mengatasi 
halangan tersebut ialah: pertama, pemindaan YAA; pengesahan New York 
Convention 1958; pembangunan pelan strategik untuk mendisiplinkan kabilah oleh 
pihak kerajaan; dan kebebasan badan kehakiman hendaklah dikuatkuasakan. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The growth of the international trade has caused more disputes and consequently, the 
General Assembly in 1966 was directed by the resolution 2205 (XXI) to form 
UNCITRAL to handle the increasing disputes instead of relying on the national legal 
systems which proved to be  unable to cope with developments in global trade.1 The 
arbitration system is regarded as an appropriate approach, due to its speed and 
flexibility in relation to procedures, availability of experienced arbitrators, 
preservation of friendly relationship between disputed parties and other salient benefits 
that are not available in the national courts.2 Hence, arbitration imposes its influence 
on the international trade arena for its salient advantages, by encouraging any dispute 
to resort to arbitration as an effective means to settle the disputes that have arisen or 
may arise from the international trade contracts.3 Consequently, the resolution of these 
disputes will positively increase the arbitration credibility compared to the national 
judiciary, which is proven to be more arduous, complicated, and slow.4 Thus, the 
                                                     
1  United Nation Commission on International Trade Law, accessed October 22, 2015, http://www.un 
citral.org. 
2 Mohamed Abdel Fattah Twrek, “Maritime Arbitration” (master’s thesis, University of Dar Aljameh 
Aljadidah, 2003), 235. 
3 Shahin Alam, "Commercial Arbitration: Factors making it lose out against other processes," Middle 
East Journal of Bussines (April 2014): 1, accessed September 14, 2015, 
http://platform.almanhal.com/Reader/Article/43996.  
4 Ibid.   
 
2 
arbitration system is seen as capable of keeping pace with international commercial 
disputes.5 
Through arbitration, a neutral third party settles any issue between disputing parties.6 
Therefore, the more arbitration and its mass use are developed, the more laws in 
several countries and international conventions are created to regulate arbitration in 
the international level.7 The simple arbitration process, in which one person or legal 
office acted as the judge, has evolved over time to make the system less complicated 
with various advanced rules.8 Arbitration is an easier legal mechanism than national 
legal systems, more self-regulated and an effective way of solving disputes working 
alongside – or in place of –national courts.9 However, international arbitration has been 
commonly known and used as a method of settling disputes since the appearance of 
the modern commercial law.10 
According to the American lawyer Olson, he confirms that enmity between disputed 
parties is being made in the national court as a result of win-loss where each party is 
struggling in order to win and get more than their own legal rights.11 Thus, arbitration 
has come into the picture to settle disputes between parties as an alternative way of 
justice in this modern era. The main purpose of this alternative resolution is to reduce 
the rigidity of procedures that are often followed by the national courts, unnecessary 
delay, high costs, and the like.12 
                                                     
5 Ibid.  
6 Twrek, “Maritime Arbitration,” 221. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Babak Hendizadeh, “International Commercial Arbitration: The Effect of Culture and Religion on 
Enforcement of Award” (master’s thesis, Canadian Queen’s University, 2012) 1. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 




As far as the Yemeni context is concerned, Yemen was divided into two independent 
states, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south and the 
Yemen Arab Republic in the north.13 The two states were then unified and the Republic 
of Yemen was announced on the 22nd of May 1990.14 Yemen Arab Republic is 
regarded as the first Arab country that enacted its national arbitration law in 1981.15 
Later, the law was amended and is currently called Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 
1992 (YAA)16 which was amended again in 1997, that is twenty year after the last 
amendment of the Act. 
The YAA is mainly based on UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial 
arbitration with amendments as adopted in 2006 (UNCITRAL).17 UNCITRAL has 
been recognized as an essential legal rule of the United Nations framework for the 
arrangement purpose of international trade law.18 UNCITRAL was adopted in June 
1985 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.19 The adoption 
of UNCITRAL is considered as a tremendous step to harmonize and modernize the 
international commercial arbitration, and a contribution to facilitate the 
implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (the “New York Convention”) hereinafter referred 
to as (NYC).20 UNCITRAL was drafted by combining both the NYC and the 
                                                     
13 Advanced Unedited Version, Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner on OHCHR’s visit to 
Yemen, Rep A/HRC/18/21 (2011), accessed October 20, 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/YemenAssessmentMissionReport.pdf. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Jens Kambeck, “Arbitration in Yemen,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2008): 333, accessed 





18 Peter Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law 
Jurisdictions, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), 7. 




UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 1976.21 One can notice that in chapter 8 of UNCITRAL, 
which deals with the enforcement of award provisions, an extract of the NYC as well 
as the other provisions which can be noticed in UNCITRAL are considered as an 
original copy of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.22 
The overall situation in Yemen is favorable, as it has an exclusive product in the market 
like frankincense and coffee.23 Additionally, Yemen is categorized among the 
countries that are producing natural resources such as oil and metals which are 
considered as resources for achieving economic prosperity and can greatly change the 
poverty and misery of the Yemeni people to a brilliant economic situation.24 Therefore, 
arbitration in Yemen may have a positive effect on the national economy if the 
government is serious to ratify it. According to the Minister of Industry and 
Commerce, the specialist Saad Eddin bin Talib “it is a right direction to pay attention 
to the arbitration as one of the means of resolving trade disputes, in particular, where 
the disputed parties can find a better and suitable environment in which access to the 
desired result is far more quicker, less costly, simple procedures, and less complexity, 
and depends on technical expertise to contribute to resolving disputes.25 Additionally, 
he points out that, the international commercial arbitration is growing and expanding 
a lot and gaining more importance. It is outstanding for its role in relieving the burdens 
on the courts and in the speed of resolving trade disputes”.26  
                                                     
21 Loukas A. Mistelis, Concise International Arbitration (United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 
2010), 582. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Kambeck, “Arbitration in Yemen,” 331-333. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Adel Thamer, “Second Forum of the Commercial Arbitration of the Ministry of Industry and Trade 




The YAA was amended in 1992 to cope with the global trade growth. In 4th December 
2013, Yemen became a member of the Word Trade Organization.27 Yemen is a non-
convention state to NYC, but is intending to ratify it as there is no reasonable excuse 
for non-ratifying the convention, especially, when ratifying it could bring positive 
effects to the national economy.28 It should be noted that YAA allows the disputed 
parties, whatever one of the parties is non-citizen or both are non-citizens to choose 
their own law, place and language to settle the existing or future dispute.29 Also, 
section 10 (1) of Yemeni Investment Law grants the foreign investor and the 
government, to settle their dispute through arbitral rules based either on local or 
international institution (2) and they could also settle the dispute by procedures based 
on UNCITRAL.30  This means that Yemen courts are obliged to recognize and enforce 
the international arbitration award (IAA) as YAA gives full freedom of the parties to 
settle their dispute through local or foreign laws and confirmed the award as final and 
binding.31 Whereas, the court of appeal is the competent court that has jurisdiction to 
deal with the enforcement of the arbitral awards.32 
However, the enforcement of international arbitral awards is beset with challenges. 
According to Jens Kambeck, the enforcement of the legal decision in Yemen faces 
difficulties,33 this is perhaps due to the existence of the tribal system. However, the 
tribes differ in their impact from one state to another.34 For example, in some countries 
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of Law, accessed March 22, 2016, 
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the tribes have a major impact on economic and political issues.35 On the other hand, 
their impact seems fragile in some other countries.36 In the Arab world, the Republic 
of Yemen is regarded as the most populated tribal state.37 Historically, the tribes in 
Yemen have a close relationship with the state in protecting the state’s lands, 
promoting security, and cooperating with the army to protect the borders of the 
country.38 Currently, it could be noticed that the majority of military individuals and 
most of the parliament members belong to the tribes.39 The tribes are characterized as 
lawless and aggressive to others.40 The tribal Sheikhs41 do various unlawful activities 
such as ghost jobs, which is receiving salaries even without really going to the 
workplace, they are attached to.42 They do not have loyalty to the country and always 
having conflict of interest, and consequently, the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh 
bought the Sheikhs’ loyalties by providing personal incentives such as money, jobs, 
and lands.43  
Undoubtedly, as the tribes are considered an important part of the Yemeni society, it 
is hard to separate them from the society,44 since they play a significant role in the 
                                                     
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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Yemen.45 The tribes do multiple tasks such as protecting their members, maintaining 
security and stabilizing the country, negotiating with the state regarding various 
matters that are important to the tribes,46 settling most of the society disputes (about 
80%), by applying customary laws.47 Thus, the customary laws have been recognized 
officially. This could lead to bias and cronyism among the disputed parties. As usually 
the tribal arbitrator and disputed parties descend from the same tribe. Thus, tribalism 
may impede arbitration, especially, the principle of independence and impartiality. 
Furthermore, Yemen is the poorest country among the Arab countries, and corruption 
is a common phenomenon in the Republic.48 Consequently, Gulf States refuse to 
accommodate Yemen in the Gulf Countries Cooperation (GCC),49 even international 
aids for development in Yemen are banned because of the rampant corruption in the 
state institutions and this has adversely affected public services.50 Corruption is a 
hindrance to good performance of the state institutions, especially the judiciary.51 
Despite the state’s efforts to reform the judiciary, it is still the weakest institution 
compared to other government institutions.52 Reforming the judiciary is strongly 
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equated with eliminating corruption.53 Personal properties and contractual rights and 
obligations are not well protected by the law, and the law can easily be changed on 
favoritism.54 Hence, corruption may be an obstacle towards the court competency on 
enforcement of IAA.  
Since it is found that the international arbitration is important to attract investment, it 
is necessary for Yemen to examine its application and enforcement in the country. 
Especially, on the impacts of provisions of YAA, tribalism, and corruption which are 
perhaps very challenging to the enforcement of IAA so this is going to be the main 
focus of the researcher. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
International arbitration besets with various challenges in achieving its objectives. One 
of the challenges is lack of good provisions to deal with arbitration system in the 
country. According to Michael Kerr, the national arbitration laws in the Middle East 
countries, including Yemen are not in accordance with international arbitration laws.55 
The laws related to the enforcement and protection of rights in Yemen are considered 
weak, so Yemeni government needs to modernize the laws.56 The last amendment of 
YAA was in 199757 which is twenty years old and thus insufficient to cope with the 
current arbitration system. Thus, this study focuses on the investigation of the 
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arbitration laws that are related to the enforcement of IAA based on YAA as well as 
to examine the international provisions such as NYC, UNCITRAL, Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 
Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) which are relevant to the enforcement of IAA in order to 
identify the loopholes in YAA. 
The judiciary is not capable of handling commercial disputes because of weak 
enforcement of the law.58 The studies Al-Zwaini have shown that 60% of judgements 
are not enforced.59 Thus, the foreign investors loses their rights because of the 
loopholes in YAA. Particularly, the provisions relevant to the enforcement of the IAA. 
It is important to refer to case of Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen,60 
in this case the respondent applied to set aside IAA while the claimant applied to 
enforce IAA. However, the Yemen court procrastinated the enforcement. Especially, 
it could not determine any ground in the respondent’s defence to set aside the arbitral 
award based on section 53 or 55 of YAA. This means that YAA has to be modernised 
by strong relevant provisions of the enforcement of IAA. It is commonly known that 
the arbitration system recognizes the parties’ autonomy relating to the choice of law 
or the place where the award is given.61  However, it is not very important for the 
disputed parties to have assets in the host states.62 The creditor party has to make 
reference to the state where the debtor party has assets in order to coerce the debtor 
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party to enforce the award. Therefore, the national arbitration laws are perhaps 
fundamental factor towards the enforcement of IAA. 
 
Tribalism may have an influence on the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. The 
tribe in Republic of Yemen plays a significant role in the public sector and also affects 
the policy of the state.63 According to Tribalism Index Scores 2009, Republic of 
Yemen is ranked number 7 out of 160 countries in the world, figure 1 is considered as 
the highest rate, while figure 160 is considered as the lowest.64 Number 7 is high rate, 
so this rate is considered as negative as tribes are one of the factors that adversely 
affect the growth of the Yemeni national economy as well as the good performance of 
the government institutions.  They perform various illegal acts which are mentioned 
with supporting evidence in this research. The tribe in Yemen is historically rooted, 
till now it has a significant impact on social, economic, and political life.65 It can be 
observed that the majority of the members of the strongest opposition party (Islah) are 
for the tribes,66 and the majority of Yemeni army and members of the House of 
Representatives are chosen by the people who are from the tribes.67 These tribes 
possess deadly weapons and are well armed.68 The United Nation Security Council 
revealed that the Yemeni judiciary reform is confronted with challenges and the tribes 
are one of the causes.69 Unfortunately, the government offers a greater importance to 
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tribal leaders (Mashaeikh), by paying them monthly salaries, and providing them with 
cars, houses, and personal security.70 This support contrasts with the reforms of the 
judiciary that has been taken by the government. This act of government supports the 
reforms on one side and ruins such reforms from another side. The tribes commit 
vandalism like bombing oil pipes and kidnapping foreigners to overcome the 
government.71 The tribes refuse to comply with the law and their attitudes are 
unfriendly.72 Such non-compliance with the law by the tribes affects judicial 
performance,73 which is against the principle that all citizens are equal before the law.74 
The party that gives judgement in favour of him/her may lose rights if he/she does not 
belong to a tribe that protects his/her rights to execute the judgement against the other 
tribal party.75 60% of the court judgements are not enforced76 because of tribal 
resistance and power.77 As mentioned earlier, the stronger tribes disobey the court 
orders and interfere with the affairs of the government. All members of the tribes unite 
to protect each other78 against those outside their groups.79 Therefore, the influence of 
the tribes on the competency of the court in the enforcement of IAA in Yemen is 
primarily considered in this research. 
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Tribalism in Arab culture is meant to protect the tribes’ interest as well as the tribal 
members’ interest80.Tribal nepotism adversely affects the judges’ independence.81 
Similarly, the judges could not perform their functions because of the threat of Sheikhs 
against them.82 They pressure them to abstain from hearing of some cases and request 
to transfer the cases to tribal tribunals, and/or give a judgement in favour of the 
Sheikhs.83 For instance, in one case, the Sheikh came to public prosecutor’s office and 
threatened him if he released the detainee84 stating that, such release would lead to 
murder.85 The public prosecutor considered the interference as a threat against his life 
and the detainee’s life.86 In another type of interference, the punishment of transfer of 
judges to different governorate because he issued a judgement against a prominent 
Sheikh.87 The same happened to lawyers when they represented their clients before the 
court in regions that are controlled by tribes which such Sheikhs considered that as 
conflict with local tribal authority.88 So, IAA will face difficulties as the court control 
and assistance are major importance to enforce the arbitral awards and to make a 
success of the arbitration system as a whole.89 It is necessary to refer to the case of 
Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen (ICSID case No. ARB/05/17), Sheikh 
Mouthir El Chazil, “ in this case a member of the local council at AlMahweet, and 
individuals of his tribe "confronted" the Claimant’s personnel (the foreign investor) at 
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the AlMahweet – Al Qanawis site, demanding to traverse the working site and opening 
fire with automatic weapons. The Claimant immediately wrote to the President of 
Yemen to request protection and security to protect lives”. Unfortunately, the President 
of the Republic did not take any action to secure the claimant. It appears that the 
government is unable to control the tribal leaders. In other words, the government does 
not will to cut alliance with the tribes for political reasons. The government supports 
the tribes’ leaders who are in alliance with the government so that most members of 
the House of Representatives are represented by famous tribal Sheikhs.90 The former 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh has intentionally strengthened tribal power in order that 
none could rule except him.91 As consequences, the legal principle all the citizens are 
equal before the law is not practiced in Yemen. This is confirmed the theory that says 
some persons who have a power whatever such power comes from businessmen, tribal 
confederation, or political persons which they enjoy special privileges and protections 
other than normal citizens.92 Therefore, there is a failure of the enforcement of IAA in 
Yemen if the government does not prevent the tribe’s interventions in the affairs of the 
judiciary. 
Another issue that probably affects good governance is corruption. According to the 
2015 of Transparency International statistic, Yemen is placed among the first eighteen 
highest corrupt countries in the world.93 It is important to understand the rampant 
corruption of the public funds by referring to the statement of the former head of the 
Yemeni House of Representative, Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Alahmer, he was also 
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a head of Hashid tribes.94 He said neither he nor members of the parliament has 
knowledge of the amount of oil extracted and its income and expenditure.95 This is 
very sensitive issue as the legislature plays a prominent role in developing good 
governance and reducing corruption and weak management in all sectors of society. 
The importance of Parliament to fight corruption is closer to citizens and the biggest 
burden is to fight corruption. The executive branch, considering that parliament is the 
only institution that can monitor the performance of governments. The Yemeni law 
itself grants the parliament an authority to fight corruption more than the three anti-
corruption agencies (COCA, PFP, SNACC). So, the anti-corruption agencies have no 
power to investigate highly placed officers in corrupt case, particularly Yemeni 
Occupants of the Senior Posts Act 1995 (OSPA) which limits jurisdiction of the 
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) to investigate 
politicians unless two-third of the parliament withdrew the immunity of such 
ministers, deputy ministers, governors and the likes. It has to refer to the internal 
regulations of the House of Representatives Law No. (1) For the year 2006 to 
understand the jurisdiction of the House of Representative on the matter fighting 
corruption. Section 52 (i) provides that the Standing Committees of the House of 
Representative shall exercise their respective supervisory functions, such as studying 
the reports of The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) thereon to 
the House of Representative. Also, section 131 provides that The House of 
Representatives shall ratify international economic and political treaties and 
agreements. Another authority in section 154 provides that each member of the House 
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of Representatives has the right to direct an inquiry to the Prime Minister or, Deputies 
or ministers to hold them accountable for matters within their competence. Also, article 
62 of the constitution provides that the House of Representative has jurisdiction to 
observe and inquire about matters related to the work of ministries or governmental 
institutions. Hence, if the House of Representative has deprived of jurisdiction 
provided by the constitution and the law, it appears the principle of the separation of 
power is not practiced in Yemen. The executive party is the most powerful party. The 
absence of the separation of power leads to interference by the executive in other 
organs.96 As consequences, the corruption is widespread in Yemen. 
 
As stated above, the main purpose of UNCITRAL is to modernize the international 
trade, but corruption is one of the problems that opposes the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to countries like Yemen, where corruption is a major obstacle.97 Studies have 
shown that less corrupt countries are more attractive for FDI.98 Hence, public 
prosecutors and the like must abstain from involving in corruption as it adversely 
affects their independence and effectiveness.99 On the other hand, higher corruption 
may be more attractive to FDI as most corrupt countries facilitates illegal transactions 
instead of following the guided rules.100 The foreign companies pay bribery to the 
authorized person to ease the contract in the corrupt host country. For instance, the oil 
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companies gain huge money by illegal means because of the corruption in Yemen. 
Through a television interview with parliamentarian Ali Ashal, winner of prize of 
GOPAC International Anti-Corruption Award that titled of “Yemen's looted funds”.101 
He said that there is an agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Hunt Oil 
Company for operating the oil sector No. 18. The agreement stipulates that after a 
period 20 years is supposed to return the entire sector to the Yemeni state to be 
operated by national company. But, the extension of this company has been another 5 
years without reference to Parliament for ratification. It has covered during the court's 
hearing of witnesses of the case from both parties the Yemeni government and Hunt 
Oil Company. The director of Hunt Oil Company said that former President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh had extended the agreement. Where the investigation team of the 
documentary film followed the International Chamber Commerce, the clarity of the 
judgement confirms that the decision to extend the company has violated international 
norms and a gross violation of the rights of the Yemeni people. What confirms the gain 
from these engagements is what the Commission of Experts said in 2005, where the 
report mentioned that former President Ali Abdullah Saleh is asking for funds in 
exchange for giving companies exclusive rights to explore for oil and gas in Yemen. 
Moreover, FDI entry strategy in a corrupt host country is to establish joint ventures 
with a domestic investor to reduce the transaction costs of dealing with local 
government officials rather than to create a wholly owned subsidiary.102 It means the 
domestic partner has a good relationship with the official persons to ease the 
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application and escape from tax. However, economic growth does not correlate with 
the existence of corruption.103  
 
Furthermore, the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh confirms the lack of 
objectivity of the judiciary in his letter, including the hearing pleadings at home, 
receiving intercession calls with regards to the cases under pleading.104 Furthermore, 
the judiciary is dependent as the government officials interfere with the judicial 
affairs.105 It is stated by Amundsen that corruption has influenced all the state 
apparatus106 which results to injustice. In like manner, the creditor parties of the 
arbitral awards are coerced to pay bribe to the Court of Appeal to enforce arbitral 
awards.  As stated by Elliot, the foreign investors have to pay bribery to officials to 
secure contracts in the state that suffers from corruption.107 The Yemeni government 
has not taken serious measures against corruption.108 In Yemen, rights and obligations 
are not well protected by the law.109 Bribery can change the verdict in favour of the 
party who pays the bribery.110 It is important to refer to section 30 of Yemeni Anti-
Corruption which provided that a person who pays bribe to the government to obtain 
commercial personal interest has committed a crime as well as a government employee 
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who receives bribes.111 This section addresses two accused, the first one is any citizen 
whatever his employment, is committed a crime if he gives the public servant any kind 
of benefit or gift with intention to ease his transaction or escape from liability, while 
the second one is public servant committed a crime by receiving any kind of benefit 
or gift to perform his obligation or misuse his position. The foreign investors are in 
search of transparency and suitable environment where the laws are effectual. 
Therefore, the influence of corruption on the competent court in the enforcement of 
IAA is explored in this research.  
 
The Yemenis prefer to settle their disputes by tribal laws instead of the formal laws 
because they do not fully trust the state enforcement as long as the corruption is 
widespread in government institutions.112  Corruption is notable in Yemen such that 
60% of the court judgements are not enforced.113 To understand the influence of 
corruption on the enforcement of IAA, it is important to refer to the case of Desert 
Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen (ICSID case No. ARB/05/17), in this case 
the place seat of the arbitration is Yemeni. The arbitral tribunal rendered IAA in favour 
of the Claimant. However, the court could not take any action against the Respondent. 
Although, the Claimant applied to enforce the arbitral award, and the Respondent has 
not proven any reasonable ground based on sections 53 or 55 of YAA to set aside the 
award. Then, the Claimant was forced to enter into the Settlement Agreement which 
latter the ICSID arbitral tribunal held the Settlement Agreement void and null. This 
means that the corruption may impede the implementation of IAA as the court 
procrastinates the enforcement unreasonably. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
This study seeks to examine the adequacy of YAA, the impacts of tribalism, corruption 
on the enforcement of IAA. Therefore, the study aims to answer the following 
Research Questions: 
1- Are the provisions relating to the enforcement of arbitration laws in Yemen in 
accordance with international arbitration laws? 
2- What is the impediment of tribalism on the competent courts in the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen? 
3- How does corruption impede the competent court in the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Yemen? 
1.4 Research Objectives  
The major objective of this study is to investigate the adequacy of YAA, the impacts 
of tribalism, corruption on the enforcement of IAA. Thus, the study attempts to achieve 
the following objectives: 
1-  To examine the provisions of the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in Yemen. 
2- To analyse international provisions of the enforcement of international 
arbitral awards.  
3- To examine the impediment of tribalism on the competency of the 
competent court in the enforcement of international arbitral awards in 
Yemen. 
4- To examine the impediment of corruption on the competent court in the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen. 
 
20 
5- To make suggestions on the improvement of the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards in Yemen. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The international commercial arbitration is growing and expanding and gaining a lot 
of importance in alleviating the burden on the national courts in fast resolution of trade 
disputes. Globally, majority of countries around the world, including Yemen, are 
serious about updating their own legal systems to overcome the difficulties faced by 
arbitration and to cope with global economic growth through the adoption of the 
arbitration system to resolve commercial disputes by professional institutions or 
arbitrators whom the disputed parties trust for their fairness, impartiality, and integrity. 
Hence, this study contributes by coming out with recommendations to the legislators 
which may be helpful in modernizing or amending the laws of YAA. The study 
examined the provisions relating to the enforcement of arbitration laws such as Yemeni 
Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, Yemeni Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 
40) 2002, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 1958), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
1985, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on 
Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international 
laws, and Bilateral Investment Treaties. These convention, UNCITRAL, and 
international laws would highlight the weakness in YAA. International laws and 
conventions are considered stronger and more suitable to deal with international 
disputes. Particularly, this study investigated the impediments to the enforcement of 
IAA thus study is significant in order to identify the weakness of YAA. It is commonly 
known that the enforcement of IAA is the most important stage in the arbitration 
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system. Thus, if the legislators intend to amend YAA, particularly, the relevant 
provisions of the enforcement of IAA in order to align with international standard of 
arbitration system, this study will be very useful. 
 It could help to legislate stricter laws to combat the tribal interference in the affairs of 
the judiciary and coerce the tribes to comply with court orders. Also, it contributes to 
the knowledge of the extent of the tribalism impediment on enforcement of IAA as the 
researcher has not found previous studies focusing on the tribalism impediment. Thus, 
study provides information to the government about the negative effects of tribalism 
on the economy, especially since the arbitration system is one of the attractive factors 
of FDI. A good arbitration system is considered by foreign investors in order to settle 
future disputes. The government, hence, will plan ways to socialize the tribes. Also, 
the influence of corruption especially since Yemen is characterized as one of the 
highest countries in terms of tribalism and corruption. According to the statistics of 
2015 of Transparency International, Yemen is classified as one of the eighteen 
countries with the highest corruption. It is commonly known that corruption may 
adversely affect any government institutions and the judiciary. The court assumes 
significant part in in controlling and assisting the arbitral tribunal as the last has less 
jurisdiction compared to the court. The independence and the integrity of the judiciary 
are vital to the enforcement of IAA.  Hence, this study focused on the influence of 
corruption in Yemen is justified. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the arbitration field by shedding light on the 
obstacles facing enforcement of IAA as well as provide elaborate explanation to the 
foreign investors on the obstacles that may face their investments in Yemen. For 
example, perhaps the foreign investors are unaware of the social structure of Yemeni 
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society; especially the hindrance of tribalism and corruption that may lead to losing 
their rights in case of disputes arising between parties to contracts, the tribes may 
provide local protection for their own members as well as corruption hence 
constituting obstacles on the enforcement of IAA. 
Moreover, this study investigated the negative impacts on IAA in Yemen, especially 
as Yemen suffers from tribal system and a high rate of corruption. The study also aims 
at determining obstacles that might lead to adversely affect the good performance of 
the judicial supervision towards the enforcement of IAA, and those interested in 
strengthening the national economy through providing an appropriate mechanism that 
could attract the FDI. Therefore, this study offered recommendations to the legislators, 
the judiciary, and the government as a whole to legislate laws that limit the barbaric 
tribes and their misconducts against the court’s ruling as well as suggests strategies 
that also aims to limit the power of the tribes. To curb corruption, the legislators may 
rely on this research to enact stricter laws to combat the rampant corruption in the 
judiciary. Overcoming such impediments could contribute to improving the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
This study provided suggestions to overcome impediments that face the most 
important stage of the arbitration, that is, the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards. This study as a guidance to legislators to adopt it, so the current system will 




1.6 Research Methodology  
This section highlights the methodology adopted for this study. The section identifies 
research design, the research scope, and types of data. In addition, there is a section 
for the data collection methods and data analysis procedure. 
1.6.1 Research Design 
The methodology of this research is doctrinal legal research and socio-legal research 
in nature as both of them could be used for a large study.114 This methodology was 
chosen since this research is more concerned about social phenomenon and does not 
involve experimental research or statistical analysis of the data like quantitative 
research.115 In comparison, between qualitative and quantitative, qualitative is more 
flexible in the matter of focusing on discovering novel or unexpected findings and may 
change research plan in response to discovering occurrences.116 Qualitative can 
produce sufficient data more than quantitative. Therefore, this research is in need of 
deep data to achieve its objectives such as relevant data of adequacy of YAA, the 
tribalism impediment on the enforcement of IAA, and the corruption as well. The deep 
data are required to identify the relationship between causes and effects of the 
impediments on the enforcement of IAA as well as the data collection of interviews 
that have to be critically analysed. According to Alan Bryman, qualitative researches 
require to produce data which they often call rich.117 Thus survey data can provide 
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insufficient data and weak evidence to conduct a social study.118 In addition, the 
researcher adopted a doctrinal approach to conduct this research as it is generally 
relying on a library-based study, which means that the research depended on the 
materials and information that are available at the library, such as books, journals, 
thesis, and articles.119 Furthermore, it is a systematic analysis of legal rules, legal 
principles, and decided cases.120 Furthermore, socio-legal research explains the legal 
procedures, alternative dispute resolutions, and effect of particular phenomenon on the 
institutions.121 
The doctrinal legal research is composed of; the systematic analysis of the relevant 
statutory provisions and legal principles, and the ordering of the legal propositions and 
principles in an orderly and legal approach. 122 Furthermore, this method calls for the 
determination of facts, principles, themes, concepts, provisions and arbitration laws 
specifically those pertinent to the international arbitration awards recognition and 
enforcement.123 This study used doctrinal legal research due to the nature of this 
research which concerns mainly the law on the enforcement of international arbitral 
awards in Yemen. Therefore, the research emphasized on substantive present laws, 
rules, doctrines, concepts and judicial pronouncements. In other words, the researcher 
studied arbitral law cases and related statutory provisions of the enforcement of IAA 
such as the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
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Awards, UNCITRAL, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab 
Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, 
international laws, and Bilateral Investment Treaties. The most of these resources are 
a library-based study. It means, the researcher can find them in the libraries, achieves, 
and other databases. Such resources will help the researcher to identify, explain, 
examine, rules, principles, facts, concepts and analysing provisions that are relevant to 
the enforcement of IAA in order identify the inadequacies in YAA. Thus, doctrinal 
legal research was an appropriate to do that. Therefore, as an advantage, it supported 
to answer the problems through the research’s analysis of the related statutory 
provisions, arbitral law cases, judges, and arbitrators’ opinions. Thus, lawyers, judges, 
and others can have required tools to reach the solutions to the problems.124 Another 
advantage of doctrinal legal research seen that in a systematic way with a reasonable 
reason the researcher could investigate the issue and inconsistency to achieve its 
purpose, as consequences of the improvement and development of the law.125 Along 
these lines, the doctrinal legal research is suitable to be applied in this study to achieve 
the objectives of this study, particularly to the research objectives one and two. Also, 
socio-legal research helped the researcher to analyse the law by studying the sciences 
used to formulate a particular law. E.g. studied tribal and corruption influence on the 
competent court towards the enforcement of IAA.126 The socio-legal research is more 
related to behavioral sciences and social facts and it efforts to introduce the 
relationship between the behavioral sciences and the law through empirical inquiry to 
examine the effectiveness of behavioral sciences on the law and the effectiveness of 
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the law on behavioral sciences.127 The social research is thus as effort to uncover actual 
realities and truths and to explain whether a particular fact, event or phenomenon was 
the cause or effect of certain distinctly identifiable forces or not. Law alone may not 
effective to answer the problem, issue or question.128 Therefore, where the true factors 
for the existence of the problem or issue are identified by empirical inquiry, law, where 
it is applied and enforced with the necessary will, commitment and appropriate 
strategies, can serve as an effective mechanism of regulation, change and reform.129 
The research objectives three and four achieved, hence, by applying the socio-legal 
research by referring to relevant resources of tribalism impediment on the enforcement 
of IAA such as legal factors that may lead to such impediment or to discover other 
non-legal factors behind that. To identify that, hence, it will refer to the recognition of 
tribal alternative dispute resolution mechanism by the official law. The 
interrelationship between the tribes and other essential factors such as politics, army, 
and economy. Also, tribal activities and interference in the judiciary by citing legal 
cases and experts’ opinions. While, examining the corruption impediment on the 
enforcement of IAA by the same method, that is, the socio-legal research. The 
researcher has to examine the cause and effect so it referred to anti-corruption agencies 
to know Yemen rank in Corruption Perception Index and the working factors behind 
it. Then, reflected it on the enforcement of IAA and the judiciary as a whole. In 
addition, it referred to the experts in both fields the judiciary and the anti-corruption 
agencies as well as the academicians and the arbitrator to discover it. This supported 
by the legal cases as well. 
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Hence, the doctrinal legal research was more suitable to investigate the provisions of 
YAA that are related to the enforcement of IAA and international laws while socio-
legal research was suitable to conduct the tribalism and the corruption influence on the 
competent court towards on the enforcement of IAA. Therefore, the research focused 
on the currently applicable law that applies to conduct over arbitral cases like Yemeni 
Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, UNCITRAL, Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh 
Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties. Moreover, it discussed the impediment of the tribalism and corruption in 
Yemen through describing this phenomenon and analysing the related cases and also 
explored the corruption influence in Yemen.  
Besides, the methods of this study are, analytical and critical, the descriptive and 
exploratory research which answered the research questions and objectives. Analytical 
and critical studies found answers to research question one and accomplish research 
objective one and two through examining the provisions that relates to the enforcement 
of arbitration laws such as provisions in YAA, NYC, UNCITRAL, Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 
Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties to understand the inadequacies in YAA. Thus, such method was 
chosen as it can evaluate the relating rules, cases and principles to give the researcher 
a clear picture to reach the conclusion.130 Through it can carefully examined and 
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analysed the inadequacy of the existing law in order to amend it to cope with some 
problems.131 
Descriptive research is related to exploratory research because it is the foundation for 
descriptive research.132 The descriptive can provide analysis of law sets such as the 
facts and related case laws. No influence or emotional facts could be added to cases 
which are already decided. The finding can explain the major factor behind the 
appearance of the issue and interrupt the cause and effect.133 Furthermore, analysis 
used to examine and evaluate decided cases lead to understanding, and coming out 
with a conclusion.134 Thus, descriptive, analytical and critical methods answered 
research question one and research objective one and two as well as research question 
two and research objective three. The descriptive method also achieved the research 
question three and research objective four. A legal research, therefore, involves the use 
of various methods combined together such as descriptive, exploratory, analytical and 
critical. In the context of this study, thus, the descriptive, critical and analytical 
approaches employed in order to investigate and respond to the research question one 
and research objectives one and two, study and respond to research question two and 
research objective three, determine and respond to research question three and research 
objective four. 
The exploratory research aims at gaining general information for the purpose of 
investigating the research topic, operationalizing or explaining the variables or 
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generating hypotheses.135 Also, it added an advantage if the researcher needs a primary 
information in order to introduce the problem and suggest hypotheses.136 The 
researcher interviewed the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), 
the Interview for Public Funds Prosecution (PFP), the Supreme National Authority for 
Combating Corruption (SNACC), Academicians, Arbitrator, Judicial Inspection 
Board (JIB), and the Court of Appeal judges who conduct arbitral cases. These groups 
have been chosen as purposive sampling as they are professionals who deal with such 
issues and cases. Hence, interviews contributed to answering the research questions 
one, two, and three and research objectives one, two, three, and four. Thus, the 
researcher employed exploratory approach in order to explore and respond to the 
research questions one, two, and three as well as research objectives number, one, 
three, and four. This due to the fact that in an exploratory approach the researcher 
worked on a relatively unstudied topic or area of knowledge with the purpose of 
finding out unknown or partly known facts.137 In the context of this study, therefore, 
the research explored the inadequate provisions that are relevant to the enforcement of 
IAA (domestic and international), as well as the working factors the tribalism and 
corruption impediment on the enforcement of IAA. 
1.6.2 Research Scope 
The scope of this study was bound in examining the provisions relating to the 
enforcement of arbitration laws such provisions as Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 
1992, Yemeni Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002, Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 
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UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial 
Arbitration, Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties to identify the inadequacies in YAA. Also, to examine 
the tribalism influence and corruption impediment that affects the competency of the 
court in enforcement of IAA in Yemen. 
This objective was achieved through the investigations involving the perceptions of 
the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), the Interview for Public 
Funds Prosecution (PFP), the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption 
(SNACC), Academicians, Arbitrator, Judicial Inspection Board (JIB), and the Court 
of Appeal judges who conduct arbitral cases. These groups were chosen as a purposive 
sampling of professionals dealing with such issues and cases. The methods used in this 
study extended to analytical and critical, descriptive, and the exploratory research and 
the research questions and objectives were answered and attained. The researcher 
chose big commercial cities to collect the data through interviews which include 
Sana’a, Aden, and Hadhramout as these are the biggest cities in Yemen where there 
are many investment projects.  
1.6.3 Types of Data  
Throughout this research, the researcher collected two types of data; primary sources 
and secondary sources as follows: 
Primary sources: these sources included Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Convention on the 
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Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 
Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, and arbitral case laws. Furthermore, the researcher collected primary data 
that could be collected through interview with each of the Central Organization for 
Control and Auditing (COCA), the Interview for Public Funds Prosecution (PFP), the 
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), Academicians, 
Arbitrator, Judicial Inspection Board (JIB), and the Court of Appeal judges who 
conduct arbitral cases.  
Secondary sources: the secondary sources included textbook, journal articles, Master 
and Ph.D. thesis, online information, deduction of secondary information from 
primary sources, commentaries on statutes, and legal dictionaries. 
1.6.4 Data Collection Methods 
The researcher relied on several methods to collect related data to answer the research 
questions and achieve the research objectives as follows: 
a) As part of the research which is based on library research, the researcher collected 
data from textbooks, journals, related case laws, Yemeni statutes, international 
provisions. Moreover, the researcher visited several places to collect data such as 
Sultanah Bahiyah Library (UUM), International Islamic University Malaysia 
(IIUM), Aden University, Sana’a University, and Yemeni National Information 
Center. 
b) The second phase of this research collected data through face to face semi-
structured interview. The researcher conducted purposive sampling by choosing 
sixteen expert persons which met interviewees face to face at their offices and some 
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in their houses. The interviewer did not face any difficulties in getting the 
respondents’ consent to be interviewed. Member of Supreme Judicial Council 
facilitated communications and meetings with most interviewees by phone call, 
reassured them that the interviewer is well-known and the data are only for study 
purpose. Especially, the interviewees from COCA, PFP, SNACC, Arbitrator, JIB, 
and the Court of Appeal judges. By this mediator, all interviewees welcomed the 
interviews face to face, except only PFP, particularly Aden branch who refused to 
meet face to face. But answered in writing. Such interviewees as the Central 
Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), the Interview for Public Funds 
Prosecution (PFP), the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption 
(SNACC), Academicians, Arbitrator, Judicial Inspection Board (JIB), and the 
Court of Appeal judges who conduct arbitral cases. Reasons of chosen one expert 
of each agency among each governorate that are COCA, PFP, and NACC whom 
were chosen to answer the questions that are relevant to anti-corruption agencies, 
especially, the public funds, whereas, these three anti-corruption agencies are 
authorized by the law to fight the corruption as well as they are interrelated in the 
matter of cooperation in the investigative operations. While, JIB was chosen to 
answer the questions that are relevant to the corruption in the judiciary. JIB is an 
authority which investigates the judicial system and ensure the implementation of 
judicial operations. Moreover, one of the Court of Appeal judges from each 
governorate was chosen to answer the questions that are relevant to arbitration 
cases as they are experts in arbitration matters because the Court of Appeal has the 
jurisdiction regarding set aside, refusal and the enforcement of IAA as well as to 
answer the questions that are relevant to judiciary. In addition, the two 
academicians and one arbitrator were chosen to answer the questions that are 
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relevant to arbitration system in Yemen. They are non-partisan and focus on the 
economy of Yemen, expert in arbitration as their knowledge is updating by 
researching in the area.   Semi-structured interview was chosen so as it combines 
both unstructured interview and structured interview,138 and it is relevant to 
qualitative design.139 A semi-structured interview is suitable for this study as it is 
more flexible, and the researcher can prepare predetermined questions. The 
wording of question could be altered according to the suitability of the 
interviewees’ position140 as we have various interviewees to respond to the 
questions. The researcher selected this kind of interview as it is suitable to collect 
structured information based on interviewees’ beliefs. In addition, it has the 
advantage of encouraging the interviewees to provide accurate information and 
talk fairly, and this feature is free from complications that could be found in the 
structured interview.141 Therefore, the researcher found semi-structured interview 
is appropriate in this study because the interviewees are not from one field or 
department. They are from various departments such as the Central Organization 
for Control and Auditing (COCA), the Interview for Public Funds Prosecution 
(PFP), the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), 
Academicians, Arbitrator, Judicial Inspection Board (JIB), and the Court of Appeal 
judges.  Further, question wording can be changed and explanations given; 
particularly questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee can 
be omitted, or additional ones included.142 In addition, the interview method was 
similar to previous studies focusing on dispute resolution and justice provision in 
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Yemen’s transition by Erica and Nawada143 as well as another study conducted on 
the fragmentation of justice in Yemen from 1990 to 2013 by Veen.144 
1.6.5 Analysis of Data 
As far as this study is concerned, the researcher employed an analytical method to 
analyse the data. Such methods were chosen as they are appropriate.145 Therefore, out 
of analysing these facts the legal issues could be formulated to come up with solutions 
of the investigating problems.146 The doctrinal legal research is an appropriate to 
interview purposive samplings such as Judges, lawyers, prosecutors, arbitrators, and 
the like.147 In purposive sampling the researcher intentionally select the specific 
individuals to identify the central phenomenon148 as the chosen interviewees are expert 
in the research study. Often, the researcher faces difficulties to consider the whole 
universe or to investigate all population. Hence, he/she takes sample from the entire 
population. Such sample is referred as purposive sampling. It is an important device 
in the domain of social science analyses. This sample is concerned with an examination 
of this method with the aim of investigating the plausibility of its utilize in ventures 
concerning law, legal and undiscovered field of legal research.149 Sampling studies are 
getting to be increasingly prevalent in all types of mass researches, but they are 
particularly in case of social studies. When a social researcher is incapable of 
observing all phenomena, he/she takes portion of that population. The vastness of 
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population and the difficulties of ascertaining the universe make sampling the best 
alternative in case of social studies. But while selecting a purposive sampling, an 
appropriate care is required by selecting the sample out of the population through 
scientifically proven methods, minimizing the chances of bias/errors and ultimately 
acquiring a representative sample.150 Thus, they assisted the researcher to collect 
information that is helpful to carry out the analysis for the collection of such data that 
would enable the researcher to explain the relevant judicial concepts, analyses the 
related statutory provisions such YAA, NYC, UNCITRAL, Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 
Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties to understand the inadequacies in YAA, formulated facts from 
related cases that led to find out answers to the research questions and accomplish 
research objectives. The researcher has to refer to a general approach to legal research, 
which has the capacity to handle a lot of problems, such general approach engages 
several steps to come up with its function. Firstly, to identify the facts. Secondly, to 
analyse the facts. Thirdly, to formulate the facts, and finally, to do the actual research 
and updating.151  
 
In this context, the researcher analysed the data and data collected by applying 
analytical approach because it contributes to evaluation and examination of the 
provided information to extract final conclusion152 and using content analysis as the 
participants are of limited numbers of experts. Therefore, the analytical approach and 
content analysis responded to research question one and research objectives one and 
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two, research question two and research objective three, and research question three 
and research objective four. The interview data were used to achieve three research 
objectives, that are, research objective one, three, and four. Data from the Central 
Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), Public Funds Prosecution (PFP), and 
the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) were analysed 
to achieve research objectives three and four as the data are relevant to tribalism 
impediment and corruption. Moreover, data from academicians were analysed to 
achieve research objectives one, three, and four as the data are relevant to the 
provisions of YAA, tribalism impediment, and corruption. These three anti-corruption 
agencies (COCA, PFP and SNACC) are authorized to fight corruption, especially, the 
public funds. As corruption affects all the government institutions including the 
judiciary, the researcher interviewed these agencies to understand the tribalism 
impediments on their operations and corruption as well. The analysed data of these 
agencies strengthen the study to know the factors behind the tribalism impediments 
and widespread of corruption in Yemen. Furthermore, data from arbitrators were 
analysed to achieve research objectives one, three, and four as the data are relevant to 
the provisions of YAA, tribalism impediment, and corruption. The arbitrators are 
expert in the matter of weaknesses in YAA and the impediments that face the 
enforcement of IAA such as inadequacy of YAA, tribalism impediment, and 
corruption. In addition, data from Judicial Inspection Board (JIB) were analysed to 
achieve research objective four as the data are relevant to the impediment of 
corruption. JIB is the authority that has jurisdiction to investigate the judge’s 
performance and judicial operation. The analysed data enriched the study to 
understand the factors behind corruption in the judiciary which adversely affect the 
enforcement of IAA.  Data from the Court of Appeal judges were analysed to achieve 
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research objectives one, three, and four as the data are relevant to the provisions of 
YAA, tribalism impediment, and corruption. As analysed data from the Court of 
Appeal judges contributed to achieve the research objectives one, three, and four as 
they are well-known of the impediments of the judicial operations as well as experts 
in the enforcement of IAA because if the debtor party refused to enforce the arbitral 
award voluntarily, then, if the place of enforcement of the arbitral award in Yemen he/she 
will refer to the Court of Appeal to set aside it or the creditor party will refer to the 
same court to enforce it. 
1.7 Limitation of the Study 
The researcher faced some difficulties in achieving the objectives of this study. One 
of the major limitations that the researcher faced is the unavailability of the books 
related to tribalism and corruption in Yemen at the Malaysian universities, specifically, 
at the targeted universities: Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), International Islamic 
University Malaysia (IIUM). Therefore, the researcher searched of these books at the 
local universities such as Aden University, Sana’a University, and the Yemeni 
National Information Center. Furthermore, published information related to IAA in 
Yemen are scarce, so the researcher spent much time to get accurate information 
through an interview. Hence, the researcher travelled to Yemen to collect primary data 
through interviews as well as secondary data from public universities and Yemeni 
information center. 
The legal cases can make the research stronger. However, Yemen applies civil law in 
which judges and arbitrators depend on the law to make judgement or the arbitral 
award. While in Commonwealth countries that apply common law, which the judge 
and arbitrator depend on the law and precedent case to render the judgement or the 
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arbitral award. Hence, in Yemen there is no legal website such as the Malaysian legal 
journal or LexisNexis to support the arguments by precedent cases. However, the 
objectives of this study can be achieved even view case are cited. According to 
Khushal Vibhute, the system of analysis of facts can be usually employed in types of 
analytic, applied, case oriented and similar legal researches.153 Even court case is not 
involved in the legal research, as legal research is systematic investigation of problems 
or information and attempting to come up with a solutions to overcome problems, the 
methods of analysing facts are similarly applicable to various kinds of legal researches, 
though the degree may vary from one to another.154  
1.8 Definition of Operational Terminologies 
Judicial Supervision: judicial supervision is a major importance to make the arbitration 
mechanism succeed.155 Thus, UNCITRAL allowed the court intervention to assist the 
tribunal to achieve the arbitration proceedings as well as the arbitral awards in the 
matter of taking evidence or the enforcement of the final award, such intervention 
cannot be determined as contravention of the arbitration agreement.156 It is necessary 
to resort to the judicial body to take interim measures of protection to assist the 
tribunal, especially, some interim measures of protection  are out of tribunal’s 
jurisdictions, as because the tribunal has no power as the same as the judiciary.157 The 
national court is the core to make the international arbitration sufficient, without 
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interference support of national court the international arbitration cannot succeed.158 
The national courts are strong support for the arbitral tribunal as they do two main 
tasks: assistance and control.159 In the matter of assistance, the national courts do 
multiple functions such as grant seeking interim measures of protection, appointment 
of arbitrators, calling for expert or witnesses, and the like proceedings that may out of 
the arbitration tribunal capacity, while in the matter of controlling the national courts 
do refuse the application of any of the disputed parties if the agreement contained 
arbitral condition and this upon the request of the other party, appointment of the 
arbitrators and revocation or replacement as well.160 Moreover, the national courts are 
only having jurisdiction to recognize and enforce the arbitral award.161  The court after 
recognition can decide whether the IAA is valid or void in order to enforce it or reject 
it.162 
The enforcement is applied as sword.163 Thus, if there is no objection to the recognition 
in the state where the award is seeking to enforce, the creditor party has the right to 
require the national court to take enforceable actions against the debtor party’s assets; 
such forcible actions come only after the debtor party rejects to implement the arbitral 
award voluntarily.164 The type of sanctions can be taken against the debtor party are 
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depended on the court’s discretion, often like the seizure of the debtor party’s assets, 
imprisonment, and the like.165 
Tribalism: is a group of people, mostly belong to one lineage due to the very top or the 
name of a tribal alliance that considered being a grandfather of the tribe and consists 
of several clans.166 Often members of the tribe live in a joint territory upheld as their 
home, and they speak a distinctive tone, and they have a homogeneous culture or a 
common solidarity (i.e. Neurological) against external elements at least.167 
Corruption: is misusing one’s position to gain personal interest, whatever gaining such 
personal interest through breaking the law or misuse of granted powers.168 Similarly, 
official persons perform an action to serve their own personal interest. Corruption 
differs from one country to another. Rampant corruption exists in countries which have 
weak institutions.169 Once corruption is widespread in the institutions, it means that 
anti-corruption laws are inadequate.170 
Arbitration: is the parties to the contract choose by free consent one person or more to 
settle their dispute which has arisen or which may arise outside the court171. Similarly, 
it is a traditional alternative to litigation process where a third party is appointed as 
arbitrator by a mutual consent of both parties to the contract; the arbitrator controls the 
outcome of the process.172 The arbitration process is mostly regulated by a legal 
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authority.173 The final decision is imposed on the contending parties which is called an 
award, based on the merits of the case, and such award usually is binding on both 
parties and not appealable except under certain circumstances.174 Fiadjoe defines 
arbitration as “a consensual system of judicature directed to the resolution of 
commercial disputes in private”.175 
Arbitration Agreement: is an agreement by the free consent of the parties to the 
contract to refer to arbitration for part or all the dispute that arose or may arise in the 
future, such dispute has to be within the legal relationship, whatever is contractual or 
non-contractual.176 It can be formed by the arbitration clause within the contract or in 
a separate agreement.177 
Arbitral Award: is an award which is totally different from the domestic awards, so 
the state where the recognition and enforcement is sought cannot consider it as 
domestic.178 It is only the same as national the court’s judgement from the perspective 
of effectiveness.179 In other words, the arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction to form the 
award at the same as the national court, such jurisdiction has the authority to order any 
of the disputed party to pay money as damages, declare the receding that has to be 
followed, order any party to do or abstain from doing something, order specific 
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performance, order endorsement, setting aside, cancellation of some documents, and 
so on.180 
The Foreign Arbitral Award: it is the award that is made in the territory other than the 
state where the recognition and enforcement of the same award is sought.181 The NYC 
provides that the state where the recognition and enforcement are sought cannot 
consider the award as domestic, it only could be considered as a domestic award by 
the enforcing state if the award was regulated by the municipal law.182 The arbitral 
award is considered as a foreign award by the state where the award is made based on 
the nationality of the disputed parties.183 However, as there is no clear definition of the 
foreign award provided by the NYC, it can be noticed that there are different 
definitions from one legal system to another.184 For instance, the European civil law 
considers the arbitral award as a foreign award if the disputed parties choose the 
governing arbitration law of another country.185 Article V indicates that the award is a 
foreign arbitral award when another state issues the guideline for the award to enter 
the local award is called non-domestic award. Therefore, it could introduce the award 
as non-domestic award or a local one that depends on the applicable arbitration law.186  
Recognition: the arbitral award shall be recognized as binding by the competent court 
once the creditor party applied in writing for the enforcement.187 It is the jurisdiction 
of the national court to recognize the award made by the arbitral tribunal, so the 
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national court will reject any issue brought by any of the parties which has been already 
decided by the arbitral tribunal.188 
Enforcement: the award is binding so the competent court has to enforce, unless the 
award comes under the grounds which powered the national court to refuse,189 these 
grounds discussed in chapter three. An arbitral award is effective at the same as the 
court judgement.190 The award is enforceable with the jurisdiction, the enforcement is 
depend on the signatory states to the convention as the judiciary body has the 
enforcement jurisdiction through judicial process.191 In other words, a national court 
grants order performance against the debtor party to enforce an award recognized by 
the arbitrator.192 
The enforcement of IAA is insisted by NYC and legal systems of each signatory 
state.193 The application of arbitration system depends on the parties’ autonomy to 
settle their dispute by arbitration, which is not the same as other mechanisms like 
mediation, conciliation and so on.194 Mediation: is a process, whereas a neutral third 
party (mediator) leads the negotiation between the disputed parties to the contract to 
assist them in reaching a peaceful settlement.195 The uniqueness of this settlement is 
that it is quicker, cheaper, and confidential.196 The disputed parties do not insist on 
only wining/losing the case, but to continue their future projects, so through this 
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settlement, often concession of legal rights occur in order to continue the 
relationship.197 However, the mediator has no jurisdiction to come out with his/her 
own decision to conclude the settlement without the free consent of the disputed 
parties.198 In other words, the mediator’s decision is not binding, so if the parties 
inform the mediator there is no chance to settle the issue; the mediator has to stop 
mediation procedures.199 
Besides, it is extremely important to refer to arbitration and conciliation through 
discussing conciliation in order to understand the differences. Conciliation is amicable 
composition, it uses to stop or prevent disputes between disputing parties.200 
Conciliation achieves by a contract conducted offer and acceptance.201 Both principles 
arbitration and conciliation can contribute to settle the disputes between the disputing 
parties in a peaceful manner.202 It can mean that the both principles have the same aim 
which is resolving disputes. However, the distinguishing between those principles is 
that, in the matter of conciliation the award or a final judgement is not bound on both 
parties of the dispute unless both the parties agreed to the award, and approved by the 
court, while arbitration is bound upon the disputing parties without the parties’ consent 
or court approval.203 
The arbitration agreement has to be in a written form and should mention clearly the 
disputed parties as well as the existing disputes or perhaps the disputes that may arise 
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in the future.204 So, the national courts will refuse to hear the dispute if there is prior 
arbitration agreement and immediately will refer it to the arbitration jurisdiction when 
the second party to the dispute opposes the court’s interference.205 To identify whether 
there is arbitration agreement or not, the NYC and UNCITRAL did not provide any 
specific requirement to constitute arbitration agreement. Thus, the national courts and 
arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to identify the agreement type.206 Hence, article II 
of NYC and article 8 of UNCITRAL only applies if there is an agreement made by the 
parties that they will settle their disputes by arbitration mechanism.  
Throughout the definitions of the recognition and enforcement it could be noticed that 
they are inextricably linked to each other, the recognition of the award is the first 
proceeding step that has to be started in the national court by the party seeking for the 
enforcement while the enforcement is the second step to be taken.207 However, it can 
be noted that the difference between the recognition and enforcement is that the 
national court can recognize the IAA without enforcement, but once there is an 
enforcement by the competent court, it means that it is already recognized.208 Even 
they are inextricably linked to each other.209 The purpose of this study is to focus more 
on the enforcement of IAA. Moreover, the study focused on obstacles that may 
challenge the enforcement of IAA and the capability of the competent court to force 
the debtor party to implement the award that is recognized by the arbitrator or by the 
competent court.  The enforcement of international arbitral award: the arbitral award 
                                                     
204 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral, article II (1) & UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, article 7 (1). 
205 Born, International Arbitration, 3. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Tecle Hagos Bahta, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Civil and 
Commercial Matters in Ethiopia,” Mizan Law Review Vol. 5 no.1, (2011): 107, accessed January 3, 
2016, https://www.ajol.info/index.php/mlr/article/view/68771/56836. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid.  
 
46 
is binding, so the national courts have no jurisdiction to ignore the enforcement of the 
arbitral award without justification.210 Thus, the creditor party can apply in the official 
language of the state where the recognition and enforcement is sought through the 
competent court to enforce the arbitral award.211 However, the national court has a 
jurisdiction to refuse the enforcement of arbitral award under specific grounds, such 
exceptional grounds such as the debtor party can prove that the party to the arbitration 
agreement referred to in article 7 was under the age of maturity, was an incompetent 
person, or aggrieved party was not given a sufficient notice in the matter of 
appointment of the arbitrator as well as a reasonable notice of the arbitral proceedings 
or was unable to present his/her case. The court could determine the refusal to enforce 
the arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal fails to comply with the terms agreed by the 
disputed parties in the arbitration agreement.212 Also, it is a reasonable ground to refuse 
the enforcement of the tribunal award if the court found that the subject matter of the 
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the state where the 
enforcement is sought or the award conflicted with the public policy.213  
The enforcement of IAA is the most important of arbitration mechanism so there are 
various international conventions and rules which guide the enforcement of IAA such 
as NYC which is the main convention of arbitration system;214 UNCITRAL which are 
rules that are determined as a guideline for national arbitration laws215 and to 
harmonize and modernize international commercial arbitration as well as to help the 
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implementing of NYC;216 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes which 
provide International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to monitor 
and observe disputes that arise between the contracting state and the national of 
another contracting state; and other international laws and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties carry the same purpose.217 At the level of the Arab Region, Yemen is member 
of various conventions that assist in the enforcement of a foreign award among the 
signatory states such as Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh 
Convention for Judicial Cooperation. All the above mentioned international and 
regional conventions, rules, treaties and laws are discussed deeply in chapter three.   
1.9 Literature Review on the Enforcement of IAA 
The arbitration system faces difficulties in enforcing IAA on time because of various 
obstacles.218 This means the procrastination of the enforcement of IAA is an 
impediment. To improve the arbitration system, here is need to investigate such 
impediments and come out with solutions. The impediments of the arbitration system 
are different from one system to another. The researcher, thus, has attempted to link 
these impediments which could be relevant to the arbitration system in Yemen such as 
inadequacy of YAA, tribalism impediment, and corruption in order to improve the 
Yemeni arbitration system. There are several literatures which are mostly related to 
obstacles facing the enforcement of international arbitral awards. There are several 
literatures conducted in different countries around the world as follows: 
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1.9.1 The Local and International Provisions Relating to the Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards  
At the outset, in El-Ahdab’s book that is titled “Arbitration with the Arab 
Countries”.219  The authors stated that there is lack of specials rules for international 
arbitration. This means that YAA is not align with international arbitration standard. 
There are important sections that have to be amended, otherwise, may set aside the 
arbitral award. Such section like the arbitration agreement which YAA has not 
clarified validity of the agreement, especially, the submission of the arbitration clause 
by modern means of communication under section 19. This section does not protect 
the party autonomy to choose to settle their dispute by arbitration mechanism. The 
court may reject to refer the disputed parties to the arbitral tribunal if the arbitration 
clause is ineffective, expired, the dispute is not within the arbitration agreement, or the 
parties proceed before the court without objection of any of the parties. On the other 
hand, section 28 of YAA provides that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to settle 
questions pertaining its jurisdiction in the matter of ineffective of the arbitration 
agreement, expired of the arbitration clause, and the dispute is not within the 
arbitration agreement. However, such jurisdiction may lead to set aside the arbitral 
award if any of the disputed parties challenged that before the court. YAA, therefore, 
has to be amended as avoid jurisdiction conflict between the arbitral tribunal and the 
court. Also, there is conflict between sections 17 and 22 in the matter of the 
appointment of the arbitrators. The contradiction is obvious where section 17 provides 
that the arbitrator/arbitrators must be appointed in the arbitration agreement while in 
section 22 provides that the parties are free to choose the method of appointing the 
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arbitrator/arbitrators. The last section applies the parties’ autonomy while the first one 
limited their freedom. The procedures are important to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal based on the principle of the parties’ autonomy. The arbitral award perhaps 
set aside if it was rendered by different procedures, other than, agreed terms by the 
parties.  
 
In a paper written by Jens Kambeck “Arbitration in Yemen”220, the author stated that 
it is the first country that legislated a local arbitration law in 1981 and that before the 
unification of the Republic of Yemen, the local arbitration law was based on 
UNCITRAL. It has been replaced by a new law in 1992 after the unification of the 
Republic of Yemen which is currently Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992. The 
author emphasizes that Yemen economy is growing due to global trade, domestic 
arbitration law has brought foreign investors, especially; investors were suffering from 
slow court proceedings, and sometimes non-implementation of the court's judgements. 
Currently, the arbitration center has opened in Sana’a.  
The author clarifies the convenience of arbitration that investors are looking for in the 
host country of investment. However, the author did not discuss the international 
arbitration in Yemen which is governed by YAA, as it applies to domestic arbitration 
and international as well, even ignored arbitration difficulties faced by the local 
arbitration. On the other hand, this study addressed the important point that the courts’ 
judgements face difficulties to be enforced, but did not mention the factors behind the 
non-enforcement. It can mean that the competent courts in Yemen may face the same 
difficulties to enforce IAA. 
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In another similar literature focusing on arbitration in Yemen written by Isam 
Muhammad Ghanem “the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgements 
in the Yemen Arab Republic”,221  the author confirms that the Yemeni local arbitration 
does not provide any provision for enforcement of foreign awards, only when there is 
an award embodied with foreign judgement could be sought in Yemeni competent 
court, but nowadays YAA can be applied over both local arbitral disputes and 
international as well. The national court enforces the foreign judgements if the creditor 
party fulfills several requirements. These requirements as stated in the case Abdul Baqi 
Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim,222 it was held that the Yemeni law does not 
provide bilateral international dispute, so to enforce foreign judgement according to 
the principle of reciprocity, it has to fulfill the following requirements: 
1. The judgement has issued by the competent court. 
2. The judgement has to be issued according to evidence. 
3. The judgement has to be free from any fraud. 
4. The judgement has not be contrary to the international law and justice. 
5. The judgement has to be finalized. 
6. The judgement must not be contrary to public policy. 
This study focused on the requirements that the award has to fulfill in order for the 
creditor party to claim the enforcement of the national court. Such article has 
conducted in 1988, before the unity of Yemen. This means Yemen is suffering from 
scarce knowledge of arbitration, as can be seen from the fact that YAA was amended 
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in 1997, twenty years old. The researcher referred to the modern international 
arbitration laws which may assist to modernize YAA and arbitration system as a whole 
in Yemen to cope with growing international trade. 
Another good literature in the context of this study is “obstacles to International 
Commercial Arbitration in African Countries” written by Samson L. Sempasa.223  The 
study concludes that the history of legal development in Africa through the African 
governments and lawyers how to deal with international commercial arbitration, 
research for universal modern rules, and challenges beset IAA. The author stated that 
African countries have a chance to update and modernize their laws to keep pace with 
the global trade; trade has become a major factor for the advancement and progress. 
So, it could be seen that the lack of modern and updated law in African countries and 
different law from country to another is as a result of colonialism as could notice the 
applicable arbitration laws of those countries as the same as old western-style.  
Currently, applicable arbitration laws in Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, and Mauritius are based on the English Arbitration Acts 1854 or 1889, 
Thus, African countries face challenges of operating with current international 
arbitration laws. Moreover, information about arbitral processes is insufficient. 
African scholars’ research formulations are very old, so it adds nothing to modernize 
African laws to deal with universal arbitration laws. Non-conducting modernized 
formulations that are mostly found in UNCITRAL and new western studies related to 
arbitration rules and international institutions. Consequently, it adversely impacted the 
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African lawyers’ understanding and ability to cope with arbitral processes. 
Furthermore, the lack of development in arbitration centers in Africa, so Africans 
resort to western arbitration centers. 
A result of the old legal system in African countries, the lawyers are facing difficulties 
to cope with arbitral cases over there, especially since the African arbitration rules do 
not apply in Africa in the contemporary international arbitration law. This study in 
Africa focused on the difficulties facing international arbitral award, it has not referred 
to the difficulties facing the enforcement of international commercial arbitration. 
It can be noticed that there are obstacles facing international commercial arbitration in 
African countries. The main obstacle is the old laws because of the lack of scholarly 
sources to assist the legislators in updating and amending the old laws that are no more 
in line with universal arbitration laws. This obstacle perhaps faces the development 
and modernization of YAA as well as the lack of scholarly sources as the last 
amendment of YAA was in 1997 which is twenty old year ago, so the laws that are 
relevant to the enforcement of an arbitral award may be not be in line with international 
arbitral issues. Thus, this research found out the weakness in YAA, especially, the laws 
which are related to the recognition and enforcement of IAA and competency of the 
YAA to ensure the Act is sufficient to deal with the enforcement of foreign awards. 
Another reason rises doubt about the lack of arbitration knowledge in Yemen is non-
ratifying NYC till now, the researcher has not found any provided reasonable reasons 
about Yemen unwillingness to ratify the convention. Especially, the convention 
allowed the national court to reject to recognize and enforce the award based on 
reciprocity reservation and commerciality in article I (3) as well as article V (2) (b) if 
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the award is contradicted with the public policy of the country where the recognition 
and enforcement is sought. 
Moreover, a study entitled “A way to increase K-SURE’s export insurance recoveries 
through arbitration by subrogation” written Keon-Hyung Ahn and Pil-Joon Kim,224  
looks for any conceivable arrangement to dispense with lawful deterrents and enhance 
trade. At that point, are the answers for dispose of lawful deterrents and encourage 
subrogation arbitration with regards to the Export Insurance Act? To expand Korea 
Trade Insurance Corporation (K-sure)’s recoveries, the researchers achieved the 
conclusion that it is important to take out lawful deterrents and build up more dynamic 
participation between K-SURE and The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board 
(KCAB) to give double assurance devices – export insurance and arbitration. These 
are adequate confirmation in various lawful framework asserted that frail and old laws 
are noteworthy impediment to arbitration system. The current old laws like YAA 
perhaps impede the enforcement of IAA. As the amendment of the current YAA is 
perhaps important to deal with international arbitral disputes since the last amendment 
was performed 20 old years ago. 
  
Furthermore, a study entitled “Party autonomy and justice in international commercial 
arbitration” written by Moses Oruaze Dickson,225 this study focused on the party 
autonomy. The application of arbitration system depends on the parties’ autonomy to 
settle their dispute by arbitration. As it is commonly known that the parties are free to 
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agree on the terms for their settlement so there is a challenge of the arbitration 
agreement as the choice of law is a major term of the arbitration agreement. Party 
autonomy such as choosing the applicable law, language, and place to conduct the 
arbitration is acceptable standard in arbitration system. However, the principle of 
parties’ autonomy may not applicable if the agreed terms will breach the natural justice 
and public policy. On the other hand, it is proposed that limitations to party autonomy 
should be chipped away as much as possible. However, the principle of party 
autonomy is limited where it impedes on issues relating to justice or public policy. 
This study clarifies that the national arbitration laws have to be modernized to deal 
with international disputes. They have to reach international standard. Like the 
principle of party autonomy, if the arbitral tribunal rendered IAA based on the agreed 
terms by the disputed parties, then, such terms will impede the enforcement of the IAA 
if it breaches the justice or the public policy of both the place seat of the arbitration 
or/and the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. Thus, it has to investigate the 
provisions of YAA that relevant to the enforcement to prevent the impediments that 
may face the most important stage in arbitration procedures and processes, that is, the 
enforcement of IAA. 
1.9.2 The Tribalism Influence on the Competent Court towards the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
Indeed, the researcher have not found direct literature about the tribalism influence on 
the competent court towards the enforcement of IAA. However, there are write up 
about local protectionism which indirect related to the tribal protection for their own 
members. It could notice a study entitled “Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
concerning commercial disputes in Bangladesh” written by Nour Mohammad & 
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Rakiba Nabi.226 This study addresses the litigation of long procedures and expensive 
charge fees in national courts, arguing that they are more than those for conducting 
litigation in foreign courts. The parties to the case are often upset with the lengthy 
proceedings, and every party considers the court’s judgement as to win or lost and this 
leads to breaking trade relations between the parties. The design, methodology, and 
approach of this study is based on theoretical sources and empirical data collection, 
and examination of legal provisions under Arbitration Act 2001 plus conducting 
arbitral case that is more related to the enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
The authors stated that the arbitration is playing a crucial role to revive trade in 
Bangladesh, so Bangladesh legislated Arbitration Act 2001 is based on UNCITRAL. 
However, the study concluded that there are several obstacles facing the enforcement 
of IAA in Bangladesh as follows: 
1. The adverse effect of biasness and corruption on the national courts. 
2. The inefficiency of the national courts to deal with alternative dispute 
resolutions. 
3. Shortage of qualified staff that understand international arbitration rules. They 
lack of knowledge and expertise of international law, international commerce, 
and practices, so arbitrators and District Court Judges face difficulties in 
handling arbitration matters. 
4. The spread of corruption. 
5. Local protectionism, which the nationality can impact on the outcome of the 
arbitration. However, sometime local protectionism is biased in favour of the 
foreign party, it is a policy to encourage FDI. 
                                                     
226 Nour Mohammad & Rakiba Nabi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Concerning 
Commercial Disputes in Bangladesh.” Humanomics, Vol. 24 Iss 4 (2008): 274 – 284, accessed January 
14, 2016, http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/08288660810917150. 
 
56 
6. Varying numbers of international arbitration conventions such as NYC, 
UNCITRAL, and UNCITRAL Rules, which there is no single agreement that 
gather all conventions. 
7. The arbitration applies judicial techniques to deal with arbitration issues. 
It could be noticed that the situation in Bangladesh which is related to the challenges 
beset the enforcement of IAA may be similar to Yemen in some points. The Yemen 
court is perhaps not willing to enforce the award in case one of the parties is a tribal 
member, the military pressure on the competent court is more likely as most of the 
military members are tribal members. According to Veen, the military plays an 
important role in determining the path of the judiciary; it is one of the main factors that 
negatively affect the independence of the judiciary.227 The military not only controls 
half to two-third of the seats of the Supreme Judicial Council but also gives 
recommendation on the judges’ appointments and transfer.228 Moreover, the high 
military officers do function as judges; they have their own prisons and do imprison 
their opponents without trial.229 Hence, through the power of tribal military members 
may adversely affect the independence of the court, so the competent court may 
become reluctant to take coercive actions against the tribal debtor party who refuse to 
implement the IAA. Therefore, local protectionism in Yemen may arise as a result of 
the tribal patronage and military. 
Besides, the tribes consider themselves as sovereign within the state sovereignty which 
they do not allow the state to enter their territories without prior permission, so many 
soldiers killed because of entering the tribal territories without giving a reasonable 
                                                     





justification as well as prohibiting the officials to perform their duties and impeding 
the state from extracting the natural sources.  Therefore, the tribal resistance against 
the state operations as a whole, means that the competent court orders would not be 
implemented. For example, if the competent court orders the police to bring the tribal 
debtor party before the court or seize his/her properties, it is more likely that the police 
would hesitate to follow the court orders as far as the resistance of the tribe is expected. 
Thus, the enforcement of IAA in Yemen may face challenges because of the tribal 
obstacles. 
It is important to refer to African countries to understand the tribalism influence on the 
judiciary. In Africa, the tribes are powerful and even have their own laws to manage 
the tribal affairs.230 In Kenya, some tribes have dominant position so they are involved 
in political influence.231 The tribes in Africa are unwilling to socialize even there is 
industrial revolution.232 They believe that tradition values will help to strengthen their 
dominance on the common opportunities and public interest.233 The government knew 
tribes’ power and illegal activities.234 For instance, once the Somalian government has 
a plan to be achieved, it has to prepare the war against evils.235 Such kinship is a 
negative factor in the society.236 The concept of the tribe that the emergence of the 
modern state means a reduction of their control and the elimination of their interests. 
This is why when the state creates development projects in rural areas, they are 
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opposed by the tribes that live there and ask them for money to use the land. If the state 
refused the conditions of the tribes, the tribes feel themselves a bit of the ability to 
confront the government, through the insurgency and the fight against the government, 
and tribal members had wide confrontations with the government. The tribes consider 
themselves as sovereign within the state sovereignty which they do not allow the state 
to enter their territories without prior permission, many soldiers killed because of 
entering the tribal territories without giving a reasonable justification as well as 
prohibiting the officials to perform their duties and impeding the state from extracting 
the natural sources. According to Al-Zwaini, the Sheikhs fight the government soldiers 
with their own bodyguards to prevent the implementation of some government orders 
that conflict with tribal interest.237 This means wherever the tribes are, they only look 
after their own interest.  The judiciary as well as the executive authority are not 
effective in the tribal areas.238 In case of disputes among the tribal men, it will be 
settled by the customary law.239 Hence, the position in Africa is the same as in Yemen 
which the tribes control some regions and adversely affect the official operations. The 
judiciary and the government are not effective in tribal areas. Thus, the official law 
faces difficulties to be applied in tribal countries. Then, the creditor party will fail to 
enforce IAA against the tribal lost party. As the tribal lost party will refer to his own 
tribe to protect him/her. Therefore, the place of enforcement of the arbitral award will be 
powerless to take coercive actions to enforce IAA. In addition, tribalism and nepotism 
are malpractices in African societies.240 It can mean that the members of each tribe 
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will come together as one group to protect each other against outside invaders. Thus, 
the creditor party will face obstacles to enforce IAA as the tribes will protect their own 
members against court legal actions. As some regions are under the control of the tribes 
so the enforcement of IAA will be impeded. Such situation is the same as in Yemen; 
the government authority is not extended in tribal areas. The tribal members bear the 
responsibility of the security of such areas. As a result, the customary law is prevailing 
in such areas. The tribal members are traditionally liable to protect their own members 
against outsiders. Thus, the court operations are not run well. This more likely to 
impede the enforcement of IAA. 
1.9.3 The Corruption Influence on the Competent Court towards the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
An article published in 2001, Seek Truth Form Facts: An Empirical Study of 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC of Randall Peerenboom also forms an 
important form of the literature review.241 This study confirms that the enforcement of 
the arbitral award is the most fundamental element to the disputed parties. It is stated 
that the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award is not guaranteed against PRC 
companies in China. The researcher, through a survey conducted in the Arbitration 
Research Institute in China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission’s (CIETAC) research arm, found that 47% of CIETAC and 52% of 
foreign awards were enforced. This article has shown the enforcement rates for foreign 
awards from the period 1991 to 1999, the total application cases reached 25 arbitral 
cases, whereas 13 cases were enforced and 12 cases were not enforced, which the 
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enforcement of foreign arbitral awards at a rate of 52% while non-enforcement at a 
rate of 48%. 
The methodology of this study mostly relied on a survey of 89 foreign and CIETAC 
arbitral awards enforcement cases, questionnaire was distributed to more than 350 
PRC firms and over 100 to foreign firms. The largest percentage, at 43%, of 
unenforceable awards are because of insolvency of the respondents. But, the failure to 
enforce the awards is not due to insolvency only, it also includes non-possession of the 
respondents’ properties to seize in order to coerce the enforcement arbitration. 
Moreover, the study found that the size of the awards play a major role in enforcement, 
if the award is big size, then the enforcement could face difficulties while smaller size 
award are more acceptable. It could be noticed that another fact in this study is the 
deficiency in legal framework as well as institutions.  Further, the weakness in the 
judiciary is due to getting financial funding from the government in addition to security 
protection supervised by the government directly. Such financial dependency on 
government causes intervention in the affairs of the judiciary.  Local protectionism has 
a negative role regarding the enforcement of the awards, especially if the local party 
has a relationship with government officials. This lead to intervention and pressure on 
the court to rule in favour of the local party, so the court tries to impede the 
enforcement of the arbitral awards by requesting additional documents and the like. 
The judges are often frustrated by political interference which hindered the 
enforcement of the arbitral awards or receiving threats from some parties to the conflict 
in case of compulsory attendance before the court. Although, the court has a power, 
but it is reluctant to use it against those violators of the order execution because the 
violators have a relationship with some government officials and getting support to 
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disobey the court’s orders. As a consequence of government intervention, the courts 
are not serious to seize or confiscate properties of the respondent, prevent the company 
from the operation, undertake mandatory sanctions, reluctant to take interim measures 
of protection to guarantee the enforcement, and afraid to make an issuance order to 
arrest or to fine the violators. Therefore, it is found out that the court decisions tend to 
encourage the parties to solve problems quietly, rather than coercion. There are only a 
few court cases which the respondents are forced to enforce the arbitral award through 
freezing the bank account, confiscation of property, and other precautions. Also, one 
of the difficulties facing the enforcement of arbitral awards in China if the local 
company’s shareholders belong to military personnel. Finally, the incompetence of 
judges to deal with arbitral cases, thus they face problem to apply related rules to the 
refusal or the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
As previously mentioned that the judiciary plays an important role in the control and 
assistance of the arbitral tribunal as it has less jurisdiction compared with the court. 
The independence and the integrity of the judiciary are important to the enforcement 
of IAA.  The enforcement of IAA is the highest summit of the arbitration dispute where 
there is nothing after this stage. In other words, the enforcement of IAA is the most 
important stage in the arbitration system. To achieve the enforcement stage of IAA, 
the independence and the integrity of the judiciary have to be practiced by the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Lack of the integrity and the judicial independence 
because of military interference and the influence of the local corporate lobby on 
judges lead to adverse effect in enforcing IAA. A study of People’s Republic of China 
found out some challenges of enforcement of IAA which may be similar to those of 
Yemen. The similarities in the matter of weakness of the judiciary as well as political 
intervention. In Yemen, the judiciary is considered as an extension department of the 
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executive. The appointment of judges is based on political recommendation, this 
means that the executive interferes with the judicial affairs so the political intervention 
in the judiciary is the most element challenges the judiciary reforms.242 Thus, such 
judges are likely to accept their political party intervention and accept political 
recommendations. 
Moreover, one of the obstacles that faces the enforcement of foreign awards in RPC is 
the threatening of the judges if issuing any writ to bring the debtor party before the 
court or seize the property of the local party who has close tie of relationship with 
officials. The same obstacle could be found in Yemen. The judges are not disposed to 
orders such as seizure of the property or habeas corpus against the tribal man in order 
to coerce him/her to enforce the IAA as it is expected that the judges will be threatened 
to be killed or kidnapping him/her or any of his family members. It is necessary to 
have case to explain that the tribe is above the law and the law only can be enforced 
against the weak person but not against the tribes’ leaders and their members. The facts 
of the case are that the defendant is a tribal leader (Yaser Al-Awadhi) and the plaintiffs 
are the parents of two dead persons at the age of nineteen. In this case during ceremony 
marriage for Al-Awadhi family on 14/5/2013 and that hold place in Sana’a. The 
guardians of Sheikh Yaser Al-Awadhi intercepted the two dead persons’ car and shoot 
them without apparent reason. The parents filed an action in the court, but the police 
did not take any investigated action of the crime incident. Till this moment, the case 
has not been tried yet.243   
                                                     
242 Veen, From the Struggle for Citizenship to the Fragmentation of Justice, 8. 




In addition, International bodies, including, the World Bank, the United Nations and 
Transparency International, have all identified that corruption is significant 
impediment to fair and impartial judicial dispute settlement in Indonesia.244 The 
enforcement of the arbitral award faces difficulties in Indonesia. It often requires 
separate judicial order to force the debtor party to honor it.245 If the judiciary is 
involved in corruption, then arbitration reform will be difficult.246 Such procrastination 
of non-enforcement is to give opportunity to the judges and court officials to receive 
bribe.247 Such corruption impediment on enforcement of the arbitration system in 
Indonesia is the same as in Yemen. The rampant corruption, particularly bribery, might 
adversely affect the enforcement of IAA in Yemen. The debtor party may pay bribe to 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award or judge to escape from implementation of 
IAA. As corruption in a few countries makes the commercial arbitration 
unsatisfactory.248 Hence, the corruption impediment will lead to non-enforcement of 
IAA. 
1.9.4 Effectiveness of Reciprocity Reservation on Yemen 
There is a legislative problem in NYC on the matter of enforcement of IAA, this could 
be seen in the article I (3) that allowed two reservations to the signatory states, and 
first one is that the convention state can only enforce the award made by another 
signatory state, not by non-convention state.249  The second one is that the signatory 
state can only apply the convention to dispute that comes out of legal relationships, 
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whether contractual or not, which the municipal law of the state making could consider 
it as commercial.250  For instance, the United Kingdom declined to enforce the 
judgements rendered in Saudi Arabia, so as a reaction, the Saudi Arabia courts refuse 
to enforce arbitral awards rendered in the UK.251  The enforcement of IAA in the 
United States may be rejected if the creditor party from the country is not a signatory 
state. The citizens of the non-convention state may lose the advantage of the 
enforcement of the arbitral award if his country does not ratify the NYC, especially 
some countries like the US ratified the convention subject to the reciprocity 
reservation.252 It is necessary to refer to the American case of  Bergesen v Joseph 
Muller Corp,253 the Court of Appeal held the that the reciprocity reservation could 
mean that the United States would only enforce the foreign arbitral award if it was 
rendered in a contracting state. The US court has full jurisdiction to refuse the 
enforcement of an award rendered by a non-signatory state. 
Thus, non-ratifying NYC by Yemen will harm Yemeni businessmen. Especially, when 
they come to recognize and enforce arbitral award whether the place seat was in 
Yemen or in another state may lose the convention privileges as the state where the 
enforcement is sought has legal permission to refuse the enforcement under the ground 
that Yemen is a non-signatory state. Such legal permission could be noticed in the 
article I (3) of NYC that provides reservations to the signatory states which can only 
enforce the award made by another signatory state, not by the non-signatory state like 
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Yemen while Yemen is obligated to enforce the foreign award as stated in sections 7 
and 57 of YAA. However, the same effect of reciprocity reservation according to 
section 494 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that Yemeni competent court 
will enforce IAA in Yemen according to reciprocity reservation. Further, by non-
ratifying the convention is not an immunity for Yemen and its citizens to escape from 
an execution of agreements. The foreign award will be enforced against Yemen based 
on other laws. It is important to refer to the case of S & Davis v Yemen,254 in this case, 
the contract was made and signed in Yemen which contained the arbitration clause. 
Later, the dispute arose and the place seat was hold in London. The creditor party 
applied for the enforcement of the award based on NYC at USA competent court. The 
competent court found that Yemen is a non-signatory convention. Nevertheless, the 
award was enforced under s 1605 (a) (6) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 1976 
that provides the foreign state cannot claim immunity of any case. Thus, the 
jurisdiction cannot apply over Yemen even if it is a non-signatory state, so the awards 
rendered in Yemen may not be enforced in the signatory convention states under the 
article 1 (3) while the award can be enforced against Yemen in other states through 
other laws like article 20 that provides a waiver of immunity and cannot be claimed to 
escape from execution.255  
On the other hand, the convention allowed the reciprocity reservation and this is more 
depends on the place where the award is rendered, but not on the nationality of the 
disputed parties,256  in addition, the article I (1) of NYC indicates that the arbitral award 
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is foreign by the state where the award is rendered not based on the nationality of the 
disputed parties. Hence, leaving unlimited interpretation to the courts is an obstacle 
towards achieving the NYC aims, as commonly known that each municipal law is 
different from state to another, as could be noticed, an American national court may 
prevent the citizens of non-convention state from enforcement of the award even the 
award rendered in convention state while the NYC provides the reciprocity reservation 
provides over the state, it is supposed to clarify how the NYC could deal with non-
citizens convention.  
The second reservation could be seen in article 1 (3) of NYC that authorizes the 
signatory state to enforce the award which comes within the commercial terms based 
on the national legal system, but the interpretation of commercial reservation is 
different from state to another state, it can be seen that the Chinese Supreme people’s 
Court failed to include the arbitration between the host country and the foreign state 
as commercial.257  Giving ambiguous definition of some principles in the convention 
causes problems in India too. The Indian courts consider the legal relationship as 
commercial for a long time because there is no provided statutory definition to clarify 
which led to lower enforcement of IAA.258  Thus, as discussed above, ambiguity of the 
reciprocity reservation, the convention terms have to be clarified by uniting definitions 
in order to avoid misinterpretation and misunderstanding and applying different 
courts’ interpretation of the same definition.  
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It is important to mention the political issue that may be considered as an obstacle to 
the enforcement of IAA whereas the national court is the main element to make the 
arbitration system to succeed. According to Calvo doctrine which provides that the 
foreign nationals are mandatorily subject to the jurisdiction of a national legal system, 
so the arbitration agreement is impossible to expel the jurisdiction of the national 
court.259  Thus, the political issue will be an obstacle towards the enforcement of 
foreign awards, especially, if there is hostility between the state of the place seat and 
the state where the enforcement is sought. For more understanding it is pertinent to 
refer to the case of Harris Adacon Corporation v Perkom Sdn Bhd.260  In this case, the 
debtor’s party’s argument to set aside the creditor party on the ground of the nationality 
of the creditor party is Israeli. However, the court found the creditor party’s nationality 
is an American, so the award was not against the public policy to enforce it. This means 
that the Malaysian competent court will not enforce the award if the creditor party’s 
nationality is Israeli. 
Based on all above literatures, it is found that the studies discussed some obstacles 
facing the enforcement of IAA such as deficient understanding of processes and 
procedures of international arbitration and lack of knowledge, foreign judges and 
lawyers face difficulties in dealing with international arbitration cases, so the judges 
get confused regarding the enforcement or the refusal of IAA. Moreover, Corruption 
is a factor in the non-enforcement of arbitral awards, and sometimes inability to 
enforce the arbitral award is a result of the insolvency of the respondent and lacking 
property to be seized. Another obstacle is the lack of independence of the judiciary 
because of political interference and military which lead to pressure on the competent 
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courts to provide local protectionism of local businessmen, especially, those local 
businessmen who have close ties of relationship with the government officials or 
powerful people owning shares in those companies to the conflict. In addition to these 
obstacles, the enforcement of IAA may face challenges in the Middle East countries if 
the awards are inconsistent with Shari’a, particularly, if those awards contain any 
usury or uncertainty terms.  
All the studies on the obstacles facing the enforcement of IAA are conducted outside 
Republic of Yemen. Lack of knowledge of other countries could be noticed in Yemen 
as the last amendment of YAA was on 1997, this is already twenty years old which 
may be out of date. This raise doubt that the YAA which is related to the enforcement 
of arbitral award is perhaps not in accordance with international arbitral law. Even, 
corruption obstacles are not handled extensively in those studies, especially, 
corruption in Yemeni government institutions is widespread. To the best knowledge 
of the researcher, no study has ever been conducted on the obstacles facing the 
enforcement of IAA in Yemen, especially hindrance or adequacy of YAA and 
corruption, while hindrance of tribalism facing the enforcement of IAA has not been 
investigated even outside Yemen.  This introduces a problem to investigate YAA, 
tribalism and corruption influence on the competency of the court in Yemen. 
1.9.4.1 Shari’a and Public Policy Requirements to Enforce International               
Arbitral Awards 
As long as Yemen is non-signatory state to NYC. It is important to refer to Shari’a 
and public policy as they are interrelated and that to understand if there are reasonable 
reasons behind non-ratifying NYC. In some of the Middle East countries including 
Yemen, IAA may be set aside or rejected based on the contravention of Shari’a or the 
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public policy. Will NYC contravene Shari’a or the public policy? It has referred to 
Shari’a and the public policy to rebut Yemeni legislator’s argument in case arguing 
that ratification of NYC will contravene Shari’a principles. Thus, referring to Shari’a 
and public policy as well, it will clarify how effectiveness of the Shari’a and public 
policy on the enforcement of IAA. In addition, it will rebut any argument behind non-
ratifying of NYC. The national arbitration laws will be stronger by ratifying NYC as 
it is accepted worldwide as the main convention of the arbitration system. In a thesis 
written by Wasim Yahya Al-Jerafi, “Yemen’s ratification of the New York 
convention: an analysis of compatibility and the uniform interpretation of articles v (1) 
(a) and v (2) (b)”.261 Al-Jerafi’ study stated that Yemen has issued a New Draft of 
Yemeni Arbitration Act (New Draft), which is still currently being examined prior to 
being enacted by the Yemeni parliament. New Draft contains sixty-eight articles 
generally inspired by the Egyptian Arbitration Act. Al-Jerafi’ study focused on the 
public policy under article V (2) (b) of New York and compared with section 66 of the 
New Draft of Yemeni Arbitration Act. However, to the best knowledge of the 
researcher, has not found the New Draft. Even, Al-Jerafi’ study was completed in 2013 
and until now 2018 no New Draft was published or found. There is no relevant 
informantion regarding New Draft in Google, Yemeni Information Centre, or affirmed 
by any of the interviewees. It is unreasonable that five years have passed since Al-
Jerafi’ study, and no draft is found either in the public or to specialist in arbitration 
field. It means that the researcher may wrongly undermined New Draft. Especially, 
Al-Jerafi’ study stated that New Draft contains sixty-eight articles generally inspired 
by the Egyptian Arbitration Act. This is rising doubt that Al-Jerafi’ study referred to 
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the only the Egyptian Arbitration Act. Moreover, Al-Jerafi’ study referred to public 
policy under article V (2) (b) of New York and compared it with section 66 of the New 
Draft of Yemeni Arbitration Act while the researcher referred to section 53 (g) of YAA 
that provides the foreign award is binding, unless the award contravenes the Shari’a. 
Also, section 55 (b) that provides the foreign award cannot be enforced if the 
competent court considers it as against the Shari’a and public policy as a whole. In 
addition, Al-Jerafi’ study of the public policy and Shari’a on Yemen’s ratification of 
New York as a research question of the study, while the researcher referred to the 
effect of the public policy and Shari’a on the enforcement of IAA as complementary 
part to improve Yemeni national arbitration laws, that is, YAA. Therefore, Al-Jerafi’ 
study followed different way of the current study. In addition, Al-Jerafi’ study is based 
on El-Ahdab’s book that is titled “Arbitration with the Arab Countries”. This could be 
seen as numerous references are found in Al-Jerafi’ study which is taken from El-
Ahdab’s book. Previously, the researcher rebutted El-Ahdab’s book regarding New 
Draft under sub-topic 1.9.1. 
 
Indeed, Yemen practice Shari’a law. The constitution recognizes Islam as the religion 
of the state262  and the Shari’a law as the main source for all laws.263 Thus, the 
enforcement of arbitral award is impaired if the arbitration agreement or the arbitral 
award violates the Shari’a. Shari’a rules play an important role in commercial 
transactions which has to be considered in arbitral awards. As noted that there are 
similar points between Shari’a law and western law and different points as well.264 
The differences between the western scholars and Islamic scholars existed in the matter 
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of arbitration and business as a whole.265 The Islamic legal system is based on culture 
which complies with Shari’a perspective, so as to avoid non-enforcement of the award 
the arbitrators have to be familiar with Shari’a law and historical arbitration 
background.266 Hence, ignoring the culture of each nation will lead to hostility among 
nations and this will adversely affect the enforcement of IAA. Thus, for the successful 
arbitration system, the arbitrators have to do more research to have knowledge of other 
nations’ culture.267 At the beginning, Arab countries welcomed the international 
arbitration system as they considered the positive effects that could benefit 
international trade.268 However, some of these countries became reluctant to continue 
to recognize foreign arbitration because of a contravention of the public policy, 
especially, the Shari’a rules.269 
As Yemen is one of the Arab countries and addressed in this study, the problem of 
contravention of Shari’a exists. According to Mayer, the enforcement of IAA in 
Yemen, perhaps faces challenges if the award contravenes the Shari’a law.270 
Therefore, the award could have a better chance to be enforced if the debtor party has 
assets outside the Middle East to seek the enforcement of the award there.271  
Otherwise, the arbitral tribunal has to avoid terms that may arose suspicion of 
contravention of Shari’a.272 It is necessary to refer to section 53 (g) of YAA that 
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provides the foreign award is binding, unless the award contravenes the Shari’a. 
Further, section 55 (b) provides the foreign award cannot be enforced if the competent 
court considers it as against the Shari’a and public policy as a whole. Therefore, the 
arbitral award would not be implemented in Yemen if it contravened the Islamic law 
which is the main source of all laws. It prevails on other human laws, and this is clearly 
stated in article 3 of the Yemeni constitution. It is necessary to refer to the case of 
Abdul Baqi Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim,273 the court held that if the award 
contravened the Shari’a, the award would not be enforced. 
In an interesting literature is written by Mark Wakim, entitled “Public Policy Concerns 
Regarding Enforcement of International Arbitral Award in the Middle East”274 the 
author stated that foreign law systems are becoming recognized in Middle East 
countries, but the knowledge requirement of applying the laws is essential to 
understand the nature of resolving disputes in the Middle East. Ignoring the norms that 
religious structure is supportive of Commercial Arbitration to resolve differences in 
operations is irrational. Religious structure plays an important role in the acceptance 
and success of the international commercial arbitration. Religion may affect the 
operation procedures. If the arbitrator violates the Islamic law (Shari’a), the public 
policy will affect the outcome of the arbitration. Hence, those lawyers outside the 
Middle East region have to be familiar with the laws of these countries, because 
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Islamic law is a very important in directing the legal system of the most Middle East 
countries.  
It is stated that uncertainty (Gharar) and usury (Riba) to the IAA or the agreement as 
a whole to be void. It is not in doubt that the all Muslim scholars agree on the 
prohibition of dealing with any transaction that involves interest whether as a profit, 
fine, and commission. However, the legal system in the Middle East differs in their 
application of Shari’a. In some Middle East countries, the commercial law derived 
from Shari’a and in other countries not complies with Shari’a. For instance, in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the law is completely derived from Shari’a, while Lebanese 
law depends on culture. 
Another similarly literature focusing on arbitration in the Middle East context written 
by J. Cammell “Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East”.275 This study 
demonstrated that the Shari’a is the law that prevails in global trade in eighteen 
countries in the Middle East except Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. So the foreign 
investors have to be aware of the foundations of Islamic law so as not to put their 
investment in jeopardy. Arbitration is practicable in those countries and enforceable if 
the arbitral award does not contradict the rules of Islamic law. Many Arab countries 
have ratified NYC such as Egypt, Syria, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, Brunei, Lebanon, Iran, Qatar, Oman, but these countries 
are conservative when it comes to enforcement of foreign judgments if they are in 
conflict with the law. Thus, in order to avoid non-enforcement in those countries as 
well as leave no argument for the respondent to refuse to enforce the arbitral award 
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base on public policy, the international lawyers have to be cautious when drafting 
international arbitral awards and avoid terms that are inconsistent with the Shari’a, 
they have to avoid terms that may raise suspicion of violating the Shari’a, especially 
in regard to usury (Riba) and uncertainty (Gharar).  
The two articles discussed have focused on the Middle East which is more concerned 
about the public policy. The enforcement of foreign awards cannot be implemented in 
some Middle East countries if the award violated the rules of Shari’a, especially, if the 
award provides interest whether as a profit, fine, or commission. Also, the agreement 
itself is void if it is dealing with uncertainty (Gharar) or usury (Riba) terms.  
It is important to refer to the above mentioned two articles to understand the effect of 
the international arbitral awards if they contravened the Shari’a principles as well as 
to refute any argument of non-ratifying the NYC by Yemen. These two articles clarify 
to the Yemeni legislator that NYC gives the national courts a discretion to refuse to 
enforce the international arbitral awards if they contravened Shari’a principles as 
Shari’a may be part of the public policy of some signatory states, which public policy 
is referred to see how it is applicable. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
signatory state of NYC, and its applicable law is completely derived from Shari’a.276 
Moreover, public policy is determined as an obstacle facing the enforcement of IAA, 
and Shari’a is a part of the public policy. The convention allowed the national court to 
reject and not to enforce an award based on an article V (2) (b) if the award contradicts 
the public policy of the country where the recognition and enforcement is sought. The 
convention specified the permissible grounds to refuse the enforcement of the foreign 
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award, it is more likely the courts will refuse to enforce the arbitral award by other 
exceptions like public policy.277 Such exception to the enforcement is enough to 
frustrate the convention’s goals.278  For instance, public mandatory is considered as a 
part of public policy which the state determines it as sovereign affairs to protect the 
public interest.279 Therefore, the arbitration tribunal has to pre-determine in the first 
instance of the arbitration proceedings whether the arbitration issue violates the public 
laws of the state where the enforcement is sought? Does the enforcement violate the 
public law? If the arbitration issue violates the public law, it should not be arbitrated.280 
Thus, the tribunal has to pay more attention to the issues that are inappropriate to be 
settled by arbitration mechanism.281 The issues that are considered as being against 
public laws do not have to be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal and only the national 
courts are competent to deal with such issues. Otherwise, the international arbitral 
award will not be enforced by the competent court if it violates the public policy.282 It 
means that when the issue is against public policy, then the arbitral tribunal has to 
withdraw its authority from ruling on such issue, so the disputing parties have to refer 
their dispute to the court.283 This is against the principle of party autonomy and the 
arbitration principle that give the right of the disputing parties to choose the law which 
is suitable for them.284 
                                                     
277 Christopher S. Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise between 
Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public Law (New 
York: Boston, 2009), 118. 
278 Ibid.  
279 Christopher S. Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise between 
Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public Law (New 
York: Boston, 2009), 121, quoted in A. Bermann, Introduction: Mandatory Rules of Law in 
International Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (2007). 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid.  
282 Ibid. 
283 New York Convention 1958, article V (1) (a), and UNCITRAL Model Law on International 




Public policy is a major power in the hands of the national courts which they depend 
on to refuse the arbitral award.285 The International Law Association Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration has stated in the final report 2002 that in fifty 
years of arbitration, public policy is considered as the most crucial problem 
encountered in the effort to enforce arbitral awards.286 The International Law 
Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration has spent an effort to 
constitute guidance on universal public policy but failed to convince all the signatory 
states.287  Another author stated that public policy is the key element constituting 
challenges to IAA.288 The national courts authorized by article V. 2 (b) to determine 
whether the arbitrated issue violates public policy or not. Thus, as there is no universal 
guidance on public policy which only the national courts have jurisdiction to interpret 
the meaning of the public policy as they think fit. It means that public policy depends 
on the legal system of each state as each state has different politics, culture, religion, 
economics, legal system, and the like, so what is considered as public policy in one 
state may not be the same in another state.289 Such factors change and develop from 
time to time, so the standard of public policy is determined by the surrounding 
circumstances.290 
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On the other hand, the author argues that public policy is not a major challenges 
towards that enforcement of a foreign award.291 However, leaving the public policy 
without specific guidance may lead to misuse by the national courts. Thus, some 
national courts, as well as arbitration tribunals, consider that the international law 
should apply to the international arbitration agreements domestic laws should come 
into the picture when the matter concerns public policy.292 The domestic law is not the 
right law to consider in the arbitration agreement as valid or void.293 The international 
laws are suitable for dealing with the recognition and the enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements.294 However, the NYC, as well as the Model Law, allow the 
state to reject the awards that are incapable of being settled by arbitration, such as 
competition and anti-trust claims, securities claims, bankruptcy, employment 
contracts, consumer disputes and so on.295 Thus, the state where the enforcement is 
sought on a case that is incapable to being settled by arbitration has jurisdiction to 
refuse the recognition and the enforcement of the award.296 Hence, most national courts 
apply their own non-arbitral rules to reject the enforcement of some arbitral 
disputes.297 
To understand how each state interprets the scope of public policy, the example of 
UAE can be used. A United Arab Emirates (UAE) study by Khalil Mechantaf under 
the title of “Public Policy in the UAE as a ground for Refusing Recognition and 
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Enforcement of Awards”298  stated that the UAE has its own laws which allows it to 
refuse the recognition and the enforcement of arbitral awards. This could be seen in 
section 3 of the UAE Civil Code 1985 which provides that personal status like 
marriage, inheritance, descent is considered as public policy, as well as the rules that 
relate to sovereign governance, commercial freedom, trading in wealth, rules of 
personal property, and final decisions that inconsistent with the societal foundation 
and Islamic Shari’a principles. It is important to refer to the case No.180/2011 on 
February 2012, in this case, the purchaser (respondent) refer to the Dubai Court of the 
First Instance to recognize and enforce an award made by the Dubai International 
Arbitration Center (DIAC) against the appellant (real estate developer). The dispute 
arose in the matter of the sale agreement validity. DIAC held that the sale agreement 
of the unit is invalid because of failure to register the unit at the Interim Real Estate 
Register, so the court ordered the real estate developer to return the paid money to the 
respondent. The Court of the First Instance recognized the arbitral award. The 
appellant appealed on the ground that the tribunal extended its jurisdiction and did not 
give him reasonable time to defend his claim, his appeal was rejected. The same claim 
was transferred to the Dubai Court of Cassation, which annulled the Court of the First 
Instance’ decision. It held that the real estate issue is related to the public policy, so 
the conciliation is not allowed. Section 203 (4) CCP considers real estate as public 
policy and prohibits application of conciliation over public policy. 
Public policy bears the arbitral tribunal hardship as it has to be familiar with the 
municipal law of the state where the enforcement is sought in order to know whether 
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the issue violates the public policy and whether the award can be enforced or not. Also, 
public policy contravenes the doctrine of the parties’ autonomy; this operates against 
the freedom of choice of law, as it is commonly known that the parties are free to agree 
on the terms for their settlement so there is a challenge of the arbitration agreement as 
the choice of law is a major term of the arbitration agreement. Compulsory referring 
to the national court is against the arbitration principle that provides the parties with 
the autonomy to agree on the terms they like. So the parties can reach an agreement as 
they wish. Therefore, public policy is an obstacle towards enforcement of a foreign 
award.  
As far as Yemen is concerned in this research, it refers to Shari’a as public policy. In 
Yemen, the jurisprudence is according to Shari’a perspectives.299 The constitution 
provides that all laws shall be based on Shari’a.300 Thus, YAA provides Shari’a rules 
as a ground to refuse the enforcement of IAA if the award contravened Shari’a, which 
could be seen in section 53 of YAA which provides that it is not allowed to reject an 
arbitral award unless it contravenes Islamic law. Also, section 55 provides that the 
court of appeal has jurisdiction to reject an arbitral award, even without a request of 
any of the parties, if the award is rendered over a dispute which cannot be settled 
through arbitration mechanism, it is against the Islamic law, or public policy as well. 
The Yemen courts do not enforce an international arbitration agreement or IAA if it 
contains any term stipulating a payment as interest as far as the judges adjudicate the 
commercial disputes based on Shari’a.301 For more understanding of this principle, 
refer to the case of Abdul Baqi Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim,302 the court 
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held that if the award contravened the Shari’a, or the public policy of the country, the 
award would not be enforced. Hence, YAA leaves full discretion to the competent 
court to determine the validity of the award, if it is contravened to Islamic principles, 
if it is, then according to section 53 the competent court is more likely to reject it and 
will not recognize and enforce the arbitral award. Such rejection can take action upon 
the request of any of the parties as well as the court could do so if it is contravened 
section 55, but in section 55 the court has the discretion to reject the award without the 
request of any of the parties. The arbitral tribunal has to know the law of place seat of 
the arbitration and the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. 
Throughout the related articles to Shari’a and public policy, Yemen is protected 
against any IAA that may contravene Shari’a principles and public policy of the 
country. Yemeni courts have a discretion to set aside or refuse to enforce IAA if 
contravenes the public policy. Shari’a is part of the public policy of Yemen as Yemen 
applies Shari’a law. So, Yemeni courts have a discretion to reject the enforcement of 
IAA if it contravened public policy. Article V (2) (b) of NYC that provides if the award 
contradicts public policy of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award, the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award has a full discretionary power to refuse the recognition 
and the enforcement based on such exceptional grounds provided by the convention. 
Therefore, Yemeni legislators have no reasonable justifications to mind the ratification 
of NYC. As Yemen is protected under V (2) (b) of NYC to refuse the enforcement of 
IAA if it is contravened the public policy. As Yemen court is one who reject or enforce 
IAA, then, public policy of Yemen is protected by the Yemeni national law. Yemen 
court will not enforce IAA if it is against the public policy. This could be seen in 
section 53 of YAA that provides upon request of any of the parties the arbitral award 
will be refused if it is violated the Shari’a rules or the public policy. Also section 55 
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of YAA gives the court a full discretion to determine the validity of the arbitral award 
in order to enforce it or reject it even without the request from any of the parties, 
especially, in these paragraphs as (a) that provides if arbitrated dispute is not allowed 
to be settled by arbitration mechanism (b) if the award contravened principles of the 
Shari’a or public policy. 
1.10 Outline of the Chapters 
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. The first chapter contains an 
introduction to the study, problem statement, research questions, research objectives, 
significance of the study, and followed by methodology conducted in this current study 
as well as limitation of the study, last part is literature review dealing with IAA outside 
and inside Yemen.  
Chapter two discussed the concept of the international arbitration such as the 
arbitration clause, composition of the arbitral tribunal, arbitral processes and 
procedures, the arbitral award, the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, 
the used enforcement tools of the arbitral award, the annulment of international arbitral 
award, and the court intervention.  
The third chapter addressed the adequacy of YAA. Especially, the laws of YAA that 
deal with the enforcement of IAA. In addition, the judicial supervision to enforce IAA 
in the matter of practicing interim measures of protection that usually take by the 
Competent Court as a guarantee to enforce the IAA was discussed. The requirements 
of the application of the enforcement of arbitral award and also the grounds to refuse 
the enforcement of arbitral award is addressed in this chapter. Additionally, the 
international provisions that relates to the enforcement of IAA, such as Convention on 
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the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial 
Arbitration, Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws, and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties to identify the inadequacies in YAA were discussed. 
The fourth chapter addressed tribalism and its relationship with the state as well as its 
impact on the judiciary, customary law, and formal law, the independence of the 
judiciary, tribal illegal activities, and analytical and critical arbitral cases, civil cases, 
and criminal cases. 
The fifth chapter addressed the adverse impact of judicial corruption, particularly, 
impact of bribe, impact of political and military interference on the judiciary and the 
adverse effect of such interference on the enforcement of IAA, while the fifth chapter 
discussed the results of the interview survey. The last chapter addressed the concluding 




CONCEPT OF THE ARBITRATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The parties to the agreement make an arbitral clause to settle their future dispute or 
raising dispute by arbitration mechanism. Choosing the arbitration system means to 
settle the dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the court system. However, the jurisdiction 
of the court system is impossible to be ignored as the court has jurisdiction to set aside 
or enforce the award.1 The arbitration system is ineffective without the court’s 
assistance.2 The court of place in the suit of the arbitration has a jurisdiction to vacate 
the award while the court where the enforcement is sought has a jurisdiction to set 
aside the award or recognize and enforce it.3 The procedures of the court litigation are 
different from arbitral proceedings.4 The procedures of the court litigations are heavily 
circumscribed while the arbitral procedures are large and more participation of 
tribunals and counsel.5 Even though, the litigation and the arbitration are different but 
they have one aim which is to settle disputes through analyses of the facts and applying 
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the laws to have a binding decision.6 The rendered arbitral award is final and binding. 
There are only limited grounds than to challenge the arbitral award.7 The settlement of 
the dispute must have a prior arbitral agreement.8 And the arbitral proceedings are 
flexible compared with court litigations that has to strictly follow civil procedure 
rules.9 
The litigation and arbitration systems are different. There are two fundamental 
distinctions between litigations and the arbitration.10 The first one is the jurisdiction.11 
The second one is the enforcement.12 The jurisdiction level is based on the parties’ 
agreement.13 Usually the different national companies form arbitral agreement, 
clarifies the jurisdiction to handle the arising dispute or the disputes may arise in 
future.14 For instance, company X and company Z entered into a contract to formalize 
company in state L. Thus, they will mention in the arbitration clause the place seat of 
arbitration and the applicable law is ICSID or can stipulate that the France court is the 
jurisdictional authority to settle any related dispute to the contract. While the 
enforcement distinction is a part of the arbitral award. This is subject to the cooperation 
among the states such as bilateral treaties and conventions.15 Such as New York 
Convention 1958 that provides the enforcement of the arbitral award in the signatory 
state.16 It is only subject to limited grounds to challenge the award.17 In contrast, the 
foreign court judgement made outside the regime of the place of enforcement of the 
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arbitral award is quite complicated.18 This is because the judgement is not based on the 
agreement of the disputed parties.19 As arbitration is concerned in this study, this 
chapter discussed the concept, proceedings and procedures of the international 
arbitration system. Therefore, the researcher referred to YAA to understand the 
loopholes in the Act. Especially, the proceedings and procedures which will probably 
influence the result of the requirement of IAA. 
2.2 The Definition of Arbitration 
Arbitration is a process which is mutually or consensually chosen by the parties that 
submit their disputes or those that may arise to be settled outside the court system by 
binding and final award.20 The award is based on neutrality and equal treatment and 
equal opportunity to the disputed parties to present their cases.21 Similarly, it is an 
alternative approach to specific disputes that disputed parties have knowledge of such 
disputes.22 The disputes are clearly known to the disputed parties through and 
arbitration agreement.23 As well the agreed procedures and processes to conduct the 
arbitration. The arbitration can be conducted by one arbitrator or more.24 Also, the 
arbitral claim can be filed by one claimant or more against one respondent or more.25 
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Then, the appointed arbitrator/arbitrators are authorized to render inter alia, an interim, 
partial or final arbitral award.26 The arbitral terms are more flexible and modern.27 
2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of International Arbitration 
One of the main advantages of international arbitration is that the disputed parties 
could settle their dispute by single law over single issue so such advantage prevents 
the conflict of laws as the parties from different country.28 It has to refer to YAA which 
provides the advantage of choosing the law to avoid conflict of laws. Section 7 
provides that the parties to the arbitration, if both or parties or one is a non-Yemeni 
can agree on the applicable law to settle the dispute that arises or may arise. However, 
the loophole in this section is limited the choice of the law if both or one of the parties 
is a non-Yemeni. This is against the principle of autonomy in arbitration system. The 
local parties may prefer to settle their dispute by any other rules or laws than national 
laws. Thus, if the dispute between local parties is settled by any other rules or laws 
than Yemeni laws, the debtor party can set aside the arbitral award base on breach of 
section 7. Moreover, if the foreign party/parties to the arbitration agreement have not 
stipulated the applicable rules or laws, then section 45 of YAA will be applicable. It 
provides that the arbitral tribunal has to settle dispute based on the laws agreed by the 
disputing parties, if the disputing parties did not mention their preferred law, then, the 
arbitral tribunal has to settle it base on international law and the principles of justice 
and has to take into consideration the customary laws. The customary laws are not 
suitable to settle international commercial disputes or even local complicated 
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commercial disputes. YAA has to be amended regarding to the applicable laws or rules 
to settle the disputes. 
 
Further, the commercial issues are sensitive so the arbitration keep such information 
like documents or evidences confidentially.29 Such confidentiality could be seen in 
section 38 of YAA that provides that the arbitral tribunal shall hold arbitral hearings 
to hear the oral pleadings in order to enable each of the parties to present his/her case 
through arguments and evidences. The hearings shall be confidential. No one is 
allowed to attend such hearings and pleadings. YAA is in compliance with 
international standard in the matter of the confidentiality of the arbitration. 
Furthermore, many national courts are not specialized to deal with mediation and 
arbitration or commercial disputes.30 The commercial courts have no adequate experts 
to handle complex disputes arising from corporate matter or mediation and 
arbitration.31 But, through an arbitration agreement, the parties are free to choose the 
qualified arbitrators to settle their disputes.32 While in court system choosing of the 
judges may randomly which the parties are not free to choose the right judge.33 Even, 
the judge is expert in the relating field but may not be expert in mediation and 
arbitration.34 Therefore, the arbitration system brings an advantage to the justice 
system. Moreover, the arbitration system provides neutrality to deal with international 
business as well as avoid biasness in the litigation court.35 The national court may give 
a decision in favour of their own national people or state. Also, through arbitration will 
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avoid the conflict of laws, especially the parties and location of the business are from 
different nationalities.36 Hence, settlement of the disputes by the arbitration will avoid 
the national courts’ bias that may give a decision in favour of their own national people 
or state as well as evade the jurisdiction conflict of the courts. Another feature of 
arbitration is that the arbitral award is binding and final so there is no appeal to a higher 
jurisdiction like that in the court.37 
 
On the other hand, the arbitration is not always cheap and speedy.38 The international 
arbitration is expensive and may be delayed as the parties have to travel and pay the 
cost of hotel and daily expenses as well as have to pay experts, especially in complex 
cases.39 The tribunal in some certain issues may appoint an expert over specific issues 
and this will increase the cost.40 While delay could arise because of the postponed of 
the submission and procedures.41 Another disadvantage of the arbitration is the 
corruption in place seat or the enforcement seat. This adversely affect the arbitration 
system which enforcement of the arbitral award will face difficulties in the corrupt 
state. Also, the lack of the competent arbitrators in some states will lead the arbitration 
system to be ineffective.42 As a result of corruption and incompetency, the neutrality 
principle and equal treatment of the parties to present their case would not be achieved. 
Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal will face difficulties in taking evidence, especially if 
the court’s assistance in different country of the place seat of the arbitration.43 Thus, 
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the arbitral proceedings will be delayed as the arbitral tribunal has to look for other 
international instruments such as bilateral treaties and conventions to take the 
evidence.44 
2.4 Types of Arbitration 
In the past the commerce was limited to the border of each country. Nowadays, it has 
become global. The global commercial development creates a need to set up an arbitral 
institution to cope with such changes. The arbitration rules arranged the framework in 
which the arbitration proceedings are to take place. It is often at the time when the 
parties draft the agreement they totally mention what type of arbitration may be used 
to settle their disputes. Usually, they prefer their agreement conduct under institutional 
rules or under ad hoc arbitration rules. It could differentiate between the two types as 
follows: 
a) Institution Rules:45 the arbitration is administered and supervised according to the 
arbitral institution and its own institutional rules of arbitration. The arbitral 
institutions have their own rules to conduct the parties’ dispute, so through their 
own provision they set out a basic procedural framework and the time to conduct 
the arbitration, the choice of the arbitrators, adjudicate the challenge of the 
arbitrators, choose the suitable place seat, review the arbitrator’s award, and the 
like. It should be noted that institutional arbitration does not mean that the parties 
have to state specific institutions to settle the dispute, rather it only means that they 
will choose the institutional rules to deal with the arbitration process, 
administration, and supervision. Thus, the institutional rules are not displaced by 
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any other rules. For instance, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 
rules exclude the right to appeal in the matter of a question of law under the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 and set out a default timetable for written pleadings. 
b) Ad Hoc Rules:46 It is arbitration whereby the parties are free to choose an arbitral 
process, they would like; it is out of control of institution rules, supervision, and 
administration. It could mean that ad hoc arbitration is conducted according to the 
rules that are agreed by the parties, these rules are usually published like 
UNCITRAL or institutional rules, but it is not necessary to choose published rules 
in ad hoc arbitration. 
In the matter of the types of the arbitration to settle the dispute, YAA is silent on 
such point. It means that the institutional rules or Ad Hoc rules are both applicable 
in Yemeni arbitration system. However, it should be noted that in some countries 
like China, ad hoc arbitration is not recognized and so it is better to determine the 
institutional arbitration.47 Therefore, the institutional rules are more comfortable 
than ad hoc rules because the latter rules do not perform full function as the 
institutional rules do or do less administrative services. For instance, the 
institutional arbitration can address the gaps in case the disputed parties did not 
agree on appointment of the arbitrators or the rules to conduct the arbitration as 
long as it has its own rules. Also, institutional arbitration has qualified 
administration to arrange the arbitration from the beginning to the end. In addition, 
in institutional arbitration review the final award before sign it which will decrease 
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the challenges in the court. Hence, YAA has to clarify the position of the 
applicability of ad hoc rules. 
2.5 Arbitration Agreement 
Arbitration agreement is a written agreement between the parties to settle all disputes 
or specific disputes that arises or may arise in future whether such disputes are 
contractual or not.48 Such arbitration agreement can be written in a separate agreement 
or included as a clause of the contract.49 UNCITRAL stipulates that arbitration 
agreement to be in writing and signed by both parties.50 The same provides in article 
II (1) of NYC that stipulates arbitration agreement to be in writing. So, the signatory 
states to the convention have to recognize the arbitration agreements that are only in 
the form of writing. However, UNCITRAL failed to clarify the effect of non-
compliance with provided requirements in article 7.51 The opponent party can only 
oppose the submission of the arbitral dispute to the tribunal prior to the proceeding 
based on article 16 (2).52 But, after continued in the arbitral proceedings, the opponent 
party will be considered as waived of his/her rights according to article 4.53  
UNCITRAL gives characteristic that the agreement can be in form of 
telecommunication such as telegram, telex or exchange of letters between the parties.54 
It is common for business negotiations and transactions to be contracted through 
internet.55 The parties can communicate in seconds through electronic message. 
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Therefore, after the arbitration agreement is concluded the parties have to refer to the 
arbitral tribunal to settle their disputes. If one of the parties refers to the court, the 
opponent party could challenge the application before the court. Then, the court will 
refer the parties to the tribunal.  
As Yemen is addressed in this study, it should understand the arbitration agreement 
requirements. In section 15 of YAA provides that the arbitration agreement is null and 
void if it is not written and the scope of the dispute that arise or may arise in future has 
to be contained in a written agreement. The arbitration agreement can be an arbitration 
document, telegrams, letters or other modern means of communication of a 
documentary nature. This means the parties who prefer to settle their dispute should 
make such arbitration clause in writing. Thus, any oral arbitration agreement will not 
be authority for the party who is willing to settle the dispute by arbitration mechanism. 
In addition, The YAA gives the parties a freedom to communicate to conclude such 
arbitration agreement whatever by electronic message, or any communication of a 
documentary nature. YAA is flexible in the matter of giving the parties the freedom to 
communicate and form the arbitration agreement by electronic message as often the 
parties are located in different states. So, such communication by electronic approach 
gives YAA a good feature. Moreover, the arbitration agreement can be a part of the 
contract as included paragraph in the contract or can be in an independent contract 
which the arbitration clause must be written according to section 16 of the Act.  
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2.6 The Scope of Arbitration Clauses 
The disputed parties to arbitration agreement are the only ones that can choose which 
dispute to be arbitrated.56 It is not a matter that dispute to be settled by institutional 
rules or Ad Hoc rules.57 They can stipulate exceptions to apply certain procedures to 
some related disputes to the agreement.58 The scope of arbitration agreement is 
depends on the arbitration clauses.59 Mostly the arbitration clauses are written in broad 
clauses.60 For example, all the arising disputes in connection with this contract shall 
be settled by the arbitration system.61 This type of broad clause are written in order to 
avoid the litigation of the court62 so the tribunal will have jurisdiction over all disputes 
of the agreement in relating to the existence, validity, breach, or termination.63 On the 
other hand, sometimes the disputed parties prefer to exclude some disputes of the 
arbitration such as the payment obligations or insurance.64 
YAA, in section 15 provides that the agreement shall be null and void if the dispute is 
not specified in the arbitration agreement. Also, section 28 provides the arbitral 
tribunal shall only arbitrate the dispute that is within its jurisdiction. If the arbitral 
tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, then any of disputed parties can appeal to the Court 
of Appeal. Similarity, the Act is very clear to deal with exceeding of jurisdiction which 
gives the resisting party of the enforcement the right to set aside the arbitral award if 
the arbitral tribunal arbitrated a disputes that not agreed by the disputed parties. 
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It means that YAA limited the arbitral tribunal jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction to 
arbitrate the dispute that is agreed by the parties to settle by arbitration mechanism. 
Therefore, the resisting party of the enforcement can set aside the arbitral award. 
However, there is loophole in YAA which is silent if the arbitral tribunal arbitrated a 
dispute but exceeded its authority by arbitrate non-agreed dispute alongside. What is 
the authority in such position? Will the court reject to enforce the whole arbitral award?  
Will the court enforce partly arbitral award which it will enforce the agreed dispute to 
be settled by arbitration and reject the non-agreed dispute by the parties? Hence, YAA 
must be amended to add section regarding this gap. 
 
Moreover, there are unilateral clauses which only bind one of the disputed parties to 
refer to arbitration while another party has the right to choose whether the arbitration 
system or the court system. This arbitration clause is in favour of the party that gives 
the choice to have any of the two systems. However, some national courts reject such 
unilateral clauses because they consider them as unfair contracts. In case of LLC Sony 
Ericson Mobile Communications RUS v CJSC Russkaya Telefonnaya Kompaniya,65 
the Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court held the unilateral clause leads to unfair rights 
of the parties so it invalidated the clause. While other national laws recognize the 
unilateral clauses like English law as long as the parties are free to choose the 
conditions of the agreements.66 Thus, the parties to the contract have to previously 
check the law of the place seat as well as the enforcement seat.  
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2.7 Composition of Arbitral Tribunal and Appointment of the Arbitrators 
It is usually preferable that the complex disputes have to be conducted by three 
arbitrators.67 Each of the parties appoint one arbitrator and the two nominated 
arbitrators appoint the third arbitrator.68 While less important disputes are better 
conducted by only one arbitrator.69 However, the sole arbitrator is not a good approach 
to settle disputes. As multiple arbitrators can reach procedure and award 
consensually.70 But, a sole arbitrator’ award maybe wrong or right while consensually 
award is closer to being right.71 Also, the arbitral processes are subject to the sole 
arbitrator so in case of resignation of death of that arbitrator, the processes will stop.72 
Article 10 (1) of UNCITRAL provides that the choice of the number of the arbitrators 
is subject to the freedom of the parties (2) in case the parties failed to mention that, the 
number of the arbitrators to constitute the tribunal must be three. This means that the 
parties are free to constitute the number of the tribunal whatever a sole arbitrator or 
three, but if the parties failed to stipulate that in the arbitration agreement or disagree 
on the number of the arbitrators, then the court will appoint the arbitrators based on its 
discretion. It is preferable to have three arbitrators if the difference is complex or the 
dispute is expensive value. But, if it is minor difference is better to have a sole 
arbitrator to avoid cost. 
It is important to refer to the appointment jurisdiction of the arbitrator or arbitrators 
under YAA. This could be seen in section 21 provides that the parties to arbitration 
can agree on the number of arbitrators, and if they do not agree, the number of 
                                                     









arbitrators shall be three. In addition, section 22 subject to the provisions of this law, 
the parties to arbitration shall have the right to agree on the time of choosing the 
arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal and how to appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators. In case 
of disagreement, the following shall be followed:  
a. If the arbitral tribunal is to be formed by an individual arbitrator, the    
competent court shall appoint him at the request of one of the parties 
after hearing and what may be justified objection by either party of the 
appointed arbitrator. 
b. If the arbitral tribunal has to be composed of two arbitrators, each party   
shall appoint an arbitrator. 
c. If the arbitral tribunal is to be formed by more than two arbitrators, each 
party shall appoint an arbitrator. Then, the two arbitrators shall agree 
with the third arbitrator. In case the arbitrators do not agree on the third 
arbitrator within the period of 30 days following the appointment of the 
latter, the competent court shall appoint him at the request of one of the 
parties. The arbitral tribunal shall be presided over by the arbitrator 
appointed by the two arbitrators or by the competent court. 
It should be noted that YAA applies principle of the parties’ autonomy in the matter 
of appointment of the arbitrator/arbitrators. Thus, the parties are free to agree on the 
number of the arbitral tribunal whatever to be one or three. However, if they disagreed 
on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, then the court will interfere to constitute 
the arbitral tribunal based on the parties’ agreed terms. If there is no term regarding 
the number of the arbitral tribunal then shall be three, while if there is prior agreed 
term but the parties failed to constitute it, then each party has to appoint one and the 
third who will preside the tribunal can be appointed by the two appointed arbitrators, 
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otherwise by the court. Hence, in the matter of the composition of the arbitral tribunal, 
YAA complies with international standards.  
2.8 Conduct the Arbitral Proceedings 
The efficient conduct of the dispute goes through various processes and procedures 
from the beginning of the filing the case to the end of the rendered arbitral award as 
follows: 
2.8.1 The Parties’ Autonomy 
The disputing parties are free to choose the procedures and the rules to settle their own 
disputes according to article 19 of UNCITRAL, also they are free to choose the place 
seat of the arbitration according to article 20 as well as the commencement of the 
arbitration that provides in article 21 and the language to conduct the arbitration based 
on article 22. However, there are limitations that must be followed by the tribunal such 
as the principle of the equality in dealing with the all parties to present their cases. 
Article 18 provides that the tribunal shall deal with all parties equally and give the 
opportunity to each to present his/her case. Hence, no party shall be given benefits 
more than the other. They shall all be given enough time to present their cases in equal 
trial. While the language to conduct the arbitration, according to article 18 (1) provides 
that the parties are free to agree on that, but if they failed to agree on certain language, 
then the tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the language or languages. (2) The 
tribunal has power to order any of the disputed parties to translate the documentary 
evidences to the agreed language by the parties or the determined language or 
languages by the tribunal. 
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As Yemen is addressed in this study, it has to refer to YAA to understand the parties’ 
autonomy. It can be seen in section 7 of the Act which provides that the disputed parties 
can agree the law, language and place of arbitration. Also, section 32 provides that the 
parties to the arbitration shall have the right to agree on the procedures to be followed 
by the arbitral tribunal. If there is no agreement on such procedures, the arbitral 
tribunal can follow whatever procedures it deems appropriate. Thus, in the matter of 
parties’ autonomy to choose the applicable law, language, and place to conduct the 
arbitration is similar with standard of international arbitration. YAA gives the parties 
a freedom to settle the parties in the manner that is suitable. Particularly, the applicable 
rules, the language, and the place seat of the arbitration. They have such rights, but if 
there is no such agreement to arrange that procedures, then the arbitral tribunal will 
decide base on its discretion. However, the parties’ autonomy is not that means the 
disputed parties can agree on the terms even that breach the natural justice and/or the 
public policy. So, YAA must provide exceptions or limitations to such principle.  
While the equally treatment of the parties by the arbitral tribunal is fundamental 
requirement of justice so if the arbitral tribunal did not do so, then resisting party of 
the enforcement can set aside the arbitral award based on breach of natural justice 
according to section 33 of the Act. 
2.8.2 Commencing the Arbitration 
Prior to commencing the arbitration there shall be pre-arbitral moves whereas the 
parties agreed. Such pre-arbitral moves like arbitration agreement. The processes of 
the arbitral application as follows: 
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1. The applicant to the arbitration shall submit the request of the arbitration to 
the secretariat, and have to post the notice to the respondent of the receipt, 
request, and the receipt’s date. 
2. The respondent shall reply to the request within 30 days of the receipt. 
3. After the constitution of the tribunal, the chairperson of the arbitral tribunal 
will call the disputed parties and other arbitrators to start the preliminary 
hearing. Then, the disputing parties will start to clarify their own defense. 
This means the arbitration time will start when the claimant serve a notice 
on the respondent.73 Such notice has to include the parties’ address, the 
arbitration clause, the contract, the dispute, the number of the arbitrators, 
the claim, claiming remedy, and so on.74 
It is necessary to refer to YAA to understand the proceedings for commencing the 
arbitration, section 34 provides that arbitration proceedings shall commence from the 
day on which one of the parties receives a request or notice of arbitration from the 
other party. Also, section 35 provides that the respondent shall send a response of a 
written statement to the claimant and each member of the arbitration committee, within 
the agreed period by the parties or time specified by the arbitral tribunal. There is a 
loophole in section 35 which left the period of the response claim to the parties’ agreed 
term or the arbitral tribunal. Often, such period specifically mention in the national 
arbitration laws. It can note that in article 4 (1) of UNCITRAL that provides the period 
that the respondent has to reply on the notice of arbitration is 30 days. Therefore, 
                                                     





section 35 has to be amended to specify the response period to the notice of arbitration 
which is 30 days. 
2.8.3 Hearing and Written Proceedings 
After the submission of the documentations and attendance, the tribunal will decide 
whether to conduct the trial by oral hearing or by documentary evidences and other 
materials.75 This is subject to any other contrary agreements by the disputed parties.76 
Thus, the tribunal has no discretion if the disputing parties agree to conduct oral trial. 
The disputing parties are free to choose the procedures to conduct the trial based on 
the party-autonomy principle according to article 19 (1). The same applies if the 
disputing parties agree not to have oral trial, then the arbitral tribunal shall not conduct 
the trial orally. All documentary evidences submitted by any party shall be given to 
another party.77 As well, all the evidences supplied to the arbitral tribunal by the 
experts have to be served on the disputed parties.78 
It is important to refer to YAA to understand whether the hearing can be agreed by the 
parties to be conducted orally. Section 32 provides that the parties to the arbitration 
shall have the right to agree on the procedures to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. 
It noted that this section is general which gives the disputed parties the right to agree 
on the terms they prefer. However, the section 35 limited the parties’ autonomy to 
agree on the terms they want. It provides that the claimant shall send a written of the 
alleging statement claim to the respondent and to each member of the arbitral tribunal. 
Similarly, section 36 provides that the respondent shall send a written of the response 
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claim to the claimant and to each member of the arbitral tribunal. On the other hand, 
section 38 provides that the arbitral tribunal shall hold hearings to hear the oral 
arguments in order to enable each of the parties to explain the subject of the case and 
to submit arguments and evidence. Throughout these sections, it can see that YAA 
unambiguous in the matter of the parties’ autonomy to agree on the term to settle their 
disputes by oral trial only. For instance, section 32 gives them the right to conduct the 
arbitration proceedings orally, while section 35 and 36 stipulate documentary 
submission. Hence, YAA shall specifically state the parties’ autonomy to agree on the 
trial of the parties’ arguments to conduct by documentary manner or orally manner as 
they seem fit. 
2.8.4 Default of a Party 
According to article 25, the parties are obligated to communicate claiming statement 
and defence as well, unless agreed on the contrary as follows: 
a) The claimant has to conduct his/her statement of claim that provided in 
article 23 (1), if he/she failed to do then the tribunal can terminate the 
proceedings. 
b) The respondent has to conduct his defence that provided in article 23 (1), 
if he/she failed to do then the tribunal has to proceed with proceeding and 
must not consider the non-communication of the defence as agreed on the 
claimant’s allegation. 
c) The tribunal has jurisdiction to make award based on the evidences before 
it so if any of the disputed parties failed to present his/her case or evidence 
has to bear the consequences of the award. 
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There is need to distinguish between the statement of claim and request of arbitration. 
The request of arbitration is only the preliminary step to arbitration based on article 
21, while the statement of claim is mentioned in article 23 (1) and has to be submitted 
on time according to the period agreed by the disputing parties or that determined by 
the arbitral tribunal.79 Therefore, UNCITRAL stipulated that the claimant has to 
communicate his/her statement of claim, if he/she failed to communicate that then the 
tribunal will terminate the arbitral application immediately. After the claimant 
submitted his/her statement of claim, the respondent has to submit his/her statement of 
defence based on the claimant’s allegation. Otherwise, if the respondent failed to 
communicate his/her statement of defence the tribunal will continue the trial and will 
render the arbitral award based on the evidentiary documents before it. The tribunal 
will not consider the respondent’s failure to submit his/her statement of defence and 
agreed on the claimant’s allegation. 
It is necessary to address YAA to understand its compliance with international 
arbitration system. Section 41 of the Act provides that if the claimant fails to submit 
his statement of claim, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate all arbitral proceedings and 
shall have the right to demand payment of all expenses arising from the 
commencement and termination of the proceedings. If the respondent fails to submit 
his/her response statement, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings. But, 
the failure of the respondent shall not be considered as acceptance of the statement of 
claim. If a party fails to attend trial/hearing or fails to submit the evidence required of 
it, the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and issue its award in the dispute 
on the basis of the evidence before it. It could be seen in the matter of default of the 
                                                     




party, YAA complies with international standard of arbitration system. As section 41 
is same as section 25 of UNCITRAL that both systems provide the same position. 
2.8.5 The Appointment of Expert 
According to article 26 provides that the tribunal has jurisdiction to appoint an expert 
unless contrary agreed by the disputed parties. (1) An expert can be appointed by the 
tribunal to give his opinion that will be considered by the tribunal. (2) Any of the 
disputed parties can request from the tribunal to appoint an expert to have his/her 
opinion over specific issue. There is need to distinguish between an expert witness that 
requested by any of the disputed parties and an expert that appointed by the arbitral 
tribunal.80 The witness expert is only called by one of the disputed parties to support 
his/her allegation or argue with the arbitral tribunal or another party.81 The 
appointment of the expert is subject to the prior agreement of the disputing parties.82 
The parties’ autonomy could prevent the appointment, if the disputing parties do not 
wish to appoint the expert.83 However, the parties’ autonomy of non-appointment of 
expert has to be prior to constituting the arbitral tribunal.84 The tribunal has to resign 
if has no ability to handle the dispute without an expert.85 Thus, the tribunal can choose 
to follow the parties’ wish not to appoint an expert or to resign.86 
The disputing parties have to cooperate with the expert if he/she requests any goods, 
documents, evidences to investigate.87 They are not allowed to refuse to submit any 
                                                     




84 Ibid, 161-162. 
85 Ibid, 162. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, 164. 
 
104 
material for investigation as long as the order is issued by the arbitral tribunal.88 If any 
of the parties refused to cooperate with the expert, then the tribunal will continue the 
trial and will render the arbitral award based on the evidentiary documents before it 
according to article 25 (c) of UNCITRAL.89 According of article 26 (2) the expert has 
to submit his/her report in writing or orally.90 Then, the disputing parties can testify 
through asking questions to the expert by their own witness expert.91 However, article 
27 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules which stipulates a written report has to be 
submitted by the expert.92 It shall be noted there is loophole in UNCITRAL which 
failed to provide the right of the disputing parties to challenge the arbitral tribunal’ 
appointment of the expert.93 So, the disputed parties has no power to challenge the 
appointment of the expert even if they discovered his/her bias.94 
There are some loopholes in YAA. Based on section 42 provides that the arbitral 
tribunal can appoint one or more experts to submit a written or oral report on the issues 
it considers being relevant to the subject of the dispute. The parties to the dispute shall 
provide the necessary assistance to enable the expert or experts to complete the task in 
the best manner. The arbitral tribunal shall send copies of the report to both Parties and 
the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide to hold a hearing to 
hear the expert's opinion and to allow the parties to hear, discuss and respond to it. 
Either party may use an expert or experts as witnesses in such a case, unless otherwise 
agreed. 










Indeed, there are loopholes in the relevant section of the appointment of expert. Firstly, 
it gives the parties a jurisdiction to appoint witness expert without the tribunal consent. 
Secondly, the expert can submit a written or oral report on the issues while it is stronger 
to submit a written report as UNCITRAL provides a written report only. Thirdly, 
whether the parties’ autonomy can agree on the exclusion of appointment of the 
expert? Thus, YAA has to be amended on the matter of the appointment of the expert 
and witness expert.   
2.8.6 The Court Assistance in Taking Evidence 
Based on article 27 of UNCITRAL provides that if the arbitral tribunal of any of the 
disputed parties want to take evidence, they can request the court of this state 
assistance. Then, the request can be executed with the court’s competency and based 
on evidence rules. Based on the suggestion of the Working Group that there are two 
approaches of the court’s assistance.95 First one is that the court will only assist the 
arbitral tribunal through compulsion which enable the arbitral tribunal to take the 
evidence.96 The second assistance is the court to take the evidence by itself.97 But, the 
combination approach of the two is that the court will determine whether to only enable 
the arbitral tribunal to take the evidence or the court itself will take the evidence.98 It 
depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case.99 While the request of the 
parties to have the court’ assistance is subject to the court’ approval.100 The approval 
condition in order to prevent the abuse of the court’ assistance.101 The request for court 
                                                     









assistance has to provide the address and name of the parties, witnesses, and so on.102 
However, the court’s assistance is difficult if the court in different country of the place 
seat of the arbitration.103 Thus, the court’ assistance in such situation will depend on 
the international cooperation among the states such as bilateral treaties and 
conventions.104 
The national court is the main factor to make the international arbitration powerful, the 
international arbitration cannot succeed without the interference support of national 
court.105 The arbitral tribunal is stronger by the court’s support as they do two main 
tasks: assistance and control.106 For assistance, the national courts do multiple 
functions such as grant seeking interim measures of protection, appointment of 
arbitrators, calling for expert or witnesses, taking evidence, and the like proceedings 
that may out of the arbitration tribunal capacity, while in the matter of controlling the 
national courts do refuse the application of any of the disputed parties if the agreement 
contained arbitral condition and this upon the request of the other party, appointment 
of the arbitrators and revocation or replacement as well.107 
As Yemen is addressed in this study, it must allude to section 31 of YAA that gives 
the tribunal a jurisdiction to require security of any of the parties to guarantee the 
compliance with tribunal awards. But, sometimes, the disputed parties resist the 
tribunal awards so as it does not have power to force any of the parties. It has to request 
assistance from the court. This could be seen in section 43 provides that the arbitral 
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tribunal or any of the parties can request assistance from the competent court to obtain 
evidence as well as a request to take interim measures of protection as it deems fit and 
it can request the competent court to adjudicate matters relating to the dispute beyond 
its powers, Without this being a reason for the discontinuation of arbitral proceedings. 
But, which of the two authorities has the jurisdiction to allow such awards? In fact, the 
court could give an interim measures but in case the tribunal allowed an interim 
measures before the court does so, at that point the court has to perform the arbitral 
tribunal awards. On the other hand, section 43 gives the court a jurisdiction to grant 
interim measures during the arbitral proceedings, this implies none of the two 
authorities has more power over another. In the researcher’ supposition, the tribunal is 
gathered to as it were have the authority to allow interim measures as it is more known 
of arbitral issues more than the court. Hence, this will lead to conflict of jurisdiction 
which YAA has to clarify the ambiguity as well as the application for interim measures 
of protection as the court will makes the arbitral processes longer. It is better to 
authorize the arbitral tribunal firstly, if the arbitral tribunal refused to grant interim 
measures of protections then the resist party can refer to the court. However, referring 
to the court will impede the arbitral processes and procedures. For more questions, the 
position of interim measures of protection in YAA is deeply discussed in chapter three 
through an interview. 
2.9 The Arbitral Award 
After the hearing of disputed parties the tribunal renders the arbitral award which is 
final and binding.108 The award is not subject to negotiation by the disputed parties to 
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accept it or refuse.109 The award is final and binding, it is only subject to specific 
grounds which the debtor party can set aside it if proved any of them.110 After the 
award is rendered, the creditor party can expect three things from the debtor party.111 
The first thing, the debtor party complies with the award voluntarily. Secondly, the 
debtor party ignores the award but does not take resisting action. Thirdly, the debtor 
party resists the award and strives hard to frustrate the recognition and enforcement.  
Such award cannot appeal to the tribunal. In case the debtor party refuses to enforce it 
for any reason must challenge that before the court of the host state or the court of the 
place of enforcement of the arbitral award.112 The arbitral award maybe set aside if did 
not comply with specific requirements provided by the law of the host state.113 Also, 
the enforcement of the arbitral award must be subject to the laws of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award.114  
2.10 The Recognition and Enforcement 
The main objective of NYC is to recognize and enforce the arbitral award which it 
requires the signatory-state to deal with the award as binding and enforce based on the 
law of the territory when the award is relied upon.115 . Most of the arbitral awards are 
implemented voluntarily by the debtor party.116 However, the arbitral award is only a 
half of the journey in case the debtor party refuses to enforce the award.117 The 
enforcement is subject to limited grounds that may lead to set aside the award.118 For 
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questions, there are bilateral treaties that stipulate on the enforcement of the arbitral 
awards.119 
The issuing of the arbitral award is the first step to the enforcement. The creditor party 
will refer to the the place of enforcement of the arbitral award require it to recognize and 
enforce the award.120 The creditor party has to follow the mechanism of enforcement 
in the court in order to effect the award that has been rendered by the tribunal.121 The 
place of enforcement of the arbitral award will firstly determine the recognition of the 
validity and the binding of the award, then will take the coercive proceedings to the 
enforcement.122   
2.11 The Enforcement Tools  
The enforcement mechanism is different from one state to another. The common 
practical mechanism is to seize the debtor party’s assets.123 The place of enforcement of 
the arbitral award can assist the creditor party if the debtor party has assets within its 
jurisdiction. Thus, it is preferable that the creditor party investigates the following:124 
1.  In which state the debtor party’s assets are located and the easier state to 
enforce the award as well. 
2. Whether the place of enforcement of the arbitral award is signatory-state to NYC, 
this is a necessary requirement. He/she has to mind any reciprocity reservation 
or public policy.In case the place of enforcement of the arbitral award is not 
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signatory-state to NYC, whether there are other conventions or bilateral treaties 
that may assist the enforcement. 
3. If there are no conventions or bilateral treaties, it has to see the laws of the place 
of enforcement of the arbitral award in the matter of enforcement of the foreign 
award. 
After investigation of easier state to enforce the arbitral award, the creditor party shall 
apply an application for recognition and enforcement based the procedures of the state 
where the enforcement is sought. Then, such application will be served on the debtor 
party in case he/she has a defence to set aside the award. The recognition and 
enforcement may made based on the following:125 
1- The provisions of New York Convention, he/she must follow the requirements in 
paragraph (1) and (2) of article IV as following: 
a) The original award must be authenticated or certified copy 
b) In case the award is written in a language other than the official language of the 
place of enforcement of the arbitral award, the applicant must translate such 
documents. 
2- The provisions of bilateral treaties or other conventions other than New York  
3- File an action claiming the obligation of rendered arbitral award 
4- Any mechanism of the recognition and enforcement that are effective at the place 
of enforcement of the arbitral award. 
It has to be noted that usually the interim measures of protection are taken in advance 
to guarantee the enforcement of the arbitral award where the applicant of such interim 
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measures proves the merit of the case in his/her favour.126 Such power to grant the 
interim measures of protection through the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the arbitration 
agreement.127 Thus, the applicant of interim measures of protection has to prove that 
the arbitral award is less likely to be enforced in the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award if the debtor party does not comply with the award.128 It has to refer to ICC case 
10021, the claimant applied to the tribunal to attach the respondents’ assets. The 
tribunal indirectly accepted the application by preventing the respondents from 
disposing the disputed assets.129 
2.12 Annulment of the international arbitral award  
Most arbitration statutes deal with IAA as presumptively valid as far as the 
requirements for recognition are existed.130 IAA shall be recognized by the court 
unless the court finds any of the provide exception in NYC.131 The arbitral award may 
not set aside by the court on the ground only a mistake of law or mistake of fact.132 
After establishing the requirements by the creditor under article IV of NYC, then the 
creditor party has established prima facie to recognize the award.133 Therefore, the 
debtor party bears the burden to fail the recognition and enforcement by proving any 
of the grounds under article V of the convention (as discussed in chapter three).134 
However, if the debtor party fails to raise jurisdictional challenge during the arbitral 
process, generally cannot later challenge the opposition in order to set aside the 
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recognition and enforcement.135 On the other hand, any practice of misconduct or fraud 
by the arbitrator will lead to refusal of the recognition and enforcement of the award.136 
Hence, as far as arbitrator’s misconduct or fraud will adversely affect the enforcement 
of IAA, it is more likely lack of impartiality and independence in the judiciary will 
adversely affect the enforcement of the award. 
The NYC does have grounds to annul the IAA, such grounds are limited to the court’ 
discretion.137 Most national arbitration laws provide such grounds for annulment.138 
The court of seat of the arbitration is generally deal with challenging the award.139 
Even though, the arbitral award is binding, the debtor party still have chance to set 
aside it if could prove any of the grounds that mentioned in article V of NYC as 
follows: 
1. Incapacity or invalidity 
2. Improper notice or inability to present case 
3. Award goes beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration 
4. Improper procedure or tribunal composition 
5. Award is not yet binding or has been set aside or suspended 
6. Matter that cannot be settled by arbitration 
7. Award is contrary public policy. 
However, debtor party does not have to prove some grounds to set aside the award 
whereas the court has the authority to raise its discretion, such grounds like that the 
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dispute is not suitable to be settled under arbitration, the arbitral award is in conflict 
with public policy, commercial, or reciprocity reservation.140 There is no express 
grounds provided by the NYC to annul IAA in the place of suit. The provided grounds 
in article V of the convention is only to deal with annulment of the IAA in the state 
where the enforcement is sought. The provided grounds in article V do not apply to 
IAA in the place of suit or local arbitral award. However, article V (1) (e) of the 
convention provides that the court of the place seat has jurisdiction to vacate the award 
based on the national law, so the convention did not deprive the national court of the 
place seat of its supervisory authority over IAA.141 
2.13 The Court Intervention 
As far as our study is more concerned about the enforcement of the IAA, the researcher 
has to highlights the court intervention that usually come into the picture when the 
creditor party looking for the recognition and the enforcement while the debtor party 
makes effort to set aside the arbitral award.142 The domestic law of the place seat has 
jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral award and the intervention authorities as well while 
the domestic law of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award has jurisdiction to refuse 
to enforce the award.143 Especially, after the award is rendered by the tribunal that 
passes it through two stages as follows: 
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2.13.1 The Supervision by the Court of the Place Seat of the Arbitration 
The court of the place seat of the arbitration has jurisdiction to supervise the arbitration 
award which could even have the right to vacate the arbitral award.144 The competent 
court of the place seat is only has such jurisdiction to supervise the proceedings and 
procedures while the place of enforcement of the arbitral award could only refuse the 
recognition and the enforcement.145 as commonly known that the most important of 
the arbitration mechanism is that the enforcement of the arbitral award so that any of 
the disputing parties or the tribunal may require some securities as a guarantee to 
enforce the arbitral award, but has no authority to compel any of the parties to 
implement its awards so that it has to ask the control and assistance of the competent 
court of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. Furthermore, the competent 
court of the place seat also could provide control and assistance within its sovereignty, 
such as securities, seizure of assets to implement the arbitration agreement and the 
arbitral process.146 Such jurisdiction to take interim measures of protection is not 
provided by NYC which only provided in article 17147 of UNCITRAL which provides 
that the arbitral tribunal has a jurisdiction to order any of the disputed parties to provide 
securities to ensure the compliance with the subject matter of the arbitration, such 
request of securities may be required upon the request of any of the disputed parties. 
However, UNCITRAL is not compulsory rules, it is only used as a guideline to 
improve the national arbitration laws. 
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Generally, the competent court of the place seat would consider the debtor party’s 
application of challenging the arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal exceeded its 
authority or improperly applied the procedures and processes.148 Whereas, the national 
arbitration law of each state which most national arbitration laws based on 
UNCITRAL clarifies the grounds that the court could set aside the arbitral award and 
the national arbitration law may has more grounds than that stated under UNCITRAL, 
but UNCITRAL does not encourage the interference with tribunal processes unless 
provided by this law.149 For example, article 53 (g) of YAA contains the ground of 
principles of the Shari’a which the arbitral award is more likely to be vacated if it 
contravened the principles of the Shari’a. Such vacation is clearly provided in article 
V (1) (e)150 which gives the court of the place seat a jurisdiction to vacate or pending 
the arbitral award.  
However, the NYC stated the grounds to refuse the recognition and the enforcement 
of the foreign award, but failed to mention the grounds which the national court of the 
place seat could vacate the award based on. Hence, it leaves a full jurisdiction to the 
court to consider the award whether it is valid or void, this is a lacuna which the court 
is perhaps bias to its nationals and might accept the interference of external influences 
such as political interference, corruption, tribalism, local protectionism, and so on. But, 
if there are specific exceptions of setting aside the award provided by NYC or other 
conventions, then the court of the place seat will be restricted from getting out of the 
course of justice.  
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Most of the national arbitration laws consider the court supervision as mandatory 
which the disputed parties has no authority to exclude or limit the jurisdiction of the 
court to supervise the arbitration and might vacate the award which argues that without 
review, the award will adversely affect the place of enforcement of the arbitral award in 
case of implementation of the arbitral award.151 However, some states like Switzerland 
allows the disputing parties to limit or exclude the court supervision of setting aside 
the award while the United States allows the parties to agree on the limitation of the 
court supervision as well as could agree on stricter court supervision.152 Moreover, in 
case the debtor party applied to vacate the award at the competent court of the place 
seat and the request is rejected, such rejection does not mean that the award shall be 
enforced by the state where the enforcement is sought, the place of enforcement of the 
arbitral award has a jurisdiction to determine the validity of the arbitral award.153 In 
addition, the most disputed parties disagree on that the place seat must has jurisdiction 
to review the arbitration award while the most agree on that the place of enforcement of 
the arbitral award shall have jurisdiction to review the award.154 To be more 
understanding must refer the case of Northrop Corp v Triad International 
Marketing.155 The judicial review of the award led to reject the enforcement because 
bargain of selling army weapons to Saudi Arabia infringed the public policy of 
California Law and America as a whole.  
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2.13.2 The Supervision of the the Place of Enforcement of the Arbitral Award 
Based on thumb’ rule, the place of enforcement of the arbitral award has to respect the 
rendered decision by the court of the place seat.156 However, in some circumstances 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award shall not follow the decision of the court of 
the place seat.157 As commonly known that each state has its own culture, legal system, 
religion and the like, so that what could be seen as lawful in one state may be seen as 
unlawful in another state.158 This is the same that the grounds to vacate the arbitral 
award are not the same grounds to reject the arbitral awards. Thus, the court of the 
place seat may vacate the arbitral award based on its discretion and the domestic law, 
nonetheless, the same arbitral award is perhaps enforced in the place of enforcement 
of the arbitral award. Such authority of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award is 
based on article V (1) (e)159 that provides the arbitral award may be rejected if the court 
of the place seat set aside the award, whereas the word may that mentioned in the 
article does not mean the award shall or must be refused. It leaves the court of the place 
of enforcement of the arbitral award to decide whether the recognition and the 
enforcement comply with NYC and the domestic law of the place of enforcement of 
the arbitral award. The convention did not provide obligations to implement the 
vacated award.160 By anyway, there are five approaches to deal with the vacated award 
as follows: 
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1- The Traditional Approach: this approach is the most strict which deal with the 
vacated award as null and void, so that the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award has no jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award which is already vacated 
by the competent court of the place seat.161 The rationale behind this approach 
is that the competent court of the place seat is more familiar with the 
proceedings and the award as a whole than the competent court of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award which such approach comply with article V (1) 
(e) of NYC that gives the place of enforcement of the arbitral award a jurisdiction 
to refuse the recognition. According to Albert Jan, applying this approach will 
cut off the creditor party of the arbitral award from marketing the award among 
the states in order to find the appropriate state that could recognize and enforce 
the vacated award.162  
2- French Approach: this approach enforces the vacated award if fulfills all the 
requirements for the recognition and the enforcement.163 To understand more, 
refer to the case of In Re Chromalloy Aeroservices.164 In this case, the arbitral 
award was vacated by the Egyptian Court of Appeal which is the place seat. 
Nonetheless, the creditor party succeeded in claiming the recognition and the 
enforcement of the same award under both France and the United States’ 
jurisdictions. 
3- Chromalloy Aero services Approach: such approach applies in the United 
States which recognizes and enforces the vacated arbitral award by the court of 
the place seat if the arbitral award fulfills all requirements for the enforcement. 
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Also, the parties had a prior conditional term in the arbitration agreement that 
stipulates the exclusion of appeal against the award. It could refer to the case 
of In Re Chromalloy Aero services.165 In this case, there was a prior agreement 
between the disputed parties which provides the exclusion of the right to appeal 
against the arbitral award. So, the US competent court enforced the award after 
fulfilling the required demands for the enforcement.  
4- Local Standard Annulment Approach (LSA): this approach allowed the 
enforcement of the vacated award even such award was vacated in the place 
seat. The argument of this approach is based on Jan Paulsson who says that the 
competent court of the place seat vacates the arbitral award based on its 
national arbitration law, not according to article 36 (1) (a) of UNCITRAL or 
article V (1) of the NYC, so that there is no legitimate reason to challenge the 
place of enforcement of the arbitral award to implement the arbitral award. Based 
on Paulsson, LSA will lead the competent court of the place seat to deal with 
the arbitral award based on international standard process.166 
5- Comity Approach: this approach is an idea of William Park, which encourages 
the enforcement of the vacated award after the creditor party proved that the 
vacated award was improper or biased or could find the competent court of the 
place seat violated the justice.167 
It should be alluded to YAA to comprehend the position of vacated award, there is an 
escape clause in YAA in the matter of the vacated award. In case the court of the place 
seat vacated the award, YAA is considered to silent. Thus, YAA has to be amended 
by adding authority that clarifies the position of the vacated award, regardless of 
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whether the Yemen court will enforce the vacated arbitral award if fulfills all 
requirements under YAA or it will reject it as long as it is vacated in the place seat of 
the arbitration. 
By anyway, the disputed parties usually prefer the court supervision because such 
supervision will protect the disputed parties from arbitrator’s perversion. According to 
F A Mann, the domestic law of the place seat is the most important element to operate 
the arbitration, so that no other factor could replace the function of the domestic law 
which is the main element to give rights and power to the private persons.168 Such 
importance of the court supervision could see in Lord Mustill’s opinion in the case of 
Cape Levalin N. V. v Kan- Ren Fertilisers & Chemicals.169 He opined that it is 
undoubtedly the court only has power which could rescue the arbitration mechanism 
in case of danger.  Thus, choosing such state by the disputing parties, means the 
arbitration proceedings are subject to the national arbitration law of the place seat 
unless it is agreed that another arbitration law should apply to the dispute. 
On the other hand, some parties dislike the court supervision. However, the disputing 
parties often prefer more supervision on the arbitral award by the competent court.170 
The intervention of the court supervision is very important whether by the court of the 
place seat of the arbitration or the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. 
Especially, when the debtor party resists the enforcement of the arbitral award, so that 
without minimum intervention the arbitration system will not succeed171 whereas the 
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intervention by the competent court of the signatory states is authorized by article 8 
(1) and 5 of UNCITRAL and II (3) of NYC. The place of enforcement of the arbitral award 
will play the role of supervision of the recognition and enforcement.172  Such 
supervision will hold on the arbitral award, which the competent court of the place seat 
will contribute to correct the wrong decision or vacate the arbitral award.173 Hence, if 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award enforced the vacated arbitral award, this 
means it enforced the rendered arbitral award by the arbitral tribunal, it does not mean 
that degrade the competent court of the place seat.174 The court supervision often 
focuses on the tribunal equal treatment of the disputed parties and delivered justice, it 
is not a matter that the one of the disputed parties not satisfied with the rendered award 
but must be treated equally.175 For example, if it is found the evidence with that 
rendered award based on was forged, this would raise doubt that the arbitration 
violated justice.  
It has to refer to YAA to understand the position of the parties’ autonomy to exclude 
the court supervision or interference. YAA is silent in this feature which has to clarify 
that the parties can agree on terms to exclude the court interference such as review the 
award or challenge it. As the main feature of the arbitration is to settle the dispute 
outside the court so YAA has be flexible to provide such position of parties’ rights to 
agree on what terms they want. The right of the disputed parties to exclude or limit the 
right to set aside or challenge the arbitral award as long as UNCITRAL did not oppose 
the disputed parties’ rights to agree on such terms. As commonly known that the 
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disputed parties prefer to settle their dispute by arbitration mechanism rather than court 
system because of faster procedures and processes. However, challenging the arbitral 
award in the court will adversely affect such feature. Thus, the parties’ autonomy may 
agree to limit the court jurisdiction to set aside or reject the arbitral award. YAA has 
to be amended by adding such authority. 
2.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the fundamental elements that are more related to the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. Such discussion gives more 
understanding of arbitration procedures and processes towards the enforcement of the 
arbitral award. It facilitates the way to discuss deeply how the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards is going to be. Throughout the discussion, some loopholes 
in YAA has been discovered as follows: 
 
1. Section 7 is limited the choice of the law. This is against the principle of 
autonomy in arbitration system. But, this does not affect the enforcement of 
IAA if both parties or one is a non-Yemeni; 
2.  YAA is silent if the arbitral tribunal arbitrated a dispute but exceeded its 
authority by arbitrating non-agreed dispute alongside. What is the authority in 
such position? Will the place of enforcement of the arbitral award reject to enforce 
the whole arbitral award?  Will the court enforce part of arbitral award which 
it will enforce the agreed dispute to be settled by arbitration and reject the non-
agreed dispute by the parties? Hence, YAA must be amended to add section 
regarding such gap; 
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3. Section 35 has to be amended to specify the response period to the notice of 
arbitration which shall be 30 days; 
4. YAA is unambiguous in the matter of the parties’ autonomy to agree on the 
hearing term to settle their disputes. For instance, section 32 gives them the 
right to conduct the arbitration proceedings orally, while sections 35 and 36 
stipulate documentary submission. Hence, YAA shall specifically state the 
parties’ autonomy to agree on the type of trial of the parties’ arguments to 
conduct by documentary manner and/or orally manner as they seem fit; 
5. There are loopholes in section 42 of the appointment of expert. Firstly, it gives 
the parties a jurisdiction to appoint an expert witness without the tribunal 
consent. Secondly, the expert can submit a written or oral report on the issues 
while it is better to submit a written report as UNCITRAL provides a written 
report only. Thirdly, whether the parties’ autonomy can agree on the exclusion 
of appointment of the expert? Even exclusion of expert may cost them more as 
the arbitral tribunal will face difficulties to understand the issue so this will 
lead to long procedures and processes. Thus, YAA has to be amended on the 
matter of the appointment of the expert and witness expert; 
6.  Whether arbitral tribunal or the court has the jurisdiction to allow interim 
measures of protection? In fact, the court could give an interim measures but 
in case the tribunal allowed an interim measures before the court does so, at 
that point the court has to perform the arbitral tribunal awards. On the other 
hand, section 43 gives the court a jurisdiction to grant interim measures during 
the arbitral proceedings, this implies none of the two authorities has more 
power over another. In the researcher’ position, the tribunal is gathered to as it 
were have the authority to allow interim measures as it is more known of 
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arbitral issues more than the court. Hence, this will lead to conflict of 
jurisdiction which YAA has to clarify the ambiguity as well as the application 
for interim measures of protection in the court will makes the arbitral processes 
longer; 
7. YAA is silent in the matter of the vacated award as to how the deal would be 
in case the court of the place seat vacated the award. Thus, YAA has to be 
amended by adding authority that clarifies the position of the vacated award. 
Whether the Yemen court will enforce the vacated arbitral award if fulfills all 
requirements under YAA or it will reject it as long as vacated in the place seat 
of the arbitration; 
8.  YYA is silent in the parties’ autonomy to exclude the court supervision which 
has to clarify that the parties can agree on terms to exclude the court 
interference such as review the award or challenge it. As the main feature of 
the arbitration is to settle the dispute outside the court is faster procedures and 
processes so YAA has be flexible to provide such position of parties’ rights to 
agree on. The right of the disputed parties to exclude or limit the right to set 
aside or challenge the arbitral award as long as UNCITRAL did not oppose the 
disputed parties’ rights to agree on such terms; 
9. What the effectiveness is of the vacated award by the state of the place seat, 
whether Yemen court will reject it base on the decision of the place seat of the 
arbitration or will enforce it if fulfills all the requirements under YAA; 
10. YAA has to clarify the position of the disputed parties’ autonomy to exclude 
or limit the right to set aside or challenge the arbitral award as long as 
UNCITRAL did not oppose the disputed parties’ rights to agree on such terms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
YEMENI LEGISLATIONS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 
3.1 Introduction 
The enforcement of IAA is the main purpose of the arbitration system which only 
could be enforced through the national arbitration laws which local laws have to be 
sufficient enough to conduct arbitral processes.1 The implementation stage of the 
arbitral award can be considered the highest summit of the arbitration dispute. Where 
there is nothing after. On the other words, the enforcement of the arbitral award is the 
most important stage in arbitration. Nevertheless, the arbitral award was rendered in 
different legal system of the place seat of the arbitration. But still the legal system of 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award is applicable at the enforcement stage. as 
the place of enforcement of the arbitral award control and assist to enforce the arbitral 
award is major importance. As far as the enforcement of the arbitral award is 
concerned, the researcher will examine the provisions relating to the enforcement of 
arbitration laws such as Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, Yemeni Procedure and 
the Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 and international conventions such as 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York, 1958), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on 
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Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international 
laws and Bilateral Investment Treaties to identify the loopholes in YAA. This chapter 
will discuss YAA in terms of matters that relates to the recognition and enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award to investigate its effectiveness and capability to cope with 
international arbitration. It is stated that one of the states with ineffective arbitration in 
the Middle East is Yemen as the country lacks of national arbitration laws.2 
Yemen is the first Arab country that enacted the arbitration law in 1981. For instance, 
Saudi Arabia issued the first arbitration system in 19833 and a royal decree was issued 
in Sultanate of Oman in 1997 for issuing arbitration law for civil and commercial 
disputes. This means Republic of Yemen is very serious to cope with international 
trade through providing the needed factors to attract the FDI. Thus, Yemeni Arbitration 
(Act No. 22) 1992 which was amended in 1997, established commercial courts in some 
provinces, and paved the way for the enforcement of the Yemeni Investment (Act No. 
10) 2010. 
3.2 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Yemen 
The judicial formal system has two courts to settle the legal disputes as follows: 
3.2.1 The Court System 
The court system applies two main Acts to settle the disputes. The application of each 
Act depends on the type of the issue as follows: 
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3.2.1.1 The Civil Courts 
Such courts usually adjudicate over the civil disputes. Section (1) of Yemeni Civil 
Procedure and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 provides that this law derived from 
Islamic Shari’a and applies to all transactions and issues, if there is no provision in 
this law, the principles of Islamic law that this law derived from shall applies. If not 
found under the Islamic law, it has to refer to custom that are in accordance with 
Islamic law, if there is nothing has to refer to the principles of Justice that are in 
accordance with the Islamic law, and takes the opinion of scientists in terms of Fiqh, 
Islamic law and customs which must not be contrary to the principles of Islamic law 
and public policy. Yemeni Civil Procedure and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 
(YCPIL) is the general law of the other branches of private law, including commercial 
law.4 This is confirmed by the Yemeni legislation in section 34 of YCPIL which 
provides that if there is no provision of specialized laws that can be applied to the 
issue, it has to refer to YCPIL. This law emerged from the book and the Sunna and the 
consensus and measurement and take the strongest evidence from the total doctrines 
of Ijtihad5.6 Based on article 3 of the Yemeni constitution which provides that the 
Islamic law is the main source of all laws. 
Therefore, the enforcement of any contract, transaction, or arbitral award cannot be 
implemented in some Yemen if that violated the rules of Shari’a, especially, if the 
contract or the judgement provides interest whatever as a profit, fine, or commission. 
Also, the contract itself is void if it is dealing with uncertainty (Gharar) or usury (Riba) 
                                                     
4 Saeed Mohammed Haitham, Yemeni Commercial Law, 2nd ed (Yemen: Aden University, 2013), 26. 
5 Ijtihad: is made or directing efforts to perform scientific work and diligence requirements must have 
a hard worker then that he can search and inference, and thus develop Sharia provisions. 
6 Mohammed Hussein Al Shami, General Theory of Obligations in Yemeni Civil Law (Sharia 
Transactions), (Yemen: Aljeel Aljadeed, 2014), 10. 
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terms. This is very important to refer to as Yemen is considered as an Islamic country, 
so the contract or the judgement that violated the Islamic law will not be valid or 
enforced under the ground of violation of Islamic law and public policy of the country 
as a whole. For example, section 53 of YAA that provides the arbitral award will be 
refused if it is violated the Shari’a rules or the public policy.7 Therefore, the arbitral 
tribunal and the parties have to be aware of Shari’a rules regarding to the agreements, 
procedures, and the awards which contravene the Shari’a and whether such 
contravention would prevent the enforcement of the arbitral award. 
As mentioned before referring to Shari’a with a specific end goal to rebut the Yemeni 
legislator reservation of non-ratifying NYC. This clarifies that Shari’a is requirement 
to enforce IAA. Yemen court has a discretion to set aside or refuse to enforce IAA if 
contravenes Shari’a principles. It cannot consider Shari’a as an impediment to enforce 
IAA but IAA itself is an impediment to the recognition and enforcement if contravenes 
Shari’a principles. Shari’a does not come from the Codes, Acts and the like, but from 
the divine law which was revealed by God. Hence, if human law is contrary to the law 
of God, it should be disregarded. Shari’a is true law and it is in agreement with nature; 
it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting. 
3.2.1.2 The Commercial Courts 
The court litigation takes dual jurisdiction, so there is a commercial jurisdiction 
dealing with the consideration of commercial disputes, and civil judiciary has 
jurisdiction in the consideration of all private non-commercial disputes.8 According to 
section 3 of The Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) 1991 which provides that this law 
                                                     
7 Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, section 53. 
8 Ibid, sections 38-39. 
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applies to merchants and commercial activities carried out by any person whether 
dealer or non-merchant. It was the first of Yemen's reign in this system after the 
adoption of Law No. 20 of 1976 establishing the primary commercial courts in Sana'a, 
Taiz and Hodeidah in northern part of Yemen that called the Arab Republic of Yemen.9 
In the so-called Yemen People's Democratic Republic, there were no existing 
commercial courts. It was taken by the system of the judiciary unit so that the court is 
competent to adjudicate in all commercial or civil disputes.10 After the unification of 
Yemen in 1990, the state worked to implement the dual justice system in the southern 
part of Yemen. A commercial courts were established in Aden and Mukalla.11 The 
provinces that did not have commercial courts were granted jurisdiction to deal with 
commercial cases so that their judgement would be final if the claim’s amount were 
not increased over 70 thousand Yemeni riyals.12  
The Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) 1991 is narrower than Yemeni Civil Procedure 
and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002.13 The commercial law deals with a certain 
class of merchants, whether individuals or companies, while civil law includes general 
provisions and rules among individuals regardless of their characteristics or the nature 
of their business.14 According to section 6 of Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) 1991, 
it provides that if there is no legal provision applicable, then the judge has to refer to 
Islamic law, if there is no provision under Islamic law, then he has to refer to the 
custom, and if there is no custom, he has to apply the principles and rules of Justice. 
The Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) 1991 is different of Yemeni Civil Procedure 
                                                     
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Alhaji Abdulkadir Mohamed, Explaining the Yemeni Commercial Law: Business and Traders 




and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 in the matter of application of Islamic law. It 
can notice that in section 1 of Yemeni Civil Procedure and Implementation (Act No. 
40) 2002 that the Islamic law shall prevail over all laws so if any law contravened the 
Islamic law is void. While in section 6 of Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) 1991 the 
applicable priority of this law if no provision in this Yemeni Commercial Act then can 
refer to Islamic law. Section 6 of Yemeni Commercial (Act No. 32) is contravened 
article 3 of the Yemeni constitution that provides the Islamic law is the main sources 
of the all laws. 
3.3 The Historical Development Legislations Governing Arbitration System in 
Yemen 
The Yemeni arbitration system has passed through many stages as follows: 
3.3.1 Yemeni Law for Enforcement or Judgements Law No. (10), 1978 
During the effectiveness of this law in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
there is no special arbitration law to deal arbitral dispute, it is only deals with foreign 
judgements.15 Furthermore, such law does not apply ex parte principles, so grant of 
interim measures will not be enforced in Yemen courts.16 Also, this law did not define 
when the court judgement is final so the debtor party and the creditor party will fail to 
prove that the judgement is final and effective.17 Such lacuna will adversely affect the 
                                                     
15 Isam Muhammad Ghanem, “The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgements in the 
Yemen Arab Republic,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1988): 81, accessed October 22, 
2015, http://sci-hub.cc/10.1163/157302588x00155. 
16 Ibid, 82. 
17 Ibid, 81. 
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refusal on grounds that give the right to the debtor party to resist or set aside the 
enforcement of the arbitral award based on that grounds. 
3.3.2 Yemeni Arbitration Law 1981 
Yemen is regarded as the first Arab country that enacted its national arbitration law in 
1981.18 Later, the law was amended and is currently called YAA.19 The researcher has 
not find any resources that can prove any loophole and the purpose of amendment 
Yemeni Arbitration Law 1981 to the current YAA. The main purpose of the 
amendment is political issue. As commonly known that Yemen was divided into two 
independent states, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south 
and the Yemen Arab Republic in the north.20 The two states were then unified and the 
Republic of Yemen was announced on the 22nd of May 1990.21 Thus, the Yemeni 
legislation merged Yemeni Law for Enforcement or Judgements Law No. (10), 1978 
and Yemeni Arbitration Law 1981 to have YAA. 
3.3.3 Yemeni Arbitration Act No. (22) 1992 
Before the unification of Yemen there were two separated Acts dealing with foreign 
judgements. Yemeni Law for Enforcement or Judgements Law No. (10) 1978 in the 
southern part has three loopholes: one is no special provisions to deal with arbitration 
issues, the second one is that the Act did apply ex parte principle in case one of the 
                                                     
18 Jens Kambeck, “Arbitration in Yemen,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2008): 333, accessed 
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disputing parties requested interim measures, and the last one is that the legislation did 
not define when the judgement is final. The northern part of Yemen was applying 
Yemeni Arbitration Law 1981, the Yemeni legislators found it necessary to amend it 
because of the two legal systems merged together after the unification 1990. 
The current YAA has to be examined on whether it is in accordance with the provisions 
relating to the enforcement of arbitration laws in Yemen are dealing with international 
arbitral issues as the Yemeni legislator miss very important sections to deal with the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Therefore, leaving YAA without trying to develop 
it will make it to be incapable of coping with international arbitration system. 
3.4 The Present Structure of Arbitration System in Yemen 
Arbitration system in Yemen is a mechanism of settlement of disputes outside the 
court.22 The parties agree prior to or after the rise of the dispute to be settled by 
arbitration mechanism.23 The Yemen International Center for Mediation and 
Arbitration is the only an independent private institute to initiate commercial 
arbitration and maritime, civil and administrative arbitration (local, regional and 
international).24 Hence, the procedures and processes that are relating to the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards based on YAA are as follows: 
                                                     
22 Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, section 2. 
23 Ibid. 




3.4.1 Arbitration Provisions Related to the Foreign Party to the arbitration in 
Yemen 
YAA combines both local and international arbitration. As could be found in section 
2, it provides that parties to the arbitration must be a natural or legal person who makes 
a practice of commercial, economic, or investment business, regardless of the 
nationalities. However, the YAA clearly distinguishes between the local and 
international arbitration. According to the Act, the local arbitration means that the 
disputing parties are local citizens whereas in international arbitration, the arbitrators 
are non-citizens while the place seat of the arbitration is outside the country or the 
arbitration conducted by an international institution.25 Thus, YAA allows the disputed 
parties, whether one or both of them are not Yemeni citizen to choose the law, language 
and the place to conduct the arbitration.26 Therefore, such sections prove that YAA 
could be applied over local or international arbitration as it accepts the non-citizen 
parties to sit for arbitration inside or outside the country, the place seat of the 
arbitration could be held in local arbitration centers, international institutions or in any 
language as well. Further, the YAA applies to local and international arbitration, this 
means the court will not distinguish between international and local award in the 
matter of procedures and requirements to enforce the arbitral award. However, the 
researcher could observe a lacuna in section 2 that distinguishes among commercial, 
economic, or investment activities and all these terms can be combined under the term 
of commercial. Additionally, it stated the Arab nationality and international 
nationality, are considered as international as well.  
                                                     




3.4.2 The Role of the Competent Court in Arbitration Mechanism 
The function of the court in the matter of control and the assistance to carry out the 
arbitration the procedures and supervision of the enforcement of the arbitral award as 
follows: 
3.4.2.1 The Jurisdiction towards Arbitration Agreement  
The competent court practices its jurisdiction before and within the arbitration 
proceedings to supervise the proceedings. Section 1927 provides that the court may 
reject any filing case brought before the court and it may refer such case to the 
arbitration unless the court finds the arbitration to be void, revoked, or the arbitration 
clause does not contain such arbitrated dispute, as well as if the disputing parties have 
already commenced with judicial proceedings. This means the court applies its 
jurisdiction to refuse arbitration mechanism if it finds that it is inappropriate. Without 
giving any reason. Such jurisdiction which has been given by YAA to the competent 
court is great. This saves the time, not to do so after the whole processes are completed 
then the award cannot be enforced because of the same reasons found in section 19.  
The competent court has jurisdiction to constitute the arbitral tribunal. So, it is 
necessary to refer to the section 2228 that provides the parties’ autonomy to appoint the 
arbitrator or arbitrators as follows: 
i) If the arbitration agreement states the tribunal has to constitute a sole arbitrator 
and the disputed parties fail to agree on such appointment, then the competent 
court will appoint arbitrator as it thinks fit. 
                                                     
27 Ibid, section 19. 
28 Ibid, section 22. 
 
135 
ii) If the arbitration agreement states the tribunal has to constitute of two 
arbitrators and every party has to choose one arbitrator, then every party could 
choose his own arbitrator. 
iii) If the arbitration agreement states that the arbitral tribunal has to constitute of 
three arbitrators, every party has to choose his own arbitrators after that the two 
arbitrators must agree on the third arbitrator, in the case of failing to choose the 
third one by the two arbitrators, then the court will appoint the third one. 
iv) This means that the parties are free to constitute the number of the arbitral 
tribunal whatever a sole arbitrator appointed by the disputed parties or two are 
appointed by the parties, each arbitrator represents a party and the two 
representative of the arbitrators are consensually appoint the third arbitrator, 
otherwise the court will do. But, if the parties failed to stipulate that in the 
arbitration agreement or disagree on the number of the arbitrators, then the 
court will appoint the arbitrators based on its discretion. 
The court has jurisdiction to reject the appointed judge as well as the arbitrator if it 
found that the arbitrator had bad reputation, has been sentenced to prosecution for a 
crime relating to honor or honesty, if practiced the trade or has another job than the 
judicial job or any job that affects the independence of the judiciary and dignity, or is 
not qualified29 but such reasons must appear after the appointment. So, the YAA 
requires from the arbitrator to reveal all factors that are likely to adversely affect 
his/her integrity and independence. Thus, if the appointed arbitrator could not perform 
his/her job which leads to impeding the arbitration processes, then he/she could be 
removed by mutual consent of the disputed parties or by request of any of the disputed 
                                                     
29 Yemeni Judicial Authority (Act No. 1) 1991, sections 57, 81, 93. 
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parties to the arbitral tribunal or the competent court.30 The section supposed to 
mention the referring to the competent court in the matter of disability of the arbitral 
tribunal to carry out its job, not only in case of disability of one of the arbitrators. After 
successful application of rejecting or removing the arbitrator, the court will fill the 
vacancy with another one31.  
The arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to investigate the arbitration agreement to check 
its validity and legality. So, if it finds the arbitration agreement is revoked, void, or not 
contained the referring arbitrated dispute, then any of the parties can appeal against 
that.32 The researcher sees allowing appeal to the court against the tribunal decision 
over the agreement validity as inappropriate as the arbitral tribunal understands its 
jurisdiction and has capability to deal with such dispute more than the court may do.  
3.4.2.2 The Arbitral Awards 
Sometimes, prior to the final award any of the disputed parties may request interim 
measures of protection to ensure the enforcement of the arbitral award. So the arbitral 
tribunal has jurisdiction to render partial award toward such request as it thinks fit. 
YAA which could be seen in section 31 that provides the tribunal has a jurisdiction to 
require security of any of the parties to ensure the compliance with arbitration 
proceedings and the award as well. Regarding the interim measures of protection the 
Court of Appeal judge (Respondents 1) through an interview stated that: 
 In international arbitration, the procedures can be taken through 
the judiciary in the host state of the arbitration. Then, the host state 
requires from the Yemen court to implement the award or the order 
that are taken by the host state. However, the host state must be BITs 
                                                     
30 Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, section 25.  
31 Ibid, section 26. 
32 Ibid, section 28. 
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or signatory-state to the convention that Yemen is, like Arab 
convention, Riyadh convention or has BIT with Yemen.33 
Court of Appeal judge (Respondent 2) through an interview stated that: 
The procedures can be taken in international arbitration through the 
international judicial mandate, if there is BIT between Yemen and 
the host state of the arbitration, the foreign judges can delegate us 
to carry out specific operations, such as seizure of the lost party’s 
property, but all the procedures must be through the diplomatic 
route (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). For example, Yemen is member 
of the Riyadh Arab Convention for Judicial Cooperation. If there are 
some trialing issues before the courts of Saudi Arabia and the 
accused ran away to Yemen or has property in Yemen, the judge in 
the Saudi courts’ can request from the Yemeni judiciary to 
apprehend the suspect or forcibly seize his property and so on, and 
we in Yemen are cooperating with such foreign judicial orders.34 
Court of Appeal judge (Respondent 3) mentioned that:  
Due to the expansion of trade with several countries, especially the 
Gulf countries, it has been found that international judicial mandate 
is necessary to ease commercial activities between these multiple 
territories. Yemen is a member of a number of international 
conventions regarding judicial cooperation such as the Riyadh Arab 
Convention for Judicial Cooperation, Arab Convention on 
Commercial Arbitration, The Convention of the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of Other States, 
and the like. This cooperation was established in order to overcome 
the difficulty of collecting evidence, enforce judgements, and enforce 
awards. Global commercial activities need a mechanism to achieve 
the desire of States for judicial co-operation through an 
international judicial mandate that enables national jurisdictions to 
complete necessary processes and investigative procedures within 
the territory of a foreign State, and using the powers of another State 
whenever necessary. However, the international judicial mandate is 
not an alternative to national jurisdictions, the two are independent 
from each other, as the implementation of the judicial authorities of 
the requesting State legislation is subject of to the national laws of 
the requested State to perform that operation, and cannot perform 
operations other than those contained in the request, and yet both 
states are complementary to each other in ensuring the proper 
administration of Justice. Thus, the international judicial mandate 
                                                     
33 Interview with Court of Appeal judge No. (1), December 11, 2016. 
34 Interview with Court of Appeal judge No. (2), December 20, 2016. 
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is practiced as long as the needed operations are not contrary to 
public policy of the requested state.35 
Academician (Respondent 4) said that: 
The reciprocity reservation applies to have exchange judicial 
cooperation. If the foreign state cooperates with Yemen then Yemen 
will cooperate with the host state of the arbitration. Such judicial 
cooperation is carried out through diplomatic corps.36 
Academician (Respondent 5) stated that: 
Unfortunately, there is inefficient supervision, especially, when the 
procedures are related to international arbitral awards. This is 
because the assistance of international judicial mandate should go 
through diplomatic procedures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
delays the procedures which lead to loss of rights. Diplomatic 
authorities sometimes ignore court orders. The international 
judicial mandate needs cooperation between the judiciary and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to facilitate communication with the 
outside authorities, and this is not always effective. As a result of this 
delay the creditor party restores to other means such as conciliation 
based on mutual agreement.37 
Arbitrator (Respondent 14) stated that: 
The international judicial mandate is a means by which requests can 
be made by a Member State to the Convention, for example, the 
Riyadh convention. A member state can request from Yemen to do 
some investigations, processes or procedures that it can't do by itself 
as it is not within its territorial jurisdiction, whether it is by 
prosecutors, the judges, or police. Such legal actions may be in form 
of providing evidence or investigation, including taking testimonies 
from persons or performing inspections or providing documents and 
records, including bank records, financial records, corporate or 
business records or seizure of funds, and so on. For example, article 
4 of the Riyadh Arab Convention for Judicial Cooperation stipulates 
that a judicial assistance is required where citizens of the 
contracting Sates within their respective limits the right to get legal 
assistance in accordance with the legislation of the requested state. 
Article 14 stipulates the international judicial mandate to each 
contracting state to request any other contracting state, shall in its 
                                                     
35 Interview with Court of Appeal judge No. (3), December 27, 2016. 
36 Interview with Academician No. (4), December 26, 2016. 
37 Interview with academician No. (5), December 25, 2016. 
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territory on his behalf to perform operation such as the testimony of 
witnesses, expert reports and discuss them, and swear an oath. 
Article 18 stipulates that the implementation method of the 
international judicial mandate should be in accordance with the 
legislated legal procedures in the laws of the requested contracting 
state. In the case of a requesting state’s desire to implement the 
international judicial mandate, it has to express a request to the 
requested state, and the requested state is required to respond unless 
it is contrary to its domestic laws or regulations. The requesting state 
must expressly notify the other state of the time, date and place of 
execution of the international judicial mandate and the requested 
state is expected to execute subject to its national laws.38 
Through the above interviews, respondents clarified that the Yemeni Arbitration Act 
permits the arbitral tribunal or the judiciary in the host State of the arbitration to request 
from the Yemeni judiciary to carry out legal proceedings, investigations and other 
operations. But, this must be done through diplomatic corps. Some interviewees said 
that delays occur from Ministry of Foreign affairs in the execution of court orders and 
causes difficulties in communicating with foreign authorities. Thus, they 
recommended better cooperation between the judiciary and the diplomatic corps. 
This supervision of the final award consists of two stages which are as follows: 
3.4.2.2.1 The supervision on the refusal of the arbitral award 
As commonly known that the arbitral award made by the arbitral tribunal is final and 
binding.39 This means that the debtor party cannot appeal against the award. On the 
other hand, the debtor party could only make an application to the competent court to 
refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award. The Yemeni legislator has restricted the 
authority of the arbitral tribunal by subjecting it to the supervision of the court. 
Consequently, the rendering an arbitral award must be based on the provisions 
                                                     
38 Interview with arbitrator, December 27, 2016. 
39 Ibid, sections 56 & 57. 
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provided by YAA. Otherwise, YAA provides the court discretion to set aside or refuse 
the enforcement of IAA. As the arbitral awards are considered not executive by the 
tribunal exclusive authority in case of the debtor party refuses to enforce it voluntarily.  
They have to obtain judicial assistance through forced execution, and that by issuing a 
special order from the competent court. It has to distinguish the arbitral awards from 
the court judgements which the court judgements are final without the need to issue an 
order to implement them. The arbitral awards do not derive any power from the public 
authority, they require the issuance of such order from the court to reach the standard 
of the court judgements, then can be forcibly implemented.  
 
There are grounds for the debtor party to reject the enforcement of the arbitral award 
if the award contravenes those grounds. However, such refusal is not considered an 
appeal or a part of the arbitration dispute. Thus, the rendering arbitral awards must 
comply with the requirements of what provided in YAA, so that non-fulfilment of 
requirements will lead to set aside or refusal of the enforcement of the arbitral awards, 
and return dispute to be decided before the court. The public policy is essential issue 
will be addressed before the court is the public policy and this at the stage of the 
application for the recognition and enforcement.  The court will make sure the arbitral 
award is not contrary to the public policy. The court exercises jurisdiction here and 
considers the request for the recognition and enforcement through verify that the 
documents submitted have an arbitral award in the proper sense, as well as the 
arbitration agreement to ensure that the parties have authorized the jurisdiction of the 
dispute to be settled by the arbitral tribunal. Such grounds could be noticed in section 
 
141 
5340 that provides the arbitral awards are binding and cannot be refused unless on the 
following grounds: 
a- If there is no arbitration agreement, revoked, or void according to the law. 
b- If one of the parties is not competent. 
c- If the arbitral tribunal exceeded its authority. 
d- If the procedures are unlawful. 
e- If the constituted arbitral tribunal is not according to the arbitration agreement. 
f- If the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal did not state the reason of the award making. 
Also, in section 48 of YAA provides the award must be signed by all arbitrators 
unless if the award is rendered by the majority so the resisting minority could 
refuse to sign but must state the reason for the refusal. Such rule is confirmed by 
the Supreme Court that holds the award is void because the two out of three 
arbitrators did not sign the final award.41 
g- If the award infringed the principles of the Shari’a or the public policy, these 
grounds in YAA only could allow the debtor party to refuse the enforcement of the 
award, even those grounds to appeal stated in civil procedures and commercial 
laws will not be taken to apply in arbitral cases. 
Section 53 is the same as international arbitration laws that considers the award as 
binding on the disputed parties and provides the grounds to refuse the enforcement of 
the award which could be seen in article v (1) of NYC and article 36 (1) of 
UNCITRAL. However, section 53 of YAA still needs to amend, especially, paragraph 
(b) which provides that the award cannot be enforced if any of the parties is 
incompetent, such paragraph is repeating the same thing as paragraph (a) which 
                                                     
40 Ibid, section 53.  
41 Supreme Court, commercial division, Recourse No. 32884, Dec. 24, 2008. 
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provides that the resisting party who was incompetent person at the time of signing the 
arbitral agreement can challenge the arbitral award as it is commonly known in all 
laws the parties to the contract have to be competent persons, otherwise, the agreement 
is voidable at the choice of the victim party. Further, the same paragraph stated the 
grounds of civil procedures and commercial laws will not be taken to apply in arbitral 
cases, and this is a lacuna as such laws provides that the judgement will be void if it 
relies on the misrepresentation, fraud, or false testimony.42  
In addition, the same section is still weak, which supposed to include other important 
grounds to refuse the enforcement, such as not given proper notice of the appointment 
of the arbitrator or the arbitral proceedings to the disputed parties as well as in the case 
of the award not binding yet. Such grounds are important to achieve justice.  Such 
grounds supposed to be included in YAA. The grounds to refuse the enforcement of 
the award have to be apply by request from a disputing party, if none of the parties 
opposed such procedures, the court will not have to investigate in materials that the 
parties go through by free consent. For more understanding it is important to refer to 
the case of Abdul Baqi Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim,43 the Yemen court 
could enforce the foreign judgement if it fulfills some requirements as follows: 
a. The judgement has to be issued according to evidence; 
b. The judgement has to be free from any fraud; 
c. The judgement has not been contrary to the international law and justice; 
d. The judgement has to be finalized; 
e. The judgement has not been contrary to public policy; 
                                                     
42 Yemeni Civil Procedure and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002, section 304 (1) (2) (3). 
43 Abdul Baqi Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim, Commercial Appeal No.2 of 1977. 
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f. The judgement has issued by the competent court. 
If the resisting party of the enforcement fails to recourse against the arbitral award 
during the limited period that allows the debtor party to set aside/refusal, then the 
arbitral award becomes binding, but the YAA fails to specify the period to set 
aside/refusal. 
Also section 55 of YAA gives the court a full discretion to determine the validity of 
the arbitral award in order to enforce it or reject it even without the request from any 
of the parties, especially, in these paragraphs as (a) that provides if an award regarding 
an issue that not allowed to be settled by arbitration mechanism (b) if the award 
contravened principles of the Shari’a or public policy. However, such jurisdiction has 
given under the section 55 cannot be considered as reviewing the arbitral award.  The 
Yemeni arbitration system does not provide the reviewing the award by the court. The 
Yemeni Supreme Court held that the grounds of setting aside the arbitral award do not 
mean to review the merit of the award.44 The court only examines the proceedings and 
the procedures of the arbitration.45  
Shari’a does not come from the Codes, Acts and the like, but from the divine law 
which was revealed by God (Allah) to his messenger Mohammad (pbuh), including 
the Quran and Sunna. A believer should never violate what God and the prophet (pbuh) 
ordered him/her to do. Provisions of humanitarian laws should be ignored if it is in 
conflict with internal or natural laws. In other words, if human law is contrary to the 
law of God, it should be disregarded. Shari’a is true law and it is in agreement with 
nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting. It is a sin to try to 
                                                     
44 Yemen Supreme Court, commercial, Ruling No. 1425/21636, Feb. 22, 2005. 
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alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is totally 
unacceptable to abolish it entirely... [God] is the author of this law, its promulgator, 
and its enforcing judge”, as God is the author of Islamic law, it certainly is all-
encompassing and, in fact, is equivalent to the rule of law in the modern state. Every 
aspect of life is regulated by Shari’a law. 
This is very important to refer to as Yemen is an Islamic country, so the award that 
violated the Islamic law will not be enforced under the ground of violation of Islamic 
law and public policy of the country as a whole. Section 53 provides that the arbitral 
award will be refused if it is in violation of the Shari’a rules or public policy.46 
Therefore, the arbitral tribunal has to be familiar with the Shari’a rules to understand 
the agreements, procedures, and the awards which contravene the Shari’a and whether 
such contravention would prevent the enforcement of the arbitral award.47 
3.4.2.2.2 The supervision of the enforcement of the arbitral award 
This stage is the most important that the creditor party is looking to the enforcement 
of the award made by the arbitral tribunal. As commonly known that even the 
international arbitration is applied and recognized by the court of the place seat or the 
arbitral tribunal, but it does not mean that is excluded the jurisdiction of the national 
court in the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. The arbitration system cannot 
succeed without the assistance and control of the court.48 Hence, the court is the 
cornerstone in coercing the debtor party to implement the award that is made by the 
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tribunal.49 For the judiciary exercises effective monitoring on the enforcement of the 
international arbitral awards. 
Respondent 1 mentioned that: 
Disagreed with that the judiciary exercises effective monitoring on 
the enforcement of the international arbitral awards. 
Respondent 2 mentioned that: 
 if the arbitral awards are rendered outside Yemen then, the creditor 
party must make an application to the Court of Appeal in Yemen 
which holds all documents relating to the implementation of 
international arbitral award such as the origin of the arbitral award 
or a copy signed by the arbitral tribunal members, a copy of the 
arbitration agreement, translating all documents to the Arabic 
language if they are written in a foreign language. Also, the 
enforcement can be carried out when the creditor party applies to a 
competent court for the implementation of the International Arbitral 
award, if the court considers that the arbitral award is valid, then 
the execution will be through police action or imprisonment till the 
enforcement or seizure of the debtor assets. 
Respondent 3 stated that: 
When the creditor party applies for enforcement of the international 
arbitral award, the competent court makes sure that the arbitral 
award is rendered based on justice such that both parties are given 
the same opportunity to present their cases. The courts also ensure 
that the arbitral award does not contravene the Shari’a and not 
contrary to public policy.  Additionally, the courts make sure that 
the host State implements the arbitral awards that are rendered in 
Yemen since the arbitral awards are enforced based on the concept 
of reciprocity. Often, the Court does not consider the application to 
set aside the international arbitral award that are rendered outside 
Yemen because the jurisdiction of the court of the host State. For 
example: If the arbitration place in Paris then, the appellant must 
submit the application to set aside the arbitral award in a France 
court, and if the host States rule that the arbitration should be set 
aside in Yemen, then, the application to set aside the international 
arbitral award can apply in Yemen. Hence, the application to 
challenge the enforcement of the arbitral award must be applied in 




the host State where the arbitral award was rendered initially, 
Yemen has nothing to do with the application of an arbitral award 
not issued in its territory unless, if there is no an arbitration 
agreement between the parties, if one of the parties to the arbitration 
was incompetent, if the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, 
the arbitral award violates public policy, or contravenes the 
principles of Shari’a such as stipulates interest or uncertainty. Also, 
he stated that international arbitral award is compulsory enforced if 
it fulfils all requirements. If the debtor party refuse to implement it. 
The court can take coercive actions such as imprisonment, seizure 
property, and so on. 
Respondent 14 stated that: 
The arbitral award is forcibly effected if the lost party refused to 
comply voluntarily. The court may seize his/her property, freeze 
his/her bank account, or hold his/her passport to prevent him from 
traveling outside the country till implementation of the arbitral 
award. 
Thus, the court applies effective monitoring to enforce based on the majority 
interviewees.  However, the researcher is not satisfied of such result as respondents (4) 
and (5) stated their own experience of the enforcement of arbitral cases. They stated 
their own experience in enforcing the arbitral awards by exercise effective monitoring 
as mentioned two arbitral cases which one creditor party forcibly referred to 
reconciliation after procrastination of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award to 
enforce the arbitral award while the second creditor party enforced it after long time 
of fighting after his rights of enforcement of the arbitral award.   Respondent 4 stated 
that: 
The implementation of the arbitral award is one of the difficulties 
facing the arbitration system in Yemen. From previous experience in 
arbitration, I was a representative of one of the disputed parties to 
the dispute. The Arbitral award issued in favour of my client. But the 
losing party refused voluntary implementation. We have gone to 
court to enforce the rendered arbitral award, but did not enforce. 
Thus, we were forced to enter into a reconciliation and waive certain 
rights. Sometimes, lost party and refusal of the enforcement of the 
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arbitral award pays bribery to release him/her from prison, then 
force the creditor party to enter into a reconciliation. 
Respondent 5 narrated his previous experience as a judge. He stated that: 
 Usually, no execution of arbitral award is carried out when it is 
against the Government or a party who has a personal relationship 
with politicians. I have already confirmed the implementation of an 
arbitral award against the Government. As a result, I exposed to 
pressure from Ministers, they insult me with words that shameful to 
be said to the judge. But unfortunately because of lack of 
independence of the judiciary find such negative interference in 
judicial affairs. 
However, the national court may have specific requirements to enforce such foreign 
award. Thus, it is important to refer to section 60 of YAA that provides that the arbitral 
award will only be enforced after investigating of the following requirements: 
a- The arbitral award is final; 
b- The arbitral award does not contravene any prior judgement issued by the court; 
c- The arbitral award has to be issued in accordance to YAA; 
However, the YAA did not mention the period of time for the executive judge to grant 
a leave of enforcement of the award, the leave of enforcement could only be granted 
after examination of the award by the judge as far as there is no application by the 
debtor party on the enforcement of the award.50 In another case, the Yemeni Supreme 
Court held that the debtor party could apply for setting aside the award even after all-
out of limited timed and the application to set aside the arbitral award will be more 
considerable if there is a reasonable ground.51 This is a kind of loophole to leave the 
enforcement subject to the judge’s time schedule which makes the judge to examine 
                                                     
50 Yemen Supreme Court, Commercial, Ruling No. 136/1424, Apr. 17, 2004. 
51 Yemeni Supreme Court, commercial division, Recourse No. 33036, Feb. 22, 2009. 
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the award when he is free. Indeed, there must be effective rules to fix the suitable 
period of time to enforce the arbitral award in case the debtor party did not raise any 
resistance for the rendered arbitral award. With regards to judges ensure the timely 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. Respondents 1 mentioned that “Yes, the 
enforcement of the award on time, unless there are obstacles raised is same as the in 
the local judgements”.  
Respondent 2 stated that: 
International arbitration provisions are implemented by the same 
mechanism that apply over local provisions. But there is no legal 
provision which determines the enforcement period of the arbitral 
award and how it should be carried out. The enforcement period is 
left to the judge estimates to ensure fairness. 
In the opinion of Respondent 3, 
No delay happens in implementing the arbitral award as long as the 
creditor party fulfils all documentations relating to arbitral award. 
If there is a delay to implement the arbitral award is due to legal 
proceedings, such as the lost party’s application to set aside the 
arbitral award. 
On the other hand, Respondents 4“disagreed that the enforcement 
of the award implemented on time”.52 Respondent 5 mentioned that 
“the arbitral award is not executed in time because of rampant 
corruption. Thus, the lost party bribes the judge to avoid the 
implementation or get the chance to force the creditor party to 
compromise on reducing the award”.  
In his own contribution, Respondent 14 stated as follows,  
Delay usually happens because of the length of the proceedings and 
the implementation processes. Therefore, implementation must be 
faster because the speed of the resolution and enforcement of the 
arbitral award is an arbitration advantageous. 
                                                     
52 Interview with Court of Appeal judges, December 11-20-25-26-27, 2016. 
 
149 
Thus, as half of the respondents agreed that the arbitral award is  enforced on time 
while the other half disagree, the researcher do agree that the enforcement of the award 
is not on time because YAA left full discretion to the executive on when the award can  
be enforced. Also, Respondent 2 is hesitant in his answer as he didn't react to my 
question specifically, whether the enforcement is carry out on time or not, so it means 
the enforcement can be on time or may delay as long as the enforcement period is left 
to the judge estimates. Here, the researcher can confirm that the majority of the 
respondents do agree that the enforcement of the arbitral award is not on time. 
The researcher could see the court supervision of the enforcement of the arbitral award 
and the requirements are reasonable and there are no complex requirements which may 
impede or allow the enforcement of IAA. The competent court could confirm the 
arbitral award if it does not contravene section 55 that insists on the award to comply 
with principles of the Shari’a and must not contravene the public policy, and the issue 
could be settled by arbitration mechanism. The Act specifies some issues in section 5 
that cannot be arbitrated on such as (a) Hudud (mandated punishment under Islamic 
law), lian (make a divorce judgement between the husband and the wife base on oath), 
matrimonial matters like (inheritance and divorce) (b) suing the judges (c) disputes 
that need coercive performance (d) issues that are incapable to be arbitrated (e) 
whatever related issues to the public policy.   
Another type of court supervision, which if the arbitral award is rendered outside 
Yemen the enforcement of the award will be based on some requirements under 
Yemeni Civil Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 that requires some 
requirements to enforce the foreign judgements and awards. Especially, section 491 
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and 49453 that provide requirements to enforce foreign decisions such as the court 
judgement or arbitral award must be issued from a recognized authority, not against 
principles of the Shari’a and public policy, the reciprocity reservation, and not against 
prior judgement issued by the Yemen court. Hence, the issue of reciprocity reservation 
will challenge the enforcement of the arbitral award rendered in Yemen as long as 
Yemen is non-signatory state of NYC,54 so the same issue of the reciprocity reservation 
provides in Yemeni Civil Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002, it 
means Yemen will recognize and enforce the judgements and awards that are rendered 
in the countries that recognize and enforce awards and judgements rendered in Yemen 
as well as will not recognize and enforce court judgements and arbitral awards 
rendered in the countries that do not recognize and enforce judgements and awards 
rendered in Yemen. 
3.4.2.3 Sanction for Failure to Comply with Tribunal’s Orders 
Sometimes the disputed parties refuse to comply with the tribunal’s legal rulings 
whether such order were made during the proceedings of the arbitration or after the 
issued the arbitral award. For such failure there must be a penalty to make the 
arbitration system stronger. Otherwise, the arbitral orders will be vain and the disputed 
parties are more likely to delay the procedures by procrastinations as well as 
procrastination in the enforcement of the arbitral award which will lead to losses on 
the creditor party and may lose other transaction because of the lack of financial 
liquidity. In fact, UNCITRAL did not empower the tribunal or the arbitrator to fine the 
                                                     
53 Yemeni Civil Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002, section 491 and 494. 
54 The New York Arbitration Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 




debtor party in case of non-compliance with the tribunal’s orders.55 Even though some 
courts enforce the penalty against the debtor party for failure to implement the 
tribunal’s orders.56 The YAA is silent about the power of the tribunal to impose 
sanction on the debtor party in case of failure to disclose the documents or refusal to 
enforce the arbitral award. The researcher suggests to include a section in YAA to 
empower the tribunal as well as the court to impose sanction on debtor parties. 
Especially, if there is no reasonable justification for such non-implementation. Such 
sanction could add a positive effect to the arbitration system in Yemen as it will deter 
the debtor party who intend to disobey the tribunal’s orders or the arbitral award. 
3.5 The Interview in the Matter of Adequacy of Yemeni Arbitration Act and the 
Difficulties Facing the Arbitral Award 
Through an interview with Court of Appeal judges, academicians, and arbitrators, it 
was confirmed that YAA is not adequate to deal with global arbitration system and to 
settle disputes. Also, there are some difficulties facing the enforcement of the arbitral 
award. 
3.5.1 The Interview to the Court of Appeal Judges 
To be understandable the sufficiency of the provisions relating to the enforcement of 
arbitration laws in Yemen. Respondent 1 said that “the Yemeni arbitration law is not 
capable of to dealing with international arbitration system, YAA has to be amended”.  
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Respondent 2 said that: 
The amendment of the currently arbitration Act is necessary to cope 
with international arbitration laws, especially repeal sections that 
recognize customary arbitration. Because such recognition of the 
customary arbitration leads the disputed parties to appoint tribal 
arbitrators as many tribal people are unaware of the legal 
requirements and procedures. As a consequence, the disputing 
parties may refer to formal court to solve the same dispute which 
leads to delay the disposition of the commercial cases. 
Respondent 3 stated that: 
There are loopholes in the current Yemeni Arbitration Act when 
compared to international arbitration laws. Hence, in order for 
Yemen to be an effective State in the arbitration system, it has to 
modernize the local laws to be consistent with international 
arbitration practices.  
This implies YAA is not align with international arbitral laws, thus YAA is not 
sufficient adequate to settle arbitral disputes. All the Court of Appeal judges confirmed 
that YAA is outdated. The current YAA has to be amended. As it is not suitable to deal 
with the current international arbitration system. YAA provides in section 7, that is, 
applies to both local and international disputes. Thus, national arbitration laws have to 
cope with international arbitration standard to settle international commercial disputes, 
as usually international disputes are complex. Hence, only modern law is suitable to 
do so. The interviewees confirmed that YAA is not only unsuitable to conduct 
international commercial disputes, but, it burdens the formal court system as it is 
recognized the application of the customary law to settle disputes. This leads to set 
aside the arbitral awards because of unqualified arbitrators who are ignorant of natural 




 In the matter of the difficulties in enforcing international arbitral awards. Respondent 
1 stated that: 
I suffer from a lack of cooperation from the security authorities to 
implement judicial orders, particularly when the lost party of the 
arbitral award is someone who has good relationships with decision 
makers and this is due to the lack of independence of the judiciary. 
This is the biggest problem facing the judiciary. In addition, there 
are increasing numbers of cases in the courts and the courts cannot 
resolve them quickly and effectively. Currently, business 
transactions are increasing so trade disputes are increasing as well. 
So, commercial disputes have to be resolved speedily as well as the 
enforcement of the arbitral awards. Another problem that the 
judiciary faces is lack of financial means to perform its role 
effectively. 
Respondent 2 said that: 
The difficulties we face in the arbitration system is that the 
arbitrators are not qualified, especially difficulties in implementing 
the arbitral award in those cases where the arbitrator is tribal or 
military because they do not understand anything in the law of 
litigation and the law of pleadings. 
While Respondent 3 said that: 
The difficulties that I face in enforcing the arbitral award is failure 
to comply with the arbitral award voluntary. The debtor party hides 
his funds in case of the absence of a previous precautionary 
measures. Thus, I have to imprison him/her in order to enforce the 
award.  
Hence, the YAA has to be amended, especially the sections that recognize the rendered 
arbitral award by tribal or military arbitrator as this leads to pile up the cases at the 
courts. Also, the Court of Appeal judges confirmed that most impediment faces the 
enforcement of IAA in Yemen is non-independence of the judiciary. The politicians 
interfere in the judicial operations. This interference is adverse effect on the 
enforcement of IAA. Especially, if the debtor party has good relationship with 
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politicians. Often, businessmen have good relationship with politicians, so in case the 
arbitral award is not in his/her favour will request interference from political person to 
impede the enforcement of the arbitral award. Hence, The judiciary has not only be 
independent body, but must be seen to practice that so it has to be financially 
independent in order to prevent the politicians of misuse such authority on the 
judiciary. In addition, interim measures of protection must be rendered in advance so 
the debtor party will not impede the enforcement of the arbitral award. 
3.5.2 The Interview of the Academicians 
According to academician interviewees of Yemeni universities that the researcher 
contacted to provide information of the sufficiency of the provisions relating to the 
enforcement of arbitration laws in Yemen. 
Respondent 4 said that “YAA has loopholes so the legislators must 
amend it to cope with international arbitration”. Respondent 5 said 
that “the YAA is an old law so arbitration system in Yemen is facing 
difficulties in handling some arbitration cases, especially complex 
cases”. 
Therefore, the amendment of the current YAA is very important since the last 
amendment was performed 20 old years ago. The modern arbitration laws are very 
important in dealing with international arbitration system. The interviewees confirmed 
that YAA is outdated which has to be modernized as it is non-compliant with standard 
of international arbitration laws. Respondent 5 confirmed that YAA is not suitable law 
to apply over the complex disputes. As commonly known that the most international 
disputes are complex so YAA has to be amended to cope with international arbitration 
system. This means that the current YAA will impede the arbitration processes and 
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procedures, especially, the last stage of the arbitration, that is, the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards. 
Moreover, the same academician interviewees did mentioned the difficulties in 
enforcing international arbitral awards. Respondent 4 stated that: 
There are difficulties such as the lack of implementation of the 
arbitral award by the parties, I was a representative of one of the 
parties of the arbitration, and the debtor party rejected enforcement 
of the arbitral award. Although the Court of Appeals held that the 
award is binding, no coercive action was taken. This forces us to 
enter into a reconciliation to reduce the amount held in the arbitral 
award. This indicates that the enforcement of IAA faces difficulties. 
Thus, the effective monitoring applied by the court is insufficient. As the enforcement 
of the arbitral award is not effective, it means that the judiciary is weak and the outside 
interference and influence likely existed. Indeed, the enforcement of the arbitral award 
is the most important stage in arbitration system, otherwise, the arbitration is 
meaningless. This raises issues such as link interrelated impediments among tribalism, 
corruption, and non-enforcement of the arbitral awards. Especially, once there is no 
application of the debtor party to set aside/refusal of the arbitral award base on the 
provided grounds in sections 53 and 55 of Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22)1992. Non-
enforcement without any justified reasons leaving no room for doubt that the 
enforcement provisions of YAA are weak, the tribalism impediment and corruption in 
the judiciary are the main reasons behind the failing of the court to enforce a rendered 
arbitral award by the tribunal. 
While, Respondent 5, said that: 
 Yes, especially the difficulties like political interventions, for me 
intervention of the Minister of Justice based on a complaint from the 
Minister of Finance, and because of my judgement to implement the 
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arbitral award. I ordered the state to implement the arbitral award 
in the amount of $7 million. This arbitral award has been rendered 
by the legal Affairs, then the Ministry of Trade and Fund appeal 
against the arbitral award applied by the trader. As a result of my 
confirmation of the validity of the award, so the Minister of Finance 
complained to the Minister of Justice against me. Then, the Minister 
of Justice insulted me by improper words. 
Therefore, the enforcement of IAA in Yemen is more likely to fail because of the 
political interference in the judiciary, the politicians interfere to protect their partners’ 
business or those who have close tie of relationships with them. The court coercive 
enforcement is rarely taken. The creditor party will face difficulties in enforcing the 
international arbitral award in case the debtor party is a political party or has any kind 
of political relations. This means that the independence of the judiciary is only ink on 
papers in the Yemeni constitution. As minister interferes in the judge’s decisions, this 
explains beyond any doubt that the politicians misuse of power and deal with the 
judiciary as a part of the executive body. As consequences, the arbitration system will 
not succeed in Yemen, unless it overcomes such interferences from the politicians. 
This is because the court plays important role in control and assistance of the 
arbitration processes and procedures so without integrity and independence of the 
court, the enforcement of the arbitral award will be impeded.  
3.5.3 The Interview of the Arbitrator 
Respondent 14 clarified the sufficiency of the provisions relating to the enforcement 
of arbitration laws in Yemen. He stated that “YAA is still not adequate to settle 




In addition, the same arbitrator provided information relating to the difficulties in 
enforcing international arbitral awards in Yemen. He said that: 
There are difficulties facing the enforcement of the arbitral award 
such as long procedures and proceedings and the competent court 
are late in making a decision in case the debtor party applies a 
defence to set aside the award.  
This means that YAA has no adequate provisions of the recognition and enforcement. 
As long as it is not suitable to settle international disputes, it confirms that YAA is not 
in standard with international arbitration laws. The interviewee recommended to 
amend YAA to cope with international arbitration system.  Also, the arbitral award is 
not enforced on time. The delay of the enforcement leads to corruption and add more 
cost and loss on the creditor party. YAA has to be amended with modern arbitration 
laws to prevent such procrastination in the implementation of the arbitral awards. The 
provisions shall not give the place of enforcement of the arbitral award a full discretion of 
time to enforce the arbitral award, especially, if there is no application to set 
aside/refusal the arbitral award by the debtor party. As speed of settlement of disputes 
is one of the most features of arbitration system. This feature will be lost if the 
arbitration laws did not limit the court jurisdiction of the enforcement period such as 
30 days from the date of the rendered arbitral award. 
3.6 Related International Provisions to the Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards 
Throughout this section the discussion will focus on some international conventions, 
agreements, and laws in order to understand the loopholes of YAA. For questions, the 
1927 Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards is the first 
convention that deals with commercial disputes to be settled by the arbitration 
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system.57 Such convention recognizes the arbitration agreement and insists on 
referring the disputing parties to the arbitration system if they entered into a valid prior 
arbitration agreement.58 Further, the same convention provides for the recognition and 
the enforcement of the arbitral awards rendered in other signatory states.59 However, 
the NYC is the contemporary instrument to deal with the international arbitration 
system as far as the NYC has updated to the Geneva Convention.60 The researcher 
refers to some international conventions such as New York convention 1958, 
UNCITRAL rules, BITs, and laws as follows: 
3.6.1 The New York Convention 1958 
The Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is called 
New York Convention 1958.61 NYC is accepted worldwide as the main convention of 
the arbitration system.62 Most countries of the world reached a consensus to ratify the 
NYC.63 NYC stipulates the recognition and the enforcement of arbitration agreement 
and IAA.64 Whereas, such recognition and the enforcement may be challenged upon 
some limitations in the convention.65 It is a great effort to gather several states which 
have a different legal system, religion, culture, geography to agree on one convention 
                                                     
57 Ibid, 18-19. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid, 19-20. 
61 The New York Arbitration Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, New York, 10 June 1958, accessed April 9, 2016, www.newyorkconvention.org. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid. 
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whose purpose is to develop international trade.66 Till now 156 states have ratified the 
convention, while Yemen is non-signatory yet.67 
3.6.2 The Enforcement of International Arbitral Award under New York 
Convention 
The recognition and the enforcement of IAA are the most important in the arbitration 
system.68 However, sometimes the debtor party resists enforcement of the arbitral 
award, so that the creditor party has to refer to the national court to seek a coercive 
enforcement.69 Even though, the arbitral award is rendered outside the judicial system 
but the competent court still has jurisdiction and power over the arbitral award.70 The 
success of the arbitration system depends on the competent court.71 This is true since 
the competent court has jurisdiction in the matter of assistance and control.72 For 
example, In the matter of the enforcement, article III that provides the signatory states 
are obliged to deal with arbitral award as a binding and enforceable through the same 
procedures that followed by the competent court in the process of the recognition and 
the enforcement of the local judgements.73 Therefore, there must not be more charge 
fees, different procedures, complex conditions, and so on.74 Thus, the court has no 
jurisdiction to refuse to enforce the arbitral award if the award does not contravene the 
domestic law.75  
                                                     
66 Ibid. 
67 New York Arbitration Convention, accessed April 9, 2016, 
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68 Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, 26. 
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70 Ibid. 
71 Vries, “International Commercial Arbitration,” 47. 
72 Ibid. 
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74 Ibid. 
75 Hamid G. Gharavi, "Enforcing Set Aside Arbitral Awards: France's Controversial Steps beyond the 
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However, the recognition and the enforcement of IAA perhaps face challenges as there 
are available defences could raise upon the application of the recognition and the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. An article V76 that provides the arbitral award can 
set aside if the resisting party of the enforcement satisfies the competent court by any 
of the following grounds: 
a) The arbitration agreement ground. The resisting party of the enforcement bears the 
burden of proof that one of the parties was incompetent at the time of entering into 
the agreement or the agreement is void under the applicable law of the place seat 
of the arbitration.77 Thus, there must be free consent of both parties to settle their 
dispute by arbitration, without such mutual consent the arbitrator has no authority 
to settle the dispute so that the resisting party of the enforcement could have a 
defence against the recognition and the enforcement of the award as far as the 
arbitration agreement is not valid. To be more understanding of the defence of void 
agreement, it has to refer to the case of Moscow Dynamo v Alexander M. 
Ovechkin,78 the court dismissed the appellant’s petition for the enforcement as 
there is no written arbitration agreement, and so the tribunal has no subject 
jurisdictional as there no valid arbitration agreement yet.  
b) Due process ground. The losing party has three reasons to resist the recognition 
and the enforcement. Firstly, if he/she was not given a proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator. Secondly, arbitration process. Thirdly, he/she was 
incapable of presenting his/her case.79 Thus, the award may not recognize or 
enforce if the tribunal is not fair to all parties or breaches the justice proceedings 
                                                     
76 New York Convention 1958, article V. 
77 Ibid, article 1 (a).  
78 Moscow Dynamo v Alexander M. Ovechkin 412 F.Supp.2d 24 (2006) 
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161 
recognized in the most laws. In the case of Reasons & Whittemore Overseas Co.,80 
It was stated that the enforcement of arbitral award could face challenges if the 
debtor party was not given proper notice regarding the appointment of arbitrator, 
the arbitral process, or was unable to present his case. 
c) Jurisdiction: the most national arbitration laws give the debtor party the right to 
challenge the award in case the tribunal exceeds its authority.81 The arbitral award 
may face challenges if the tribunal conducted a dispute that is not within the terms 
of arbitration agreement. For example, the parties submitted a specific dispute to 
the tribunal but the tribunal arbitrates another type of dispute or added another 
unrelated dispute. In the above example the dispute that within the tribunal’s 
authority is enforceable.82 The decisions that beyond the authority cannot be 
enforced.83 This showed that the court may separate the authorized and 
unauthorized award when it comes to the enforcement of the arbitral award even 
though the award was made at the same time and the same tribunal. For more 
understanding of the exceeding authority by the tribunal, refer to the case of Fiat 
S. P. A. v Ministry of Finance and Planning of Suriname.84 In this case the tribunal 
made a binding award against a third party who was not a party to the arbitration 
agreement. The competent court held the tribunal exceeded its authority.  
d) Procedural ground: the recognition and enforcement of arbitral award could be 
challenged by request from the resisting party of the enforcement if he/she proves 
that the composition of the tribunal or the procedures contravened the agreed terms 
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in the arbitration agreement, or such agreement is against the laws of the place seat 
of arbitration place.85 For example, the laws of the place seat of the arbitration 
provides that the arbitration must be conducted with present of neutral party co-
arbitrator.86 So, if the arbitration is conducted without a neutral co-arbitrator then 
it is against the law of the place seat of the arbitration.87 Therefore, signatory state 
is not obligated to accept the disputed parties’ terms of procedures.88 
e) The award: the arbitral award will not be effective unless it is the final award. 
Article 1 (e) of NYC provides that if the arbitral award is not completed or 
suspended by the court of the place seat of the arbitration, the award would not 
enforce. According to Garry, the creditor party seeks the recognition and the 
enforcement is not obligated to have a prior confirmation of the arbitral award from 
a recognized authority in the place seat of the arbitration.89 For more 
understanding, refer to the case of Fertilizer Corp. of India v IDI Mgt. Inc.90 This 
case sought the enforcement of the award while the judicial actions are perhaps 
taken in future in the place seat where the debtor party sought to set aside the 
arbitral award. Nevertheless, the court enforced the award since the award did not 
contravene the public policy.  
The same applicable result of the non-enforcement could come into the picture if a 
dispute is inappropriate to be settled through arbitration mechanism or the recognition 
and the enforcement of such award contravened the public policy of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award.91 Therefore, the disputing parties have to be careful 
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in choosing the place seat of the arbitration because the choice of law may lead to a 
negative effect on the enforcement if will infringe the public policy of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Even, the tribunal tries to ignore the choice of law 
in order to avoid the refusal of the enforcement in the state where the enforcement is 
sought, the ignorance of the choice of law will lead to the arbitral award to being 
challenged in the place seat.92 It should be noted here that, public policy does not mean 
political affairs of the states or international policies.93 Public policy which is relevant 
to procedural justice are misrepresentation, fraud, bribery and the like which may 
affect the award decision.94 
However, the jurisdictional challenge has to make by the resisting party within the 
arbitration process, not after the issuing the award.95 The continuation with the process 
without raising the objection, then may after the rendering of the arbitral award cannot 
refuse the recognition and the enforcement of the award.96 On the other hand, some 
jurisdictional objections may not be waived even there is no opposition during the 
proceedings and processes of the resisting party of the recognition and the 
enforcement.97 Also, in case the resisting party raise jurisdictional challenge before the 
tribunal but it did not recognize such challenge, such decision by the tribunal does not 
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consider as a waiver of jurisdictional objection because the tribunal exceeded the 
authority.98 
Another defence could be seen in the article I (3)99 which provides that the signatory 
states have authority to enforce the foreign awards that are only rendered in a signatory 
state as well as the convention only apply to disputes that arise from legal relationships 
which are considered as commercial under the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award. For more understanding, refer to the case of Lombard Commodities Limited v 
Alami Vegetable Oil Products.100 The Court of Appeal set aside the award rendered in 
London under the argument that the Yang Di Pertuan Agong did not declare in the 
Gazette that the United Kingdom is a signatory convention to the list, so according to 
the local law of Malaysia the award is not considered as commercial.  
Another defence, which is the state immunity, such defence may consider as an 
obstacle towards the enforcement of IAA but not strongly.101 For instance, the rendered 
award is against the trade assets of the state or its agencies.102 The state immunity 
depends on each state, some legal systems provide the state immunity and others do 
not.103 Thus, non-enforcement of a foreign award does not mean that the award is void 
so that the same award may be effective in another state, what is void in one state is 
perhaps valid under another legal system. So, the creditor party could apply for the 
enforcement in another state if the debtor party has assets there.104 For example, the 
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award will not be enforced in some Arab states if contains interest, but it could be 
enforced in another states.105  
3.6.3 The Court Requirements of the Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Award 
The competent court where the enforcement of IAA is sought demands some 
requirements prior to the recognition and the enforcement. Such requirements are same 
as the requirements of arbitration agreement as follows:106  
a- Arbitral Award Requirements 
The award has to be international and not a domestic as the convention and the 
other arbitration laws apply to IAA only. Such award has rendered based on 
written arbitration agreement whatever is concluded in the paragraph of the 
contract itself or in a separate agreement which to conduct a substantive issue, not 
a procedural one. 
b- The Award Applied to Commercial Relationship 
The award has to apply to settle commercial issue only, other than commercial 
issue the court may not recognize and enforce the award under the provided 
reservation in article 1 (3), so that the local law is the one that considers whether 
the issue is within the commercial term or not.107  
c- The Award Arises from Legal Relationship 
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According to the article II (2) of NYC and the article 7 of UNCITRAL, the 
arbitrated dispute must be a commercial one that arises out of legal relationships. 
d- The Award is International 
The convention and other arbitration laws apply only to international awards so 
domestic award are different from a foreign award.108 The foreign awards are usually 
rendered in a state, other than the state where the enforcement is sought.109 It is only 
considered as the domestic awards when procedures and proceedings are based on the 
municipal law,110 so that the awards are considered as a foreign when the guideline of 
the arbitration processes is a foreign law.111 The U.S. courts do not consider the awards 
rendered in the United States as domestic awards as far as they are related to 
international characteristics.112  
3.6.4 Proof of International Arbitral Awards 
The IAA must be introduced by the creditor party who intends to enforce the arbitral 
award through showing some requirements to prove the validity of the award, such 
requirements are as follows: 
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3.6.5 The Requirements under New York Convention  
The New York Convention demands some requirements of the creditor party in order 
to recognize and enforce the foreign award. It is necessary to refer to article IV:113 (1) 
the creditor party bears the obligation to prove the validity of the award, such as: 
a- The award has to be original and authorized or certified; 
b- The arbitration agreement must be certified. 
(2) If the rendered award made in a different language other than the official language 
of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award, it has to translate it to the official 
language of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award and the documents has to be 
officially translated by recognized authority.  
Thus, once the creditor party proves the above requirements the national courts do not 
have to add other requirements that may lead to pending or difficulties towards the 
recognition and the enforcement of the award. After proving such requirements, the 
proof will shift to the debtor party to prove any of the exceptions under article V in 
order to avoid the recognition and enforcement made by the creditor party. The 
convention and the signatory states made effort to support the creditor party by 
reducing required obligations.114 Hence, article III of the convention made such 
requirements for the recognition and the enforcement in the matter of the procedures 
scope only, no other hard materials are required as evidence more than that 
requirements applicable to the domestic judgements. According to Gary, article III has 
to be read together with article V that give the debtor party a chance to prove any of 
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the exceptions in order to refuse the recognition and the enforcement of the award.115 
Thus, if debtor party proves any of the exceptions it would be a defence to reject the 
enforcement of the award as the application of such grounds is compulsory, and not 
discretionary.116 This means that the court is bound to recognize and enforce the 
arbitral award subject to article V of NYC and other resisting exceptions to the 
recognition and the enforcement such as reciprocity reservation and commerciality in 
article 1 (3) where such exceptions have to be proven by the resisting party of the 
award as well as article V (2) (b) that provides if the award contradicts public policy 
of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award, the court has a full discretionary power 
to refuse the recognition and the enforcement based on such exceptional grounds 
provided by the convention. Thus, after the creditor party proves the validity of the 
arbitral award the competent court is more likely to enforce the award unless the debtor 
party resists the enforcement, then the burden of proof will shift to him/her to prove 
the argument of resisting the award to satisfy the court to reject the award.117 
With regards to international arbitration system, the court has no jurisdiction to review 
the essence of the arbitrator’s decision that includes the award in order to recognize 
the award. Indeed, the court makes the review, but under the matter of the public policy 
or the grounds stated in article V of NYC. Actually, there is no provided exception by 
the convention in case the decision was wrongly reached by the tribunal/arbitrator. 
Even, the award contained a mistake of law or fact is not acceptable grounds to reject 
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the recognition and the enforcement of the award.118 This means that the court has no 
jurisdiction to review the credibility of the award or the award has to be officially 
confirmed pro-enforcement. However, some legal systems practice very limited 
judicial review of IAA, especially, in the matters of the authority of the arbitrator, the 
validity of the arbitration agreement, the procedural regularity of the arbitration, and 
the public policy while other states like United Kingdom provide application of 
judicial review to the foreign awards that are usually determined by the merit of the 
tribunal’s decision, such limited judicial review could be noticed in the most 
institutional arbitration rules.119 
Furthermore, there is another serious ground than the public policy which is public 
interest. Such grounds apply in national arbitration laws that aims to protect public 
interest.120 This contains the grounds of environmental financial effect on the public 
and culture so that if the award contravened the public interest or public group is 
perhaps to face a challenge.121 The arbitral award will not be enforced on the ground 
of the public interest.122 Thus, the public interest influences on the arbitration system 
and it creates negative effect than public policy. 
3.6.6 The Consequences of Yemen as Non-Convention State 
Currently, there are 156 states that ratified the New York Convention 1958, however, 
Yemen is not a signatory state.123 Such large number of the signatory states could mean 
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that the NYC brings positive effects to their national economies more than negative 
effects. Thus, the researcher is surprised about the rationale behind non-ratifying the 
convention by Yemen. On the other hand, most countries have ratified it and some of 
such signatory states apply principle of the Shari’a like Saudi Arabia. According to 
Alsalahi, there are no reasonable grounds for Yemeni government to justify the 
rationale behind non-ratifying the convention, especially, joining the convention will 
lead to positive effects on Yemen such as discharge of compulsory jurisdiction due to 
the agreement on the promotion and protection of investments 1985, contribute to 
attracting FDI.124 As Yemen is a part of the global trade joining the convention will 
assist the enforcement of IAA.125 
Therefore, non-ratifying the convention by Yemen will lead to putting the country 
under the exceptional grounds for the refusal of the recognition and the enforcement 
of arbitral award as provided in NYC. Article I (3) allows reservation to the signatory 
states which the signatory state can only enforce the award made by another signatory 
state, not by non-signatory state.126 The same effect will be treated by the competent 
court in Yemen which the IAA could only be enforced in Yemen according to 
reciprocity reservation.127 For instance, the United Kingdom refused to enforce the 
judgements rendered in Saudi Arabia, in reaction, the Saudi Arabia courts refused to 
enforce arbitral awards rendered in the UK.128 In another example, the enforcement of 
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foreign awards in the United States may be rejected if the creditor party from the 
country that is not signatory state, the citizens of the non-signatory state may lose the 
advantage of the enforcement of the arbitral award if his/her country is non-signatory 
state, especially some countries like the US ratified the convention subject to the 
reciprocity reservation.129 It is necessary to refer to the American case of  Bergesen v. 
Joseph Muller Corp.130 The Court of Appeal held the that the reciprocity reservation 
means that the United States would only enforce IAA if it was rendered in a signatory 
state. The US court has full jurisdiction to refuse the enforcement of an award rendered 
by a non-signatory state. 
Through an interview, all interviewees of Court of Appeal judge, academicians, and 
arbitrator suggested that in order to improve the arbitration system in Yemen, they all 
recommended ratifying New York Convention 1958. Respondent 1 stated that: 
Of course, if Yemen wants to deal with international arbitration 
dispute, it has to ratify the relevant international conventions. But, 
before that, it must have effective national arbitration laws. 
Respondent 2 stated that: 
NYC is the most effective convention in the arbitration system, 
especially in the matter of the enforcement of IAAs. Its main 
objective is recognize and enforce IAA. Thus, Yemen will be secede 
from global trade if not ratified New York Convention 1958. 
In his contribution, Respondent 3 stated as follows: 
Yemen continually a non-signatory state to NYC will adversely affect 
the recognition and the enforcement of IAA. So, it has to ratify the 
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convention if it is interesting to cope with international arbitration 
system. 
Respondent 4 mentioned that: 
Non-ratifying NYC by Yemen is an obstacle towards the enforcement 
of IAA whatever it was rendered in Yemen or by any foreign state as 
the reciprocity reservation will impede the enforcement because 
NYC stipulates the enforcement of the IAA if it is rendered in 
signatory state. 
Respondent 5 stated that: 
It is commonly known that NYC is the most important convention 
that most of countries have ratified it, including Arab countries. 
Hence, Yemen supposedly to ratify it to enhance the national 
economy. 
While Respondent 14, said that: 
Actually, there is no reasonable reasons to satisfy us that NYC is 
may harm the economy or Yemen as a whole. Especially, the NYC 
empowers the national court to reject to enforce IAA in case 
contravenes the public policy such as Shari’a principles. Ratifying 
NYC will join Yemen with global trade. I strongly advise the 
legislators to ratify it. Indeed, we do not have qualified person who 
understand the international laws so Yemen is confuse of ratifying 
the international convention as does not understand which will bring 
positive effects to the country. NYC is important to improve the 
arbitration system in Yemen. 
Thus, the victims of non-ratifying NYC are Yemeni businessmen and Yemen as a 
whole because if they seek to recognize and enforce arbitral award whether the place 
seat is held in Yemen or in another state may fail to enforce the award as the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award has legal authority to reject the recognition of the 
arbitral award on the ground of reciprocity reservation. Also, Yemen is obligated to 
enforce foreign awards as stated in section 7 of YAA that allows the parties to agree 
upon the law they wish, the place seat of the arbitration, and the institution. Moreover, 
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section 57 that provides the arbitral award is binding. However, Yemeni competent 
court will apply the reciprocity reservation as well. According to section 494 (3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the competent court will enforce IAA in Yemen based on the 
reciprocity reservation. Furthermore, non-ratification of the convention is not an 
immunity for Yemen as well as Yemeni businessmen to escape from execution of 
agreements. The foreign award will be enforced against Yemen based on other laws. 
It is necessary to refer to the case of S & Davis v Yemen.131 In this case, the contract 
was made and signed by an embassy of Yemen which contained the arbitration clause. 
Later, the dispute arose and the place seat of the arbitration held in London (UK). The 
creditor party applied for the enforcement in US competent court based on NYC. The 
competent court found that Yemen is a non-signatory state. Nevertheless, the award 
enforced against embassy of Yemen under s 1605 (a) (6) of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act 1976 that provides the foreign state cannot claim immunity to escape of 
the obligations. This case provides that the arbitral award made outside Yemen can 
still be enforced against Yemen even though Yemen is non-signatory state to NYC. 
So, based on the previous discussion Yemen will be the losing party in the following 
ways. Firstly, Yemen is the losing party of non-ratifying the convention because the 
arbitral award can be enforced against the debtor party outside Yemen. Another 
situation base on Article I (3) that arbitral award made in Yemen cannot be enforced 
in the contracting states of NYC. 
3.7 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration was recognized 
in December 1985 by United Nations General Assembly then the United Nations 
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Commission on International Trade Law adopted such rules and that was on 21 June 
1985 and later amended in 2006.132 Such rules have been adopted by many members’ 
states during the period of 40 years,133 so far over 60 countries have adopted it.134 
UNCITRAL was adopted in June 1985 by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, it was a tremendous step to harmonize and modernize 
international commercial arbitration, and it helped the implementation of New York 
convention 1958.135 UNCITRAL drafted by combining both the 1958 New York 
Convention and the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.136 Chapter 8 of UNCITRAL 
deals with the enforcement of award provisions which is an extract of the 1958 New 
York Convention as well as other provisions could be seen in UNCITRAL which is an 
original copy of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.137 
3.7.1 The Intervention of the Competent Court  
The competent court could interfere in some proceedings, but such intervention is 
limited whereas the court has no right to interfere unless that is provided by 
UNCITRAL.138 However, article 6 gives the competent court larger authority to 
interfere in some exceptions. There is a conflict between article 5 and 6 in the matter 
of jurisdiction. In anyway, the most important is the intervention of the court in the 
interim measures of protection, whereas various articles provide the jurisdiction of the 
competent court upon the request of any of the disputed parties to order the other party  
                                                     
132 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, accessed April 25, 2016, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Peter, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law 
Jurisdictions, 8. 
135 Henri C. Alvarez et al., Model Law Decision (the Huge: Keluwer Law International, 2003), 1. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Loukas A. Mistelis, Concise International Arbitration (United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 
2010), 582. 
137 Ibid. 
138 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, article 5. 
 
175 
to provide an interim measures of protection whether before the proceedings or 
after.139 Even though, such interim measures of protection were ordered by the tribunal 
that has jurisdiction to request prior to the deciding of the award140 while the role of 
the competent court comes to the picture upon the request of the tribunal asking the 
court assistance for coercive actions relating to the award of the interim measures 
which the place of enforcement of the arbitral award shall consider the arbitral award of 
such interim measures of protection as binding irrespective of where they were 
rendered.141 The article 9 and 17 give separated jurisdiction, whereas article 9 gives 
power to the court to order an interim measures of protection while article 17 gives 
power to the tribunal for the same purpose.142 However, which of the two authorities 
has the priority to grant such orders? Indeed, the court could grant an interim measures 
of protection but if the tribunal granted an interim measures of protection before the 
court, then the court has to perform the arbitral tribunal orders.143 On the other hand, 
article 9 gives the court a jurisdiction to grant interim measures of protection before or 
within the proceedings, this means none of the two authorities has more priority over 
another.144 In the researcher’ opinion, the tribunal is supposed to only have the 
authority to grant interim measures of protection as it is more known of arbitral award 
before it than the court. Also, the application for interim measures of protection in the 
court will makes the arbitral processes longer and conflict of jurisdiction will arise.  
Such important point to grand interim measure could be seen in sections 30 and 31 of 
YAA which that provides the tribunal has jurisdiction to order any of the parties to 
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provide interim measure award to ensure the implement of the award. This strengthens 
the arbitration system in Yemen if practiced as interim measures of protection may 
help to enforce IAA. However, the same jurisdiction is given to the court to grant 
interim measures of protection upon the applicant’s request based on section 43 of the 
same Act. 
 In terms of jurisdiction, the competent court has the power to issue interim measures 
of protection in arbitration taking place outside Yemen to ensure the enforcement of 
the international awards if requested by the applicant of the tribunal. Respondent 1 
stated that:  
The enforcement of international interim measures of protection and 
awards through judiciary channels of the host and the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award to implement the arbitral award 
or an order if that host state is a member to the convention, such as 
Arab Convention. 
Respondent 2 said that: 
 By international judicial mandate through the diplomatic corps, the 
arbitral tribunal requests from Yemeni judiciary an interim 
measures of protection in some arbitration cases. The arbitral 
tribunal has a discretion whether specific goods are going to expire 
or they are perishable, or the need to set a guard on a factory to keep 
it running or supervising its maintenance to continue in production 
to avoid losses from stoppage of production, or quick action to keep 
goods in dispute safely and to avoid damage by providing 
refrigerators or reservation depots during high temperature 
weather. This is especially if the goods are perishable such as fruit, 
medicines, and so on. The arbitral tribunal needs a faster procedure 
to prevent damage. Some goods could get damaged by delay, hence 
need temporary procedures and speed so as not to hurt the disputing 
parties’ interests if the arbitral tribunal waited until the litigation 
ends. Thus, we consider such request of interim measures of 
protection rendered by the arbitral tribunal or the court. 
Respondent 3 said that: 
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Sometimes, the lost party against whom the temporary award of 
interim measures of protection is rendered may fail to implement it 
voluntarily. The arbitral tribunal or the judiciary in the host State 
contact us to in order to take coercive actions to enforce the 
temporary arbitral award. It commonly known that the arbitral 
tribunal has no authority to force the lost party to forcibly implement 
what it decided. But, such procedures may be a bit complex 
procedures because the communication between two different 
systems is through the diplomatic corps. 
Respondent 4 stated as follows: 
The arbitrator has no authority to compel the lost party to enforce 
the interim measures of protection, which refers to the court to 
forcibly enforce interim measures of protection as like freeze the 
bank account, seize property, and so on. There is a judicial 
cooperation between Yemen and several States to implement judicial 
decisions and arbitral awards, so we cooperate with those States 
that have international conventions with Yemen providing for 
judicial cooperation. We received several requests which require us 
to enforce interim measures of protection, and already accomplished 
these requests as long as not contrary to the public policy or the 
grounds to set aside the arbitral award as provided in sections 53 
and 55 of Yemeni Arbitration (Act No. 22)1992. 
Respondent 5 said that: 
The Yemeni Arbitration Act does not prevent the foreign arbitral 
tribunal to request from a Yemen court any assistance and control 
whether before or during arbitral proceedings but the enforcement 
of such request is subject to the national laws. There is no section in 
the Yemen Arbitration Act which provides for rejecting the right of 
the foreign arbitral tribunal to request from the Yemen court to assist 
it in taking an interim measures of protection. Also, you should not 
interpret such request rendered by the arbitral tribunal as a mandate 
the conflict with the Yemen court. Such request is only to have the 
court’ assistance and control as the court is the only authority has 
jurisdiction to take coercive actions. 
Respondent 14 stated that:  
I have seen a foreign arbitral tribunal’s request to the Yemen court. 
Section 43 of the Yemeni Arbitration Act provides that of the arbitral 
tribunal has a jurisdiction to request from either party or request 
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assistance from a competent court to take interim measures of 
protection without stopping the arbitration proceedings. 
As it stated above, it is confirmed that the interim measures of protection are provided 
by YAA and practiced. As the host state of the arbitration and the place of enforcement 
of the arbitral award are different legal system, so the procedures and processes of 
interim measures have to be implemented through diplomatic corps. However, it 
confirmed that to implement interim measures will face communication difficulties 
which have to go through complicated procedures and processes by two different 
systems. In addition, the communication will be worse in Yemen, as Respondent 2 
answered in different question that “the judiciary faces issues with diplomatic corps 
because Yemeni diplomatic corps fail to cooperate with the judiciary in case the court 
requested it to communicate with foreign diplomatic agencies to implement judicial 
operations. This means that interim measures will face difficulties to be implemented 
as Yemeni diplomatic corps do not cooperate with court. Hence, it has to improve the 
internal cooperation between Yemeni judiciary and the diplomatic corps. 
Also, regarding to the competent court giving assistance to the tribunal in case of the 
applicant or the tribunal requested interim measures of protection before issuing the 
final awards. Respondent 1 said that “the arbitral tribunal requires the Court’s 
assistance, but to accept the request is depend on court’s discretion”.  
Respondent 2 stated that: 
The court plays a major role in assistance and control the arbitral 
tribunal to implement the interim measures of protection such as 
provide guards after seizing the property. The arbitral tribunal has 
no jurisdiction to appoint guards to take after specific possession or 
freeze the bank account. Thus, through a request from the arbitral 
tribunal then, the court may approve or reject it. The court has 
discretion whether such an arbitral award is reasonable or not. 
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Hence, the matter of interim measures of protection are not 
enforceable if the lost party refused to enforce unless the court 
approved such arbitral award.  The formal court has more power 
than the arbitral tribunal in the matter of enforcement of the interim 
measures of protection, the arbitral award of interim measures of 
protection is only implemented voluntarily by the lost party while, 
the court could enforce it by coercive actions. 
Respondent 3 said that:  
The court provides assistance and control to arbitral tribunal, but 
subject to requirements that must be fulfilled before the acceptance 
by the court, they are substantive requirements and formal 
requirements. Substantive requirements such as the arbitral award 
is issued by the arbitral tribunal according to the arbitration 
agreement whatever the arbitration agreement in a part of the 
contract or in a separate contract. The Court will not accept any 
interim measures of protection in a matter family disputes or 
criminal disputes as the Yemeni Arbitration Act prevent settlement 
of family disputes or criminal disputes by arbitration system 
according to section 5 of the Yemeni Arbitration Act. The interim 
measures of protection must be relevant to the dispute. The interim 
measures of protection must be a jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal 
so if there is an agreement between the disputed parties which 
prevents the arbitral tribunal from taking any interim measures, then 
the court will not assist the implementation of the arbitral award of 
interim measures of protection. While such formalities like that the 
arbitral award of interim measures of protection are issued in a 
written document, must translate any relating documents to Arabic 
language. 
Respondent 4 said that: 
The court collaborates with arbitral tribunal to implement interim 
measures of protection measures which aims to preserve evidence 
or maintain the goods from damage, and sometimes to create 
realistic or legal status needed to ensure the implementation of the 
final award, such interim measures come to the end at the time of 
issuing the final arbitral award. As temporary in nature, and they 
are not decisive or conclusive, so their survival depends on the 
survival of the original dispute, such interim measures are not 
guaranteeing that the final arbitral award will be in favour of the 
party whom the interim measures are rendered in favour. Despite its 
association with the original dispute, they are not intended to resolve 
the conflict, but aims to facilitate the implementation of the purpose 
of the original litigation, adjudication, and ensure its future 
implementation of the final arbitral award. 
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Respondent 5 said that: 
The relationship between the court and the arbitral tribunal is not 
that of competition, but this relationship is meant to facilitate 
cooperation between the formal judiciary and the arbitration system. 
That's why the court intervenes in case of refusal of one of the parties 
to the dispute to enforce the interim measures of protection or the 
final arbitral award. 
Respondent 14 mentioned that: 
The arbitral tribunal refers the procedures to the competent court to 
carry out the subsequent procedures when the lost party rejected 
implementation of the arbitral tribunal. An arbitrator has no 
authority to compel some actions so requires judicial intervention to 
protect the right or liabilities, here could be an arbitrator and 
judge's role represents a sort of job sharing for the benefit of existing 
proceedings. Here it clearly highlights the role of the judge as a 
facilitator and to supplement inadequate authority of the arbitrator. 
Therefore, the tribunal award can issue an interim measures of protection in case of 
goods that are perishable in order to avoid damage and cost. Also, the interim measures 
of protection can be taken by the arbitral tribunal to ensure the enforcement of 
international arbitral award by the lost party. The arbitral tribunal can request the 
court’s assistance and control if the lost party refuse to enforce the arbitral award of 
an interim measures of protection voluntarily.  However, the court can accept the 
arbitral tribunal’ request after fulfilling specific requirements. But, it does not mean 
reviewing the arbitral award. Such requirements are only stipulated in the Yemeni 
Arbitration Act. Regarding the discretion of court to accept or reject the award of 
interim measures of protection. Arguably the court has jurisdiction to reject the award 
of interim measures that rendered by the tribunal. This is on the grounds that the court 
is considered be the higher authority. It is irrational to equate the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
with the court’s jurisdiction. The court is the authority that all authorities have to be 
under its jurisdiction. The court is the authority that has to be referred to in case of 
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breach of the natural justice. Thus, the arbitration laws allow the disputed parties to 
refer to the court if the tribunal breach the natural of justice or refuse to accept 
reasonable request such as interim measures. On the other hand, the researcher prefer 
the tribunal to have sufficient jurisdiction to deal with interim measures as it is the 
authority which is more understandable of the dispute before it. However, the tribunal 
jurisdiction cannot be higher than the court jurisdiction. YAA which could be seen in 
section 31 that provides the tribunal has a jurisdiction to require security of any of the 
parties to ensure the compliance with arbitration proceedings and the award as well. 
However, YAA is silent regarding the review of the arbitral award of the interim 
measures by the court. As the arbitral award of the interim measures is not final as the 
same as the final arbitral award. YAA, thus, has to clarify the court position. It has to 
refer to the international cases to understand the award of interim measures. The 
tribunal indirectly accepted the application by preventing the respondents from 
disposing the disputed assets.145 Other measures such as inspection of property to have 
evidence,146 sell perishable goods,147 arrest of a ship,148 and prevent the respondent 
from disposing of assets.149 It is not incompatible with the arbitration agreement to 
seek the court’s assistance to have an order such as interim measures of protection or 
a subpoena, the applicant has to choice to seek such assistance that with the arbitral 
tribunal’s authorization based on article 27 of the Model Law or without the arbitral 
                                                     
145 ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 (unpublished). 
146 CLOUT case No. 692 [Transorient Shipping Limited v. The Owners of the Ship or vessel “Lady 
Muriel” v. Transorient Shipping Limited, Court of Appeal, Hong Kong, 3 May 1995], [1995] HKCA 
615, also available on the Internet at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkca/1995/615.html. 
147 Taxfield Shipping Ltd. v. Asiana Marine Inc. and others, High Court—Court of First Instance 
(Construction and Arbitration Proceedings), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, 7 
March 2006, [2006] HKCFI 271, available on the Internet at 
http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2006/271.html. 
148 CLOUT case No. 354 [Silver Standard Resources Inc. v. Joint Stock Company Geolog, Cominco 
Ltd. and Open Type Stock Company Dukat GOK, Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Canada, 11 




tribunal’s authorization base on article 9. The cases have clarified that the courts are 
mostly enforce the arbitral award of the interim measures. 
3.7.2 Recourse against the Arbitral Award 
The arbitral award maybe recourse, so that any of the disputed parties may refer to the 
court to recourse against the arbitral award if resisting party satisfies the court through 
proving any of the exceptions stated in article 34 (2) (a) as follows: 
(i) One of the parties to the arbitration agreement has less capacity when the 
arbitration agreement took place, or the agreement is void based on the 
applicable law to the dispute or the law of the place seat of arbitration and the 
disputed parties miss to mention that. 
(ii) The resisting party challenged the appointment arbitrator and arbitral process 
under the ground of not given proper notice of the mentioned actions. 
(iii) The rendered award conducted a dispute that not contained in the agreement or 
the arbitrator/arbitrators acted beyond their authority, otherwise, the part that 
not within the submitted dispute may set aside and that within the submission 
is more likely to enforce. 
(iv) The constituted tribunal or the procedures are against the agreed terms of the 
disputed parties to the arbitration agreement or such agreement against the laws 
of the place seat. 
The arbitration tribunal shall follow the arbitration rules, proceedings, and 
procedures agreed upon by the disputed parties in the arbitration agreement.150 
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In one case the German court refused to recognize the arbitral award based on 
the argument that the disputing parties agreed upon choosing of arbitrators a 
pre-set list of arbitrators while the tribunal recognized other arbitrators out of 
the agreed list. Additionally, the tribunal refused a request to listen to oral 
hearing which the parties previously agreed in the arbitration agreement as 
well. So, the tribunal exceeded its authority by such appointment of arbitrators 
and proceeding that is against the agreed terms in the arbitration agreement.151 
(b) The competent court has a discretion to set aside the award upon the following 
grounds: 
(v) The subject matter of the dispute is inappropriate to be settled under arbitration 
system.  
UNCITRAL allowed to set aside the arbitral awards that are not appropriated to be 
settled by arbitration mechanism.152 However, it did not provide the scope of the 
disputes that are not arbitral, so it leaves the discretion to the court to determine that 
based on the national legal system.153 
(vi) The court classified the award as a contravention of public policy. 
According to Sanders, UNCITRAL is lack of essential provisions in the matter of the 
arbitral agreement or the award that affected corruption, fraud, or bribery.154 Such 
matters contravene public policy which gives the right to the debtor party to set aside 
the award or judgement through limited period of three months from the knowledge of 
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such matters.155  The public policy is a contentious issue which the signatory states 
failed to have to a consensus on one guideline.156  Thus, leaving the court to consider 
what constituted the public policy.157 
3.7.3 Recognition and Enforcement of Awards 
It is commonly known the arbitral award is binding on all the disputing parties. Article 
35 provides that the arbitral award is binding, so that the court has no jurisdiction to 
refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award without any of the reasons stated in articles 
34 or 36.158 On the other hand, the place of enforcement of the arbitral award is compelled 
to enforce the arbitral award that complied with the requirements.159 Thus, the creditor 
party can apply for the recognition and the enforcement by providing an official award 
or authorized copy in an official language of the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award.160 However, the certified copy in case the arbitration agreement or the arbitral 
award is rendered in different language of the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award.  
The arbitral award is automatically recognized and enforced if the creditor party fulfills 
all requirements stated in the article 31. The creditor party is not obligated to confirm 
the award in the place seat of the arbitration. In one case the resisting party of the 
enforcement argues that the award has to be confirmed in Canada before applying the 
enforcement of the award in U. S. courts. The competent court dismissed such 
argument.161 Hence, the effectiveness of the arbitrated case will be considered by the 
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place of enforcement of the arbitral award, rather than the state of the place seat of the 
arbitration.  
The fundamental issue of UNCITRAL is revising what is as of now covered by 
NYC.162 It means that UNCITRAL is repeating the same provisions of NYC. Thus the 
non-signatory states of NYC are perhaps not adopt UNCITRAL as it has not brought 
new provisions on the matter of the recognition and enforcement, other than repeating 
NYC provisions.163 On the other hand there is conflict between article 35 (1) of 
UNCITRAL and article 1 (3) of the convention.164 The convention allowed the national 
court to refuse to recognize and enforce the arbitral award based on reciprocity 
reservation and commerciality in article I (3). While, UNCITRAL is silent on this 
authority. However, this researcher disagree with the author because that UNCITRAL 
is only guideline for the states to adopt it to the national arbitration laws. It does not 
mean that has to adopt it entirely. The states can merge, change, amend based on what 
they could be seen is suitable for their reciprocity law. For instance, The YAA is 
mainly based on UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration with 
amendments as adopted in 2006 (UNCITRAL).165 But, YAA is only partially adopted 
it as can notice provisions are relevant to the customary law. Another difference could 
be seen in article 35 (1) of UNCITRAL and article III of NYC which UNCITRAL is 
intentionally distinguished between the recognition and the enforcement.166 It 
considered them as separated from each other.167 Even though, at the application of 
the enforcement of IAA does not require applying for recognition. The same 
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application is applicable for both the recognition and enforcement.168 By anyway, 
YAA adopted article 35 and 36 of UNCTRAL but added a paragraph, that is, the 
arbitral award will not be implemented if it contravened Shari’a. It means that YAA 
compels Yemen court not only to deal with international awards and domestic awards 
equally but bears it the obligation to enforce the awards as long as they comply with 
the requirements provided in YAA. In addition, article 36 of UNCITRAL and V and 
VI of NYC are similar in the matter of the recognition and enforcement.169 However, 
the article 36 of UNCITRAL applies to all awards whatever they are international or 
domestic awards while articles V and VI stipulated to deal only with foreign awards.170 
Indeed, the rationale of UNCITRAL to be applied to both awards is to prevent the 
distinction between the international and domestic award.171 Therefore, the same 
provisions that apply over domestic awards will be applied to international awards as 
well. It has to refer to YAA to understand the position of the distinction between the 
international and domestic award. Section 7 provides that the disputed parties, 
whatever one of the parties is non-citizen or both are non-citizens to choose their own 
law, place and language to settle the existing or future dispute. This is good feature of 
YAA which deals and applies the same procedures over both parties. It does not 
distinguish among the parties’ nationality. It means that the Yemen court will apply 
the same relevant provisions of the enforcement over the both local and international 
awards. 
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3.7.4 The Grounds for Refusing Recognition and Enforcement 
Upon the application of the recognition and the enforcement of the competent court, 
the debtor party could raise objections to set aside the arbitral award.172 UNCITRAL 
requires the place of enforcement of the arbitral award to treat the international award and 
local awards equally.173 Article 36 (1) (2) provides that the court has a jurisdiction in 
some exceptional rules to refuse the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, 
such exceptions can come into the picture if the resisting party of the enforcement 
could prove that one of the parties to the arbitration agreement referred in article 7 was 
under the age of majority or was an incompetent person or the agreement is void so 
that the resisting party of the enforcement bears the burden to prove that the agreement 
is void based on an article 36 (1) (a) (i). Article 18 provides that the disputed parties 
have to be treated equally and each party must be given sufficient time to present his 
case, otherwise, if the debtor party was not given a sufficient notice in the matter of 
appointment of the arbitrator as well as a reasonable notice of the arbitral proceedings 
or was unable to present his case, he could challenge the enforcement of the award. In 
one case, it was held that the court requires the tribunal only to give sufficient time to 
each party, whether the parties exploit such time or not, getting no advantages of the 
given time will not affect the enforcement of the award.174  
Another exception, the court can determine the refusal to implement the arbitral award 
if the arbitral tribunal fails to comply with the agreed terms of the disputed parties that 
stated in the arbitration agreement. Thus, the tribunal must not adjudicate issues that 
excluded by disputing parties, otherwise, the award will not be enforced. In one case, 
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the tribunal issued an award that terminates the franchise agreement while the 
arbitration agreement excluded any matter leading to termination. The competent court 
held the tribunal exceeded its authority so the award is unenforceable.175 However, it 
is not a breach of the arbitration agreement if the arbitral tribunal made a decision on 
the subject matters that submitted to arbitration which is separated from those subject 
matters are not submitted, the award on the subject matters that submitted to the 
arbitration can be recognized and enforced. Furthermore, it doesn't breach of 
UNCITRAL if the composition of the arbitrators or the arbitral procedures does not 
comply with the law of the country of the place seat of the arbitration.  
 Also, it is a reasonable ground to refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award if the 
court find that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being settled by 
arbitration mechanism under the enforcement law, or the award is contravened public 
policy.176 Such violation of public policy like infringement of the principles of 
morality and justice in the place of enforcement of the arbitral award.177 For example, 
Riba is strictly prohibited under principles of the Shari’a so that imposition of Riba in 
commercial transactions or as penalty is unacceptable.178 Thus, the arbitral award will 
be considered as against the public policy of the state that apply Shari’a.  
Moreover, UNCITRAL considered the award as binding on the disputed parties, 
regardless of where the award was rendered179 in order to avoid the distinction between 
the international awards and domestic awards, especially, to avoid a demand of 
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onerous evidences to enforce IAA.180 However, the award will be rejected in the place 
of enforcement of the arbitral award if the state where the award is rendered had set it 
aside. However, in a German case, the court enforced the award that was set aside in 
Russia which it is the original state of the rendered award.181 This means a lack of 
uniform guideline in international arbitration systems. 
3.8 The Convention of the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and 
Nationals of Other States 
Convention of the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of 
Other States (Washington/ICSID Convention), 1965. Such convention established the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to monitor and 
observe disputes that arise between the contracting state and the nationals of other 
contracting states.182 Till now, 152 countries have ratified the ICSID Convention 
whereas the Republic of Yemen signed the convention on October 1997 and ratified it 
in October 2004 while the force of the convention entered on November 2004.183 
ICSID has to be the tribunal that shall conduct the disputes whereas the place seat of 
arbitration is the principal office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the Bank)184 which is the main location in Washington, but the disputed 
parties could agree upon other branch locations of the Bank.185 This means that the 
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contracting states to the convention have no jurisdiction to conduct the dispute through 
their own centers of arbitration. Such jurisdiction is different from that provided in 
NYC and UNCITRAL which allow the arbitration proceedings to be held in any 
contracting state to NYC and conduct the arbitration by the rules of the contracting 
states or the international institutions. 
3.8.1 The Jurisdiction of ICSID 
ICSID has jurisdiction to conduct disputes that are relating to the investment disputes 
between the signatory state and the national of the signatory state upon free consent in 
writing of the mentioned parties to settle their difference through ICSID.186The 
definition of the investment did not leave to the court to determine after the issuing of 
the award whether the dispute is within the scope of investment or not, this convention 
stipules on the signatory state that upon ratification of the convention must inform 
ICSID the disputes which are considered as investment disputes as well as the disputes 
that are not within the scope of investment.187 Such limitation is great as did not leave 
the court to use the definition as a sword against the non-willing to enforce the arbitral 
award in  case the award might not in favour of the signatory state economy, citizen, 
and the like. Also, this limitation is a guideline for a foreign investor to understand the 
disputes that inappropriate to be settled by arbitration mechanism. Such limitation 
provided by ICSID is different from article I (3) of NYC and article 1 (1) of 
UNCITRAL which stipulated that the dispute must arise out of legal commercial, 
otherwise, the award will not be recognized and enforced by the place of enforcement 
of the arbitral award. However, they did not provide the exact meaning of the 
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commerciality which authorized the courts to interpret the definition according to its 
national legal system, and this led to a gap in the arbitration system as commonly 
known that each state has its own legal system, culture, religion, and so on which are 
different from other legal systems. Therefore, what dispute is considered as legal 
commercial under legal system of one state may not be considered as commercial 
dispute under a different state.  
3.8.2 The requirements of valid award 
The arbitral award shall go through some requirements to have the credibility of a valid 
award, such requirements could notice in article 48188 as follows: 
1- The majority of the arbitral tribunal must decide the questions; 
2- The members of the arbitral tribunal who agree on the arbitral award shall sign it, 
and the award must be in writing; 
3- The tribunal shall state the reason which the award based on and must covered all 
the submitted questions; 
4- All the tribunal members shall state their opinion of the rendered award including 
that member who against the majority opinion. 
Further, article 45 (2)189 provides if the one of the disputed parties fails to attend the 
arbitration proceedings the other party could require the tribunal to deal with the 
submitted questions before it in order to render the award, however, the tribunal must 
not issue the arbitral award before notifying the failed party, and gives him/her a 
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chance to present his/her case, unless the tribunal finds that the failed party is unwilling 
to present.   
3.8.3 The annulment of the award 
The debtor party has some defences that may challenge the recognition and the 
enforcement of the arbitral award through a written application to the Secretary 
General. Such defences could be seen in article 52 (1) as follows: 
a- The constitution of the arbitral tribunal was not well constituted; 
b- The tribunal acted beyond its authority; 
c- One of the tribunal members is involved in corruption; 
d- The major rules of procedures were violated; 
e- The tribunal failed to state the reason that the arbitral award is based on; 
5- Upon request of the resisting party of the enforcement which the enforcement must 
be suspend until the committee gives its decision over such request; 
6- If the award is annulled, then any of the disputed parties could request a transfer 
of the arbitral award to a new arbitral tribunal. This paragraph is very important 
which the NYC and UNCITRAL fail to provide such provision as may after the 
application of resisting the enforcement is successfully won by the debtor party, 
then the court must refer the disputed parties to a new tribunal to settle the same 




3.8.4 The Recognition and Enforcement of the Award 
The recognition and enforcement of the award is binding on both the disputed parties 
and the contracting states. An article 53 (1) that provides the disputed parties are bound 
by the arbitral award and such award is not subject to appeal, other than exceptions 
that provide in this convention, so the parties have to comply with the award, whereas 
only the enforcement may delay according to the stated provisions in this convention. 
While the binding on the signatory states could notice in article 54 as follows: 
1- The arbitral award is binding on the signatory state which has to enforce upon 
fulfilling the required requirements and must be effective as the same as the 
judgement has to be final. The contracting state that has a federal system which 
perhaps enforce the award through the federal court; 
2- The creditor party bears the responsibility of satisfying the competent court or any 
other authority through a certified copy of the award from the Secretary-General; 
3- The enforcement of the award has to follow the laws of the state where the 
recognition and enforcement are sought. However, the award must not deal with 
as a second degree and the defence of the state immunity is unacceptable according 
to article 55. 
3.9 Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration 
This convention was founded in Sultanate of Oman in 1982 which 13 Arab States are 
members of it including Yemen that joined the convention in 1982 and entered into 
force in 1982.190 The main purpose of this convention is to establish a consensual Arab 
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trade system to cope with international trade.191 It is mainly legislated to settle the 
disputes among natural and legal persons that arise out of a commercial relationship,192 
whereas the Arab International Union for Arbitration is authorized to settle arising 
disputes. The award rendered by the tribunal is binding and the high court of each state 
is the competent authority which has to enforce the award unless it is contrary to the 
public policy.193 As Yemen is addressed, public policy ground provides in section 53 
(g) that the arbitral award will be refused if it is in violation of public policy.194 
Similarly, section 55 (b) provides that the foreign award cannot be enforced if the 
competent court considers it as against public policy.195 In section 53 the debtor party 
has to apply to the court to set aside the arbitral award while, section 55 the court itself 
will reject to enforce the arbitral award even without the debtor party’s application to 
set aside it. Abdul Baqi Abdul Qadir v Zayn bint Ahmad Hashim, Commercial Appeal 
No.2 of 1977, it was held that the award will not be enforced if breached the public 
policy. 
3.10 Riyadh Arab Convention for Judicial Cooperation 
All Arab states have joined this convention, including Yemen which signed the 
convention in 1983 and became enforceable on 1985.196 However, Egypt and the 
Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros have not joined this convention.197 The 
convention recognizes and enforce any legal decision such as an arbitral awards and 
court judgements as far as it is based on the judiciary procedures, the court, or 
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authorized body.198 The place seat of the arbitration can hold in any of the signatory 
states.199 Such decision is binding and must be recognized and enforced in the 
signatory states.200 However, the signatory states are not obligated to execute the 
decision that is issued against the government or the official staff while doing his/her 
duties.201 Article 30 provides that the award may rejected in the following 
circumstances: 
a- If the award contravened principles of the Shari’a, constitution, or public policy; 
b- If did not serve the resisting body a notice of the proceedings or did not give the 
sufficient time to defend his/her case; 
c- If any of the disputed parties is not competent; 
d- If the dispute is under the court proceedings. 
While the enforcement of the judgement could notice in article 31 as follows: 
a- The judgement is issued from recognized court of the place seat, such award 
became enforceable when it is enforceable in the place seat of the arbitration; 
b- The procedures that conducted disputes which not within the convention are 
subject to the law of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award. 
After the application of the enforcement at the state where the enforcement is sought, 
then the judiciary of that state will supervise the award and check the finality of the 
award based on the requirements provided by the convention but not to review the 
arbitral award. The judiciary supervision may order coercive actions to enforce the 
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award.202 The requirements for the application of the enforcement at the state where 
the enforcement is sought are mentioned in article 34 as follows: 
a- A certified copy of the competent court; 
b- A certificate to prove that the judgement is final; 
c- All related copies must be certified and at the time of the enforcement and shall 
get the signature of the execution judge at the place of enforcement of the arbitral 
award. 
Without prejudice to the articles 28 and 30, the convention specifically stated in article 
37 that the arbitral award is binding on all signatory states except in the following 
grounds: 
a- If the dispute is not appropriate to be settled under the law of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award; 
b- If the tribunal rendered an award to enforce a term or arbitration agreement that is 
void; 
c- If the qualification of the arbitrators is not according to the terms agreed by the 
disputed parties or the law of the place seat; 
d- If  a proper notice of the arbitration proceeding is not given to the disputed parties; 
e- If the award is against principles of the Shari’a or the public policy of the place of 
enforcement of the arbitral award. 
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3.11  The International Laws on States Commitments and Obligations 
In order to know the effectiveness of the arbitral award against the state or national of 
the state that is not signatory to NYC, the researcher has to go through international 
law whatever treaties, custom, or general principles that are relating to the states’ 
commitments and obligations. As article 38 (1) provides that international law can be 
treaties, custom, and general principles. Thus, the followings could be referred. 
a- International Law and Municipal Law 
All states have the sovereignty over their region which no state could interfere with 
the sovereignty of another state, even that states that are powerful have no right to 
do so.203 Each state has its own domestic laws to arrange the relationships among 
its jurisdictional region so that the international law such as human rights and 
international investment law to arrange the relationships among the states and 
foreign nationals as well.204 The international law is considered as more superior 
than the domestic law as it is dominant among states over the world. Thus, a state 
when breaching any rule of international law can’t rely on its own domestic laws 
and sovereignty principle, the international law must prevail.205 For more 
understanding, refer to article 3 which provides that international wrongful acts 
committed by a state must be subject to international law.206 Article 27 provides 
that when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility in international agreement, it 
can’t justify such failure by its own municipal law.207 Additionally, the state can’t 
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claim that its ratification of the treaty led to contravention of its own municipal law 
in order to justify its failure to carry out its responsibility.208  
b- Immunity from Jurisdiction 
In the past, each state has sovereign which prevents another state from interfering 
with its affairs.209 So, the court shall refuse to hear cases that related to a sovereign 
of the foreign state as previously, the trade exchange among states is limited to tax 
collection.210 Nowadays, global trade faces difficulties of the extremely state 
immunity as trade is expanding tremendously among the states and nationals of the 
states as well, so that the jurisdictional immunity is impossible to follow.211 Article 
20 provides that waiver of immunity cannot be claimed to escape from 
execution.212 For instance, there are commercial agreements among the states or 
the foreign nationals and the place seat, if one of the parties to the contract breaches 
the contract terms, then the court has no jurisdiction to hear the case for lack 
jurisdictional authority as one of the parties is a foreigner.213 Therefore, the 
jurisdictional immunity is not anymore applicable to exempt the state activities 
from execution in the matter of commercial transaction.214 Article 19 provides non-
state could take an execution action through an order of the court of another state 
which leads to arrest or seize of property of another state except if there is written 
consent stated in an international agreement or arbitration agreement.215 It is 
important to refer to one state law to clarify the immunity principle, For example, 
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section 3 (3)216 of United Kingdom State Immunity Act clarifies the meaning of 
commercial transaction: 
1. Any supply of service or goods contract; 
2. Any contract for financial obligations; 
3. Any contract for commercial transactions or activities, financial, 
professional, industrial or the like. 
Therefore, any contract comes under the scope of section 3 would be subject to 
jurisdictional application which the principle of the sovereignty or immunity will have 
no effect. Further, section 3 (1) of the same Act provides that the state cannot claim 
immunity to escape from obligation in commercial contracts.  
At the modern time, the international law replaced extreme state immunity by limited 
state immunity, which the foreign state actions cannot litigate in the court of another 
foreign state if the matter is relating to government action that may lead to negative 
effects but the foreign state is liable for commercial actions and the immunity will not 
apply in commercial issues.217 It is necessary to refer to the case of KJ International v 
MV Oscar Jupiter,218  the commercial transaction is not necessary in order to have 
judicial jurisdiction as far as commercial purpose hold place when the Romanian 
government sailed the ship to one company, even the characteristic of commercial 
transaction could not be noticed as commercial by the state immunity defence is 
rejected. 
                                                     
216 UK State Immunity Act 1978. 
217 August, International Business Law, 157. 
218 KJ International v MV Oscar Jupiter 131 ILR, P. 529. 
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3.12  The International Agreements 
The states that have a trade with other states, mostly do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) in order to protect the national investors’ rights in case of expropriation of their 
investment rights.219 On other words, the agreements mostly focus on the obligations 
of the place seat of the investment and the investors’ rights and less concentrated on 
the investors’ obligations and exporting state obligations.220 Such agreements try to 
protect the investors of place seat in case of violation of international law, investment 
rights, enforcement of arbitral awards, whereas the legal action could be taken by the 
original state of the investors against the place seat of the investment.221 BITs are 
mostly stipulates that the place seat of the investment should be treated with foreign 
investors as the same as national investors as well as in the matter of the proceedings, 
procedures, and the enforcement of the dispute settlement systems. 222 Also, the 
investment treaties require equal treatment of the foreign investors who have the 
investment in the place seat so the international law provides the minimum standard 
of treatment of foreign investors.223   
The disputed parties could refer to the ICSID mechanism if there are BITs between 
the disputed parties, the ICSID mechanism could also apply to settle the investment 
disputes even one of the disputed parties is not a signatory state or not a national of a 
signatory state.224 Yemen has signed 47 Bilateral Investment Treaties with various 
states around the world which stipulates the condition of settlement of disputes of 
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investment among the states,225 this means Yemen has no open gate to escape from the 
execution of international arbitral awards.  Refer to the case of Desert Line Projects 
L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen,226 in this case the claimant in Desert Line Project L.L.C 
(hereinafter referred as D.L.L) which was established under Omani law, while the 
respondent is the Republic of Yemen (Yemen). The claimant entered into numerous 
contracts at different times with the respondent for construction of asphalt roads in 
different places in the country. They agreed to settle their dispute amicably and 
executed an arbitration agreement and its award is deemed as enforceable and final.  
On 9 August 2004, the tribunal issued the award in favour of DLP and entitled it 
amount for works done YR18, 447,857,500 plus additional costs at an amount of YR 
1, 520,620,929. However, the respondent did not execute the arbitral award. After 
disappointed hopes of the judiciary regarding the enforcement of the arbitration award, 
on 2nd August 2005 the claimant individually filed a request for intervention of the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). The ICSID 
rendered the arbitral award in favour of Desert Line Project L.L.C. 
3.13  Expropriation 
Expropriation comes into the picture when the place seat of the investment violates the 
rights of the foreign investor such rights like assets or refuse to enforce arbitral awards 
without judicial reasonable grounds.227 In the arbitration, the creditor party can 
challenge the place of enforcement of the arbitral award in case of rejecting to enforce 
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the arbitral award without any reasonable ground of such refusal.228 The international 
law classified the expropriation into two types; one is lawful expropriation and this 
occur when there is no discrimination against the foreign investor who must pay 
damages for breach of obligation while the second expropriation must pay damages 
for violation of expropriation which violated international law as well, and this is 
usually happen when there is discrimination and infringement of owned right by 
foreign nature or legal person.229  However, the refutation of the foreign state court’s 
decision is not easy except if there is the unambiguous misconduct of the court which 
led to infringement of the justice.230 
For more understanding, refer to the case of Saipem v Bangladesh.231 In this case, the 
contract made between Saipem and Petrobangla (Bangladeshi national oil company) 
which contained an arbitration agreement to be held in Bangladesh through ICC 
Arbitration. The award was rendered in favour of Saipem but could not enforce it in 
Bangladeshi court where the Petrobangla has its valuable assets. The refusal was due 
to bias. Saipem filed an action at ICSID based on BIT agreement between Italy and 
Bangladesh government. The tribunal held that the Bangladesh court illegally invoked 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal which breached the international law by exceeding the 
authority of supervising the arbitration process. As a result of preventing Saipem from 
investment and the misconduct of the court, compensation was awarded to Saipem.  
Based on the above international law, treaties, and cases, could mean that Yemen is 
obligated to enforce the IAA whether it is signatory of NYC or not, it cannot disappear 
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under an umbrella to escape from commitment and execution whereas the sovereign 
immunity cannot apply as a shield to avoid its consent of entering arbitration 
agreements under argument of violation of the municipal law or non-ratifying NYC.  
Thus, in the case of non-enforcement of IAA as a result of the adverse effects of 
insufficient YAA, tribalism, corruption, or the like so that the foreign investor could 
refer to his/her original state to take an action of expropriation on behalf. Whereas, 
Yemen has signed 47 Bilateral Investment Treaties with various states around the 
world which stipulates the condition of settlement disputes of the investment among 
the states.232 This means Yemen has no open gate to escape from the execution of IAA. 
Therefore, the researcher sees non-ratifying of the NYC by Republic of Yemen leading 
to negative effects on Yemeni businessmen and the national economy as a whole, so 
that the researcher strongly advises the Yemeni government to ratify NYC which could 
lead to positive effects on the investment and the economy, Yemen could not be more 
reserved and careful than 156 states that have ratified NYC. Further, Yemen is a 
signatory state in ICSID, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, international 
law, BITs. This means that Yemen is obligated under such international conventions, 
international law, and agreements so what could be the rationale for non-ratifying 
NYC?   
                                                     




AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9.htm.   
 
204 
3.14  Conclusion 
At the end of the chapter, the researcher answered research question one and achieved 
research objective one and two. Based on international conventions, rules, agreements, 
and law which found that YAA is not parallel to cope with issues that are relating to 
the enforcement of IAA. YAA failed to include some sections that are relating to the 
proceedings and processes of the enforcement of IAA which are important guidelines 
to the disputing parties, the tribunal, and the competent courts in order to treat the 
disputing parties equally and give justice to all. Such missed articles are as follows: 
1) Section 53 is insufficient. It is lack of paragraphs to provide sections as right for 
the debtor party to resist the enforcement of the arbitral award based on the proper 
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and the arbitral proceedings to each of 
the disputed part. The notice of arbitration is very important to be stipulated in the 
Act. The resisting party of the enforcement is usually challenge under the ground 
of non-receiving a notice of arbitration, post to wrong address, or no research 
conduct has of the last known address of the respondent. It is a big gap to ignore 
such authority.  Also, the effectiveness of the arbitral award in case of the award 
not binding yet. The position of the award that is not final yet shall be clear. 
Otherwise, the party who the arbitral award is in his/her favour may apply for the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Even the majority of the arbitral tribunal not 
signed yet. Thus, such authority is fundamental factor of the enforcement of the 
arbitral award. YAA leaves big gap not only for the disputed parties to be confused, 
but the court itself needs sufficient guideline to render correct decision; 
2) Section 53 of YAA needs to amendment, especially, paragraph (b) which provides 
that the award cannot be enforced if any of the parties is incompetent, such 
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paragraph is repeating the same thing as paragraph (a) which provides that the 
resisting party who was an incompetent person at the time of signing the arbitral 
agreement can challenge the arbitral award; 
3) The YAA is silent about the power of the tribunal to impose sanction on the debtor 
party in case of failure to disclose the documents or refuse to enforce the arbitral 
award. The unwilling party may intentionally reject to cooperate with the arbitral 
tribunal in order to delay procedures and processes as long as the arbitral tribunal 
is limited of such jurisdiction. It has to refer to the court to have the order. It 
makes the arbitral tribunal meaningless. However, provide such jurisdiction to 
the arbitral tribunal will make the national arbitration system stronger; 
4) The procedures especially the requirements to set aside the arbitral award before 
the competent court are not adequate. YAA supposes to provide the requirements 
to set aside or refusal of the arbitral award such as submit the final arbitral award, 
the claimant’s statements, the arbitration agreement, and so on; 
5) The right of the debtor party to resist the enforcement based on the arbitrator’s 
bias. Such provision to be included is necessary as bias is breach of natural justice. 
Bias is sufficient ground to set aside or refusal. Indeed, YAA supposes not only to 
provide a provision relevant to bias to set aside or refusal the arbitral award, but 
shall have provisions to prevent any effect may lead to bias such as requests the 
arbitral tribunal to submit declaration that the arbitrator/arbitrators have no interest 
of the dispute or has no relationship with any of the disputed parties; 
6) the enforcement proceeding, how many days the enforcement takes, the allowed 
time period for the debtor party to set aside or refusal against the enforcement of 
the arbitral award, the proceedings are taken for the enforcement in case of 
resisting enforcement. YAA left extensive jurisdiction to the competent court. It 
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is unreasonable that the debtor party to come after long period to set aside the 
arbitral award. I have referred to other national arbitration system such as section 
37 (4) of Malaysian Arbitration Act 2005 that provides an application for setting 
aside may not be made after expiry of ninety days from the date on which the 
party making the application had received the award. Therefore, It is a loophole 
in YAA for non-stating the allowed period of the debtor party to recourse against 
the award; 
 
7) What procedures and proceedings are in case of an application to vacate the arbitral 
award in the place seat of the arbitration are. Once the creditor party applied for 
the confirmation of the arbitral award in the competent court, the lost party has to 
know the procedures and processes in case he/she wants to oppose the enforcement 
application. Also, YAA has to clarify the requirements as well as the allowed 
period to vacate the arbitral award. If the rendered award is vacated in the host state 
of the arbitration, it should be enforced against the debtor party in Yemen? 
Different national arbitration systems have different positions. Some systems 
enforce the arbitral award if fulfills the requirements under their national 
arbitration laws, while others do not. The position in Yemen on this issue is silent 
so YAA has to be amended to come with such provision; 
8) What the effect is in the matter of discovering credible evidence that may change 
the award or the evidence which the award is based on was forged, 
misrepresentation, fraud, or false testimony, and the allowed period to set aside or 
refusal to the enforcement. In case of rejecting these grounds to set aside the 
arbitral award will put the court in breach of natural justice. These factors are very 
important to be clear known. Ignoring such factors by YAA is huge gap. As it 
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would be breached of natural justice if the arbitral award is based on forge, 
misrepresentation, fraud, or false testimony. YAA has to include authority 
clarifying the position in case the arbitral award is based on such mentioned 
factors. Also, the allowed period to set aside the arbitral award, whether such 
grounds can be applied even after lapse of time as they are considered as reasonable 
reasons; 
9) The YAA will be stronger to specify an article which provides the jurisdiction of 
the foreign tribunal to request the Yemeni competent court to take coercive actions 
to perform the award of interim measures of protection; 
10) Need for re-arbitration in order to correct the minor mistakes instead of setting 
aside the award. YAA is silent on this position. It has to clarify whether that is left 
for the court’ discretion to order the parties to refer back to the arbitral tribunal or 
to decide by itself. Such discretion will make the arbitration agreement 
meaningless. Often, the parties prefer to settle their dispute by arbitration 
mechanism. This is because of the speed in settling the dispute. So, referring the 
dispute to the court because of minor mistakes will delay the settlement. This is 
against the parties’ autonomy. Hence, YAA has to be clear regarding arbitral 
awards with minor mistakes, are the parties have to refer back to the arbitral 
tribunal or to the court? It is better to refer back to the arbitral tribunal to correct 
the minor mistakes; 
11) YAA shall stipulate the period of time for the enforcement judge to grant the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. The enforcement of the arbitral award supposes 
to achieve the purpose of the arbitration. The fast procedures and processes are 
fundamental features in arbitration system. Then, leaving the enforcement without 
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limited period is adversely affecting such feature. Especially, if the lost party 
neither resist the enforcement nor has reasonable grounds to do so. 
Moreover, Yemen is found to be a non-convention state to NYC while it is a member 
in other international conventions and BITs. Such non-ratification may affect the 
enforcement of IAA if the place seat of the arbitration holds is Yemen as the 
convention allows the court of the signatory states to refuse to recognize and enforce 
the award based on the reciprocity reservation in article 1 (3) which provides that the 
convention states could refuse the foreign award if rendered in the non-signatory state. 
Thus, some states entered the convention after being assured the permission of 
reciprocity reservation is provided by the convention like the United States of 
America. Moreover, Republic of Yemen and Yemeni businessmen cannot escape from 
execution or the enforcement of IAA based on the argument that Yemen is not a 
signatory-state to the convention or even on the jurisdictional immunity as IAA can be 
enforced by other laws rather than NYC as well as the international law replaced 
extreme state immunity by limited state immunity. The foreign state shall perform 
commercial agreed terms contracted with other parties. Hence, Yemen is liable for 
commercial actions and the immunity will not apply in commercial issues. As could 
be noticed in the case of KJ International v MV Oscar Jupiter 131 ILR, P. 529, it was 
held that the state is liable towards its obligations as agreed in the commercial 
agreements with others so that the state could not argue based on the jurisdictional 
immunity to escape from duties.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE TRIBALISM IN YEMEN 
4.1 Introduction 
The Yemeni society is considered as a tribal society compared to other Arab countries 
because of the large existence of the tribes in the rural areas. As a consequence of the 
tribal existence, there have been a spread of the tribal culture in the society.1 According 
to Arun, the tribal culture could be introduced through values, ideas, knowledge, and 
beliefs.2  The nature of collectivism is the existence of a huge number of families who 
have a strong loyalty to protect each other as one group.3 The tribal culture puts more 
emphasis on the interest of the tribes as well as the tribal members only.4 The tribes 
do not bother about other things except their tribes.5 As a result of this attitude the 
politics and the economy of Yemen became worse.6 The tribes in Arab society are still 
in existence and impact on the public culture, behavior, kinship, and attitude.7 It is 
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difficult to ignore the adverse effect of tribes on the social political and economic 
issues.8  
The majority of the Yemeni population live in rural areas.9  The urban people who live 
in cities are estimated 35% only, while rural people are 16 million out 25 million of 
Yemen’s population.10   According to Peterson, the tribes are a major constitution of 
Yemen society so that the tribes are main component of the Yemeni society.11 
According to Tribalism Index Scores, 2009, Republic of Yemen is ranked at number 
7 out of 160 countries in the world, a ranking of 1 is considered as the highest rate, 
while a ranking 160 is considered as the lowest rate.12 Thus, tribalism has a strong 
impact on the political affairs, traditional life, and the society as a whole. 
Historically, Yemen is a tribal country with powerful tribes who interfere with the 
political and economics’ affairs till today.13 Such interference in the political and 
economic policy of the country leads to the state paying a huge amount to provide for 
the tribes’ interest.14 Tribes in Yemen are historically rooted, and till the present time, 
it has a significant impact on social, economic, and political life. It should be noted 
that the tribal structure is very strong in the northern part of Yemen, while in the south 
of Yemen, it is weaker. The weakness in the south is because southern Yemen was an 
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independent country till 1990 that was called the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY). It followed communist regime which was totally against tribal 
intervention with the state affairs.15 Hence, it could find the presence of tribal is more 
spread in the north of Yemen, at the same time the enforcement of the law is quite 
acceptable in the south even though it is still weak.16 
4.2 The Definition of the Tribe 
Tribe is a group of people mostly belonging to one lineage due to the name of a tribal 
alliance that is considered to be a grandfather of the tribe, and consists of several clans. 
The members of the tribes often live in a joint territory upheld as their home, and they 
speak a distinctive tone, and they have a homogeneous culture or a common solidarity 
(i.e. neurological) against external elements at least.17 According to Oxford Dictionary 
defines the tribe as a group of people have same culture and language and descendants 
of one ancestor and ruled by one leader.18 
4.3 The Background of the Tribal Arbitration 
As tribalism’ role is shown in this study, it has to address the tribal arbitration through 
an application of the tribal customary law as follows: 
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4.3.1 The Tribal Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (TADRM) 
The tribes are a part of Yemeni society so that the customary law as an inherent system 
based on culture.19 The disputed parties choose the wise men in the community to 
resolve their disputes.20 The customary law is not that perfect to solve the society 
conflicts and brings justice as a whole, but is not worse than the official law.21 
Furthermore, the people prefer to solve their disputes through TADRM because of the 
lack of independent judiciary since the government itself is unwilling to implement the 
court’s orders against powerful people such as political persons and tribal leaders.22 
Therefore, the people refer to the tribal law instead of an official system because of 
various negative factors in the official system such as weakness, unqualified judges, 
non-enforcement of judgements, and slow procedures.23 Also, the official justice 
system is less developed in the northern areas that are dominated by the tribes and 
where the number of official courts is very limited.24 In the urban governorates, tribal 
law is often used while in the southern governorates, it exists but in a weaker form.25  
As a consequence of the weakness of the official justice system and non-enforcement 
of the court judgements, trial cases in the court system is declining.26 In 2013 trial 
cases in Aden province declined at a rate of 44%, Sana’a 41%, and Taiz 35%.27 The 
tribal arbitration mechanism could be used to solve disputes among tribal members 
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themselves as well as disputes between tribes and the state.28 Therefore, some officials 
recommend application of TADRM to solve some disputes like murder issues.29 Some 
judges unofficially advise the disputing parties to settle their dispute by TADRM as 
long as it is recognized by the official law.30 
In addition, the tribal conducts and operations are well recognized by the government. 
Even, the government itself requires a tribal interference to settle complex issues that 
arise between the tribes and the government.31 The government also invites the tribes 
to settle the tribes and the business issues within the tribal region.32 For instance, in 
May 2010 American drone killed Yemeni deputy governor in Marib provenance.33 The 
former president Ali Abdullah Saleh proposed to settle the dispute that arose between 
the government and the deceased’s tribe by TADRM.34  
Through interviewees of Court of Appeal judges, academicians, and arbitrator. 
Respondent 1 suggested that: 
in order to improve the arbitration system in Yemen, recommended 
the development of institutional arbitration and stay away from non-
institutionalized arbitration referring to The tribal alternative 
dispute resolution Mechanisms because tribal men are not aware of 
legal procedures and pleading which the court faces difficulties in 
implementing the arbitral award and lead recourse the award so 
suggested to repeal section 45 of YAA that provides the recognition 
of TADRM.35  
 
                                                     
28 Ibid, 3.  
29 Ibid, 6. 
30 Ibid. 
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Respondent 2 said that: 
To improve arbitration, it must concentrate on institutional 
arbitration and the legal persons have to send abroad to study, this 
in order to make use of international experience in the field of 
arbitration. Yemen lacks qualified experts in the area of arbitration. 
Also modify the current arbitration Act in accordance with the 
standards of international arbitration laws.  
Respondent 3 stated that:  
The amendment of the Arbitration Act (22) 1992 as it does not 
comply with international arbitration laws. In addition, speedy 
actions for the enforcement of the arbitral awards and not to delay 
a decision regarding acceptance or rejection on the part of the lost 
party’s application to set aside the enforcement of the arbitral 
award. Also, to upgrading in this area, the judges have no 
experience in the field of international arbitration. Thus, it is 
necessary to have qualified staff to handle complex arbitration 
cases.  
Respondent 4 mentioned that: 
The formal judiciary and arbitration system are interrelated to each 
other. The arbitration system would be better if improves the 
performance of the judiciary to overcome rampant corruption. Also, 
the independence of the judiciary from the Executive Branch is very 
important so there must be restrictions on politicians to prevent 
interference in the judiciary. As commonly known that not all lost 
parties voluntarily implement arbitral awards, so only independent 
judiciary can provide effective assistance and control to the arbitral 
tribunal. Also, the arbitration Act must repeal the recognition of 
TADRM. It is irrational to equal TADRM as a judgment of the Court 
of the First Instance. 
Respondent 5 stated that: 
To improve the arbitration system in Yemen, the practice of 
separation of power must be encouraged. The Constitution provides 
for the independence of the judiciary, but it amounts to ink on paper 
only. Also, ratifying the New York Convention and the amendment 
of the current arbitration Act are very necessary for improving the 
arbitration system in Yemen. 
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Thus, the interviewees concentrated on key suggestions to improve the arbitration 
system in Yemen such as improving institutional arbitration, the separation of power, 
amendment of the current Yemeni Arbitration Act, and ratification of the New York 
Convention 1958. Also, YAA has to be amended as there are sections adversely 
affecting the arbitration system in Yemen such as section 45 of YAA that recognizes 
the tribal award which is equivalent to primary court judgement. However, 
discrepancy or divergence among interviewees, especially, in the matter of repeal 
section 45 that provides the recognition of TADRM. It is irrational to repeal TADRM 
before starting judicial reforms. As it confirmed above by interviewees there is a lack 
of independence of the judiciary, because of the interference in judicial operations 
from the politicians as well as the rampant corruption that ravage the judiciary. 
Regarding the qualified experts in arbitration areas, the judiciary supposed to send 
judges to overseas to attend workshops in this field. This is a gap for future study to 
identify whether the unqualified experts in arbitration system will adversely affect the 
enforcement of IAA in Yemen. Respondent 5 recommended, ratifying the New York 
Convention in order to improve the national arbitration laws. Hence, based on 
interviewees’ recommendations, the researcher discussed the reasons behind non-
ratification of NYC in chapter three to rebut the Yemeni legislator’ excuses of 
continually refusing to ratify it. Especially, the effect of NYC on Shari’a and the public 
policy as a whole. 
4.3.2 The Function of the Tribal Customary Law 
Each tribe is independent and has its own tribal leader who presides over its internal 
affairs. The leader handles disputes which may arise between individuals and other 
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tribes in their area without requesting the assistance of the State.36 There is no law 
defining and regulating the relationships between the various tribes but the tribal 
customary laws regulate and control the tribal social organization.37 These laws are 
able to regulate inter-tribal relationships and provide a high degree of homogeneity 
among the tribes in all respects.38  
The main functions of the tribal customary laws are as follows: 
1. To regulate the relationship between the tribal members in terms of their rights 
and obligations towards each other and their tribes.39 The tribe has local 
governance so they practice tribal rules.40 
2. To regulate the relationship among the tribes in matter of ensuring stability and 
security, settle disputes among tribesmen, regulate the power and influence of 
each tribe.41 The tribes have different levels of power. So in the arbitration 
system, the less powerful tribe maybe under the protection of a more powerful 
tribe.42 
4.3.3 The Features of the Tribal Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
The tribes play an important role in ensuring the stability of the society through 
conciliation.43 The tribal role extended to resolving political disagreements in the 
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country.44 In urban areas, the tribal customary laws are dominant and people prefer to 
settle their disputes through the customary laws than the courts.45 The customary law 
is more effective and has faster proceedings than the court system.46 The people do not 
fully trust the court system because of rampant corruption, lack of independence and 
integrity.47 The government itself is weak and is unable to enforce the laws and the 
courts’ judgments.48 From an interview regarding confidence in the court system, it 
was found that 29% of respondents confirmed that they are not comfortable with court 
litigations, 19% are a little comfortable, 22% are much comfortable, and 7% are very 
much comfortable.49 This means that the government is unwilling to combat the spread 
of corruption in government institutes. Thus, the people do not fully trust the formal 
laws to settle their disputes fairly. 
The tribal customary laws are complementary to the formal laws.50 The formal laws 
also does not weaken the tribal customary laws.51 On the other hand, the tribal 
customary laws are not always in tandem with the formal law. In case of Aal Baras 
2007 in Shabwa governorate, a dispute between two subtribes of Aal Baras led to five 
persons being killed. The court conducted the case and found ten persons guilty with 
seven, out of the ten, sentenced to death. The tribal leaders of the sub-tribes did not 
agree with the court’s judgment because the seven sentenced to death is not equal to 
the five persons killed stating that this will lead to revenge killings. Through 
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negotiation between the tribal leaders, they reached an agreement to sentence only five 
to death instead of seven.52 The formal law may not function appropriately if tribal 
customary laws are abolished.53 The judges themselves resolve disputes in their 
communities through the tribal customary laws.54 This is because, the formal laws may 
not be suitable in handling some disputes because the tribal customary law is closer to 
the traditions and culture of the Yemeni society. 
The Yemeni formal law itself does not go against settling disputes through other means 
of ADR.55 Section 45 of YAA provides that the arbitral tribunal has to settle dispute 
based on the laws agreed by the disputing parties, if the disputing parties did not 
mention their preferred law, then, the arbitral tribunal has to settle it based on 
international law and the principles of justice and has to take into consideration the 
customary laws.56 The judge Yehya Al-Mawri, who is a Supreme Court member, 
stated that YAA strengthened the tribal relationship with the state through the law.57 
In addition, the Yemeni law is not adequate and also not effective. Hence the official 
law is not the supreme law in the country which this is one of the main reasons people 
prefer to settle their disputes through the tribal law.58 To sum it up, the formal legal 
system is not well-established in Yemen.59 Hence, the tribal arbitral award is 
recognized by the law and if the debtor party resists the enforcement of the award, then 
the Court of Appeal will recognize it in the same manner as primary court judgment. 
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According to Sheikh Salim Awad Abu Zaid Al-khulaifi,60 one of the elders of the tribe 
Al-Khalifa in Ataq City, said that “Customs are above the law, especially in light of 
the current security situation. Nowadays, customs are governing the country as courts 
are closed”. He continued:  "if one disobeys the customs, the tribe will cut his blood 
ties announce it publicly”. This indicates that the customs are very strong and it is the 
backbone of the tribe, there is no place for bandits among the tribes. In tribal custom 
there is something called almhadsh governance which awards hundreds of thousands 
of dollars as punishment for crimes of murder and treachery and waylay. Praise be to 
Allah the people trust our judgments more than courts, which courts have lost their 
confidence and lost credibility throughout the provinces of Yemen”.  
Adnan Al Mansouri narrated an arbitration case caused by dispute on agricultural land 
between tribal leaders61 "there was a dispute between my family and one of the 
villagers on share of the land. We were about fighting, so we submitted an interim 
measures of protection such as cars or guns or other to ensure the enforcement of the 
award. The Sheikh rendered the award and the parties enforced it. He continued: “we 
chose Sheikh and didn't choose the Court as the tribal arbitration is faster and is not 
costly, and we have no doubt about the integrity of the rule of Sheikh compared the 
provisions of some corrupt judges. TADRM handed down judgement in less than a 
week”. This means that the tribal arbitral award is faster and cheaper than the litigation 
of the court. The people trust tribal customary law because its main object is to keep 
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the stability of the society so the tribal arbitrator or arbitrators handle the cases honestly 
and fairly. 
On the other hand, the weakness of the judiciary and the state as a whole could be as 
a result of the spread of the power of tribes who resist reforms of government 
institutions.62 From the results of interviews of Court of Appeal judges, academicians, 
and arbitrator that was conducted on (2016, December), they suggested that: 
in order to improve the arbitration system in Yemen, they all 
recommended that the development of institutional arbitration and 
stay away from non-institutionalized arbitration like The tribal 
alternative dispute resolution Mechanisms because tribal men are 
not aware of legal procedures and pleading which the court faces 
difficulties to implement the arbitral award and lead recourse the 
award so they suggested to repeal section 45 of YAA that provides 
the recognition of TADRM.63  
Thus, YAA has to be amended as there are sections that adversely affect the arbitration 
system in Yemen such as section 45 of YAA which recognizes the tribal awards as 
equivalent to primary court judgement. Undoubtedly, institutional arbitration is the 
only suitable to settle commercial disputes. Foreign investors will not agree to settle 
the raising dispute or may raise in the future by TADRM. TADRM is only suitable to 
settle minor local disputes. However, YAA applies over international and local 
disputes, thus, the Yemeni legislator should amend section 45 instead of repealing, that 
is, to apply over local disputes only. However, the researcher point of view is against 
this recommendation of repealing section 45 at this moment because local people do 
not fully trust the court system, this is on account of there is a lack of independence of 
the judiciary and the rampant corruption that can change the judgement for the party 
who pays more. TADRM replaced more than two-third of the court functions. 
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According to Laili al-Zwaini, the TADRM settles most of the society disputes (about 
80%), by applying customary laws. Thus, it has to reform the judiciary before getting 
started in repealing section 45. Repealing the section before reforming the judiciary 
will lead to disruption of peoples’ interests. 
Experts on the rule of law advised against the recognition of tribal customary laws. 
They consider the tribal arbitrators as ignorant of the processes and proceedings of the 
tribal customary laws. The tribal customary law is more likely to be set aside because 
of breach of justice proceedings. However, the experts criticized the role of tribal 
customary law, but failed to refer to the necessary reforms that have to be taken to 
improve the judiciary. Especially, to combat the rampant corruption in the judiciary. 
Indeed, the tribal customary law is the fundamental element to keep Yemen stable. It 
is a well-known fact that after the Arab Spring, all government institution and security 
have collapsed. Nowadays, the tribal customary court is performing the functions of 
the government courts such as settling disputes among the citizens and maintaining 
security. The situation in Yemen is better than other Arab countries that are affected 
by Arab Spring and this is due to the maintenance of law and order through customary 
laws. 
4.3.4 The Jurisdiction of the Tribal Customary Laws 
The Yemeni law allowed the disputing parties to settle their differences in civil cases 
through arbitration and settlements outside the formal justice system based on section 
45 of YAA.64 The formal law limited litigation in criminal cases to formal justice 
which the public prosecution only has jurisdiction. However, TADRM can be used for 
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all type of disputes whether civil cases, commercial cases, criminal cases, or family 
matters.65 The TADRM interferes to settle even criminal disputes which only the 
official court system has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with.66 Criminal matters as 
mentioned in the law are administered by state prosecutors and require appropriate 
punishment on committed crimes. Such punishment is a right of the general public and 
not a right of the victim only.67 The Yemeni law in section 21 of the code of criminal 
procedure provides that a state prosecutor has the jurisdiction in criminal proceedings 
and lawsuits in court.68 Section 22 provides that the public prosecutor is not allowed 
to stop criminal proceedings, disrupt its progress, waived judgment or stop 
Implementation except in cases defined by law.69 To understand tribal customary law 
interference in criminal matters, a dispute between Yahya and Salih can be referred 
to.70 In this case Yahya crushed Salih’ crate of tomatoes accidently. Yahya offered to 
compensate Salih for damages to his crate but Salih refused. When Yahya walked 
away, Salih stabbed Yahya from behind. The tribal leader arbitrated the case and 
awarded Yahya YR 65,000 that equivalent to $14, 444 in 1978. 
This means that the civil cases and criminal cases are not distinguished under the tribal 
customary law. The tribal customary law is more suitable to traditions and culture. As 
previously noticed an Aal Baras case 2007, the court judgment will make the dispute 
more complex, so the disputed parties agreed on another dispute resolution mechanism 
like tribal customary law instead of the formal law. However, the tribal arbitrator does 
                                                     
65 Gaston, Dispute Resolution and Justice Provision in Yemen’s Transition , 4.  





70 Najwa Adra, “Tribal Mediation in Yemen and its Implications to Development,” (2011), 5, accessed 
August 28, 2016, http://www.najwaadra.net/tribalmediation.pdf. 
 
223 
not rule on prison or death sentence. This will lead to increase in crimes as there is no 
deterrence to crimes. So, the researcher encourages to reform the formal judiciary to 
settle all disputes. 
4.3.5 Types of the Tribal Arbitration 
Based on Al- Muwadda said that the disputed parties are free to agree on the type of 
the arbitration as follows:71 
1- Non-appealable arbitration: the disputed parties will agree on the quality of the 
arbitration where there is no right of appeal after the award either to the 
government court or a higher customary body (final and binding).  
2- Appealable arbitration: this kind of arbitration allows the disputing parties to 
appeal which TADRM is considered in formal justice as primary court 
judgement. It is noteworthy that the appellant bears the burden of appeal if the 
appellate body endorsed the sentence with an apology and slaughter of a sheep 
or cattle for appealing the arbitrator’s award. If the appellate body set aside the 
previous arbitrator’ award, the arbitrator or arbitrators has to pay for the appeals 
process commitments. 
4.3.6 The Proceedings and Processes of the Tribal Customary Arbitration 
There are several ways to customary arbitration: 
1- The first approach:72 the respondent appoint the claimant as a judge and 
opponent at the same time.  Normally, the respondent or his family or his tribe 
                                                     




delivered guns (weapons) to the claimant or his family or his tribe. These guns 
act as an interim measures of protection to the arbitrators to ensure the 
enforcement of the award and proof of good faith. Once the guns are accepted, 
this period considered guns as a truce so must not commit any illegal acts that 
will adversely affect the case proceedings.  
2- The second approach:73 the claimant delivers guns to the Sheikh or the wise 
man. The person who received the guns call the respondent. Then, the disputing 
parties make an arbitration agreement. After they agreed on the type of 
arbitration and the arbitrator which is often the same person who took guns 
from both parties. But, custom rule gives each party the right to change or 
include other arbitrators.  
3- The third approach:74 That the third party tribal man interferes by taking an 
interim measures of protection from disputing parties. 
Moreover, the Sheikh is responsible for solving all disputes between tribal members 
and third parties or among the tribal members themselves.75 If the Sheikh sees that he 
is not competent to deal with serious disputes, he may call for assistance of another 
tribe’s Sheikh.76 Disputes between different tribes need a tribal expert (Maragha).77 
Every tribe has its own maragha, if it does not have, then it will ask for the advice of 
a maragha from another tribe.78 Furthermore, the tribal customary law settles disputes 
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based on the negotiation, forgiveness, dialogue, transparency, accountability, tribal 
rituals and customs.79 
4.3.7 The Interim Measures of Protection 
Yemeni people prefer to resolve their commercial disputes through tribal mechanism 
because the tribal mechanism is more effective than the formal system.80 Usually the 
tribal leader who is appointed as arbitrator takes an interim measures of protection 
such as arms or cars from the disputing parties to ensure the enforcement of the award 
(Hukm).81 In some cases, each party to the dispute has to bring his Sheikh as a 
guarantee of the enforcement of the award and to show good intention to prevent 
further commitment of offence during the arbitral proceedings and processes.82 If the 
debtor party fail to honour the award, then he will lose his rights, support, and 
protection of his tribe.83 
4.3.8 Compensation under the Tribal Customary Law 
The tribal arbitral awards are insufficient punishment for the committed crimes. As 
mentioned earlier, in tribal custom there is no imprisonment or death sentence.84 All 
penalties are material compensation, sums, land, animals, abandonment of the 
perpetrator, or planting.85 The limitation of the punishment to just material 
compensation and the absence of any form of corporal punishment or imprisonment in 
criminal cases lead to nonchalant attitude by the perpetrators. Especially, those from 
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rich powerful tribes.86 The tribal customary law’ aim is to maintain harmony in the 
society, it insists more on the individuals’ rights than penalizing perpetrators of 
crimes.87 However, in serious offences the cash compensations are not preferable.88 
Such types of compensation are not effective, as they will encourage the perpetrators 
to continue with criminal acts. So, the crimes of murder, robbery, rape will be increase 
if there is no strong deterrence. 
4.3.9 The Tribal Arbitral Award 
The tribal award is depends on the agreed type of the arbitration. The non-appealable 
arbitration is final and binding while the appealable arbitration is not final.89 The 
decision made by the tribal arbitrator can be appealed twice to two higher layers of 
tribal justice if one or both of the disputing parties disagree.90 The settlement of the 
dispute is often solved by moral pressure than physical coercion.91 
4.3.10 The Overview of the Tribal Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
According to Omar Bawazir, TADRM is more favourable than the formal law.92 As 
the formal system became weak because of non-enforcement of the judgments and the 
rampant corruption.93 Legal practitioners are claiming that the tribal arbitrators are not 
qualified to engage in arbitration.94 Hence, their tribal award are usually set aside.95 
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However, in order to set aside TADRM, the judiciary has to be reformed.96 The people 
do not fully trust the courts as bribery can influence the judge’s rulings and 
independence.97 It is commonly known that government institutions have collapsed 
since the Arab Spring of 2011 so the custom substituted the official institutions.98 
Therefore, Yemen has maintained a kind of stability because of the existing of the 
TADRM and the custom as a whole.99 
As a result of the lack of the enforcement of the law, the people prefer to solve their 
disputes by customary laws that are supervised and administered by Sheikhs as they 
have the power to enforce the customary laws. Additionally, the state does not fully 
extend its sovereignty over the territory as mentioned above. Throughout the tribal 
mechanism arbitration, often Sheikhs take an interim measures of protection from the 
disputing parties to ensure enforcement of the decisions. It is traditionally considered 
as shameful if debtor parties reject the Sheikh’s decision. Thus, the collapse of the 
judicial institutions is because the citizens do not fully trust the formal courts as 
rampant corruption adversely affect the courts’ judgments. The researcher is not a 
supporter of TADRM, because the formal law is the gate towards civil State. But, 
before overcome TADRM the formal judiciary shall be reformed of corrupt effects 
and interventions of politicians and tribes. 







4.4 The Role of Tribes in Society and the State 
The tribes assist the state in maintaining internal security in the tribal regions as well 
as protect the state borders from outside interference.100 The tribes take responsibility 
from the government to provide basic facilities such as electricity and water 
supplies.101 
Historically, the tribal law works together with the official law, this is since the ruling 
of Imam in 1904.102 The studies have shown that 80% of disputes are settled by the 
tribal arbitration mechanism.103 In fact, this high percentage is as a result of the 
weakness of the judiciary which has unqualified staff and the inability to enforce the 
court’s judgements.104 Also, the tribal law is effective as the Sheikhs guarantee the 
enforcement of the tribal awards.105 Moreover, the procedures and proceedings are 
easier than the court procedures.106 The tribal law recognizes two approaches to 
settling the disputes that are sulh (reconciliation) and the tahkim (arbitration) which 
the applicant law is based on the region, custom, and tradition.107 Furthermore, not all 
acts by the tribes are bad or illegal which the tribes contribute to settle the arising 
disputes among citizens by the tribal law with Dar Al-Salaam considered as the tribal 
tribunal that is recognized by the Yemeni law.108 
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4.5 Tribes and the State Interrelationship  
As mentioned before109 the tribes work with the state since the Imam who established 
the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen in 1904 in protecting the borders from outside 
interference as long as securing the regions that the state was incapable to spread its 
soldiers in that areas.110 This interrelationship between the state and the tribes is 
currently continuing as some tribes fight the Huthi111 movement that is rebelling 
against the state.112 Till now the tribes are important to the state’s stability.113 Studies 
have shown that sons of tribal leaders who are educated hold 13% of government 
positions.114 Tribes possess deadly weapons and with that protect their own members, 
cooperate with the state to secure some places, provide some social services, and 
negotiate with the government to limit the government’s control in the tribal region.115 
Indeed, there is a negotiated agreement between the government and the alliance tribes 
stipulating the tribes’ contribution to maintaining security in some regions.116 
So, the tribes and the state have a joint function in the unsecured regions which the 
tribal men replaced the performance of the soldiers’ task.117 This was confirmed by the 
former president Saleh through an interview which he said that the state is a portion of 
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the tribal collection of people.118 According to Tribalism Index Scores (TIS), 2009 
Republic of Yemen is ranked at number 7 out of 160 countries in the world, figure 1 
is considered as the highest rate, while figure 160 is considered as the lowest rate.119  
Number 7 is a high rate, so this rate is considered as a negative as tribes are one of the 
factors that adversely affect the growth of the Yemeni national economy as well as the 
good performance of the government institutions and they do various illegal acts, such 
facts are cited by clear evidence in this research. TIS classification of highly tribal 
countries is based on failed states, weak center, instability, poverty, violence, and other 
problems.120 
The tribes do not have the ability to contribute in building the institutions as themselves 
breach their duties and usually break the law.121 This is admitted by the Deputy 
Minister of Communication when he announced that the northern areas are less 
developed as they under the control of the tribes.122 The tribes have influence over the 
society and dominate the position of the government institutions more than the state 
even though the influence is unofficial.123 Therefore, the government has no 
sovereignty over all land in order to extend its authority and ensuring the application 
of the law.124 Furthermore, the government faced difficulties in implementing its 
policies because it is faced with the tribal resistance in cases where such policies are 
against tribal interest.125 Especially, the tribes that are located in the north of Yemen.126 
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According to Syed Hussein Alatas, the tradition is one of the factors that lead to 
corruption which nepotism requires the tribe or the family to protect each other so that 
the traditional responsibility to the family members is an impediment towards fighting 
the corruption.127 Thus, the enforcement of IAA is more likely to face difficulties to 
implement in cases where the debtor party is tribal. The lost party will refer to his/her 
tribe to protect him/her against the court legal actions as well as the lack of the court 
control over the tribal regions which the tribal law dominates over the official law. 
4.6 Tribal Confederation 
The tribes that are considered as powerful in Yemen have confederation especially, 
the tribes that live in the same geographical place.128 They come together as one group 
to assist their own tribal members.129 For example, the tribal confederation is consist 
of Hashid that is considered as political tribe because of its influence on the state 
policy, and the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s tribe is a part of Hashid 
confederation and Bakil which is considered as the biggest confederation tribe.130 Such 
two tribes are located in the north of Yemen, especially around the capital Sana’a. The 
population of that two tribes is estimated at about fifty five thousand people.131 Both 
tribes descended from the tribe of Hamdan and also there are several branches of the 
tribes of these two tribes.132 
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The government knows the tribes’ power so that they work together to protect the 
country borders and secure other places inside the state’s sovereignty.133 The tribal 
confederation consist of Hashid that is considered as a political tribe because of its 
influence on the state policy, and the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s tribe is a 
part of Hashid confederation while Bakil is considered as the biggest confederation 
tribe.134 The Hashid and Bakil are the most crucial tribes that the state often rely on to 
achieve their objectives. Such cooperation between the tribes and the state could be 
noticed from the time of Imam Yahya, the former king of Yemen.135 Until today 2015, 
the state used the tribes to fight Hutthi movement. It should be noted that most of the 
military members belong to the tribes.136 Hence, the state without the tribal support 
can’t control the country.137 The government is afraid in case the tribes opposed its 
policy.138 The former president Saleh learned a lesson from the former president 
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi as the latter was assassinated when he planned to build a modern 
state which is a far from the tribal interference. Hence, former president Saleh be 
ensured the satisfaction of the tribal Sheikhs through supporting them with multiple 
facilities and sharing the ruling of the country alongside the tribal leaders.139 This is 
why the politicians get prior consent from Sheikhs in making some decisions.140 
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4.7 Interrelationship of the Tribes and the Politics  
In Arab countries, the influence of tribes on politics and economy varies from state to 
state.141 In some states, tribal influence on the decision of government in politics and 
economy is strong while in other states it is weak.142 In Yemen, the tribes play 
fundamental role in politics.143 They exploit the weaknesses of government 
institutions. They use force and power to share in the political decision of the 
government.144 Moreover, the government supports the tribes’ leaders who are in 
alliance with the government so that most members of the House of Representatives 
are represented by famous tribal Sheikhs.145 In addition, the former president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh has intentionally strengthened tribal power in order that none could 
rule except him.146 As a result, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s tribes have lion’s share in the 
politics and the army.147 Therefore, the government has to pay attention to the tribal 
leaders.148  
Consequently, the government set up Ministry of Tribal Affairs to provide the tribal 
Sheikhs huge financial aids and other facilities.149 These actions amount to abuse of 
public fund such as abusive use of oil revenues to buy the loyalties of tribal leaders.150 
Hence, the tribes are considered as one of the core elements that lead to the 
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corruption.151 They are one of the factors causing Yemen to be the poorest Arab 
country.152 The government deliberately arrange the involvement of the tribal leaders 
in the politics in order to gain their loyalty to support political parties during 
elections.153 Studies have shown that 40% of parliament membership in 2003 election 
are tribal men whereas such members do not have any basic qualifications.154 So, this 
will save the government from any control and accountability of misconduct and 
corruption.155 The Sheikhs, political parties, and the government exchange the interest 
so that in return of tribes support, the Sheikhs gain special privileges such as getting 
monthly salaries, cars, houses, and positions. This is why some Sheikhs did not support 
the Arab Spring in 2011 because they are part and parcel of the current corruption.156 
Thus, appointment of the tribal men into powerful position in the army even without 
qualifications is the trend.157  
Due to the absence of a strong central state, the Yemeni tribes carry out all the 
functions of economic, political, social, and cultural state. The tribes play the most 
prominent role in politics of Yemen. This could be seen in Arab Spring 2011, as the 
tribes were one of the first forces that supported the revolution. Further, the 
relationship between the tribes and the executive has become an integral relationship 
which serves as an obstacle towards the modern state. The state relinquishes part of its 
jurisdiction to the tribal leaders; the Sheikhs become representatives of the state. In 
return, the state pays them salaries to help them perform these functions and enable 
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them to control the Legislative Council. Thus, the government is without effectiveness 
in tribal areas, the tribes that manage the affairs in their areas. It means that there has 
been collusion between the Sheikhs and the ruling elites. The continuation of the elite 
in power depends on the use of tribal power and the persistence of tribal leaders in 
control and get benefits. This has weakened the state, and it has led to its complete 
failure to achieve a developmental achievement. In addition, the involvement of tribal 
men in the political institutions helped to extend the influence of the tribal leaders not 
only at the level of their tribes, but also throughout the country. Thus, it has to socialize 
them within the institutions that they head in the state. 
The Respondents, 11, 12, and 13 of COCA answered the relating questions to the 
tribalism interference on the COCA’s good Performance.158 When the interviewees 
were asked to confirm whether the tribal leaders interfere in COCA’ good 
performance, the all respondents confirmed such interference. The respondent 11 
States that “Yes, there is interference”, respondent 12 stated that “in my department I 
have not met such interference maybe such thing happens in other states”, while 
respondent 13 stated that “we are an under developed country so we get the 
interventions effect on the COCA operations”. This means that the tribes interfere in 
most government activities and such intervention is an indication of the unlimited 
power of the tribes in Yemen. Even though, section 3 of Yemeni Central Organization 
for Control and Auditing (Act No. 39) 1992 provides that COCA an independent 
regulatory body. Also, section 22 provides that authority shall be independent in the 
performance of its duties. No party shall interfere in the affairs of the Agency, its 
branches or its employees in any way whatsoever. However, the Act lacks strong 
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provisions to prevent the interference in COCA operations. No provision provides 
punishment against interference in its performance. The majority of interviewees 
confirmed that the tribal men still interfere even though the Act provides its 
independence. The researcher referred to anti-corruption agencies such as COCA to 
understand the tribes’ power and their interferences in all the government institutions. 
To give good background that the tribes not only interfere in the judiciary, other than, 
all the government institution. This will help the government to come out with general 
solutions to overcome tribalism impediments. This impediment will not be eliminated 
by stopping their interference in the judiciary. The judiciary is one of the government 
bodies so it is vain to fight it from the judicial institution, while, they are powerful in 
other bodies. The independence of the three bodies, which are, parliament, executive, 
and the judiciary are interrelated to each other. None of these will be protected from 
tribal interferences while, other bodies under the tribal tutelage.  
 
Moreover, tribes do interfere on Public Funds Prosecution’s good performance.159 
Throughout the interview of the three Public Funds Prosecution (Respondents 8, 9, 
and 10) and SNACC, respondent 8 stated that: 
As we are a third world country so the interference from tribes in 
judge’s operation is more expected but this depends on the strength 
of the judge and the prosecutor to reject any adverse effect on his/her 
judgement. 
Respondent 9 stated that: 
I actually don't know that there are tribal interventions in our 
operations. Until now I haven't received any recommendations or 
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telephone in order to withdraw any case involving corruption in 
public funds. 
While respondent 10 stated that: 
Yes, such interventions affect our performance. We are a tribal 
society so the intervention is expected. As far as the tribes are 
considered as disobeyers of the law so their intervention will lead to 
negative effects on judicial operations. 
In addition, in an interview of the Interference in SNACC Affairs from the Tribes.160 
Interviewee of SNACC (Respondent 6) said: 
There is pressure on us because of the intervention of the tribes. We 
are a part of the public system which all state institutions suffer from 
imbalances, wrong policies and pressures. 
Therefore, three respondents agreed that tribal interference occurs in the Public Funds 
Prosecution and adversely affect their performance. On the other hand, only one 
respondent has not faced such interference. It can be noticed that the tribes are large in 
number hence are not easy to fight. The former president Ibrahim Al-Hamdi was 
assassinated when he tries to limit the tribal intervention in the government 
institutions.161 So, any policy plans to reduce the tribal intervention has to be done 
through appropriate strategies. Thus, assassinations of judges are expected if they did 
not listen to the tribal recommendations and interference in the judicial operations. As 
individuals risk and dread influence our freedom and respectability. However, the 
politicians themselves could not protect their lives, so the judges are less protection. 
The tribal leader will interfere to judge on the enforcement of the arbitral awards. As 
a result, the judges will bias in favour of tribal member as the lost party will resort to 
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his/her tribe to protect him/her from any court legal actions.  Thus, it is highly expected 
that the tribalism impediment will adversely affect the judges’ good performance, 
especially, on the enforcement of IAA in case the lost party is tribal man.  
The official persons strive hard to involve the tribes in political affairs in order to get 
the tribal leader and tribesmen support.162 Thus, a lot of the tribal members have 
membership in the political parties.163 Hence, the political parties much depend on the 
tribal alliances to win victory in the parliamentary election.164 The politics in Yemen 
depends on the tribes to have a participation in making political decisions,165 
especially, the tribes in the northern part of Yemen as they are powerful.166 However, 
in southern part of Yemen the dependence on the tribes is weak because the southern 
part was under the British rule and influenced by the socialist rule and did not allow 
the tribes’ interventions in the affairs of state.167 However, after the unification 1990, 
the regime of president Saleh has attracted the tribes that are located in the southern 
part to participate in political affairs and they are likely to become influential as those 
tribes in the northern part.168 Hence, because of the great influence of the tribes in 
politics so that the political men prefer to get marriage with tribal females in order to 
ensure kinship with the tribes.169 This practice been followed by the former president 
of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh who has married four tribal women.170 Thus, some 
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foreign countries are confused when dealing with Yemen in relating to diplomatic 
matters because of the tribal interference in the public policy of the state.171 
The tribal influence in political affairs is impossible to ignore. It is important to refer 
to Arab Spring revolution in 2011 to show the influence of tribalism on state policy in 
Yemen where the revolution was against Ali Abdullah Saleh.172 He was toppled down 
because some tribes did not support him as they did before.173 The same revolution 
2011, Sheikh Sadiq Al-ahmer who is hashid tribal leader with other tribal alliance 
protected rebels from the military attack.174 During the revolution, the former president 
Saleh called for a tribal conference to face the revolution pressures that requiring his 
resignation but the conference failed because of some major Sheikhs did not attend.175 
The failure to hold the tribal conference caused the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh 
involuntarily. The former president Saleh lost the game and handled out the presidency 
to his former vice president Abd Rabbah Hadi through gulf initiative for temporary 
transition of the authority to a national unity government. 
The political parties should be independent of any tribal influence. Indeed, they rely 
on the tribal support to establish the regime. The tribal members in General People’s 
Conference which is the ruling party constituted about 30%176 while Islah party that is 
the strongest opposition party is constituted of tribal members as well.177 One of the 
obstacles facing political reforms is tribalism.178 Under the tribal influence, the 
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appointment standard of the political posts does not depend on the qualification and 
experience but mostly relying on the tribalism standard.179 Based on Hofstede’ theory, 
under tribalism there is the culture dimension of collectivism. The culture dimension 
exists where there is a huge number of families with strong loyalty to protect each 
other as one group.180 As far as the tribes influence the executive body, the 
enforcement of IAA is more likely to fail because of tribal interference to protect their 
own tribal members against any court coercive enforcement.  
4.8 Interrelationship of Tribes and the Army 
The majority of the military members are from the tribes.181 Thus, the weakness of the 
army and the state is because of the strength of the tribes.182 As long as there is an 
interrelationship between the army and the tribes, they cannot be considered as 
nationalistic to protect the country’s interest.183 This was confirmed through Arab 
Spring when some tribal Sheikhs supported the 2011 revolution the soldiers withdraw 
from the military barracks and joined their own tribes.184 The tribes dominate the 
military positions so that the tribes misused such positions to work for their own 
interest and selfishness. This was noticed after the country’ unification in 1990 and the 
victory of the northern part over the southern part in the civil war of 1994. The victory 
led the northern tribes to have a dominant position over the national sources.185 
Furthermore, a 2006 study carried on by the United States embassy in Yemen have 
                                                     
179 Ibid.   
180 Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, 91-92. 
181 Lynch, “Arab Uprisings,” 21.  
182 Burke, “One Blood and One Destiny,” 11. 
183 Al-Ahsab, What Makes Yemen’s Spring Different,” 5. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Glenn E. Robinson et al, “Yemen Corruption Assessment,” (September 25, 2006): 15. This 
publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development, 




shown that the tribes and the army are the major components that drain capabilities 
and wealth of the country.186 The Ministry of Tribal Affairs pays monthly salaries and 
other facilities like houses, lands, guards to a number of six thousand of the tribal 
Sheikhs.187 
4.9 Interrelationship of the Tribes and the Economy  
The tribes have an adversely influence over the business life especially, in the matter 
of the protection among the tribal members.188 The tribes are the main cause of the 
deterioration of the national economy. This is because the tribes cause the weaknesses 
of internal security, government institutions, and non-enforcement of laws.189  As a 
result of weak institutions in Yemen, the tribes exploit that to drain a lot of money 
from the state.190 The central government is incapable of enforcing its sovereignty over 
all national territory.191 Thus, bearing the tribes obligations to protect the border and 
share in keeping security has to pay back to tribes’ leaders. Therefore, the Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs pays to over than six thousand tribal Sheikhs monthly salaries, 
accommodation, provide cars, guards, and so on.192 Thus, foreign investors are not 
willing to invest their money in a country that has less effective laws to protect their 
rights. They also do not want to invest in a country that does not have full sovereignty 
over its land. Otherwise, they are more likely to lose their rights and could only protect 
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their rights by illegal methods through asking of protection from tribal leaders or pay 
bribe that could lead to losses for the foreign investors. 
According to the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) , Yemen is one of the less developed countries of the world which 
ranking number 144 out of 173 countries and one of the poorest countries at the Arab 
level.193 Even, the foreign aids unwilling to support the government to overcome the 
economic crisis that face the government.194 Such unwillingness because of the 
interference factors of the tribes and the army in the state as well as the rampant 
corruption that spread in the government institutions.195 The army is considered as a 
fundamental contributor to the economy. For instance, there was business council 
named Military Economic Corporation (MECO) which was later renamed Yemeni 
Economic Corporation (YECO).196 This means that the military members do business 
which if there is a commercial dispute between the military member and foreigner 
investor the enforcement of IAA may not be implemented because the military 
member is more likely to resort to his own tribe to protect him/her from the competent 
court’s coercive actions as far as the most of the military members come from tribes.197 
Corruption comes from the patronage and alliance, especially those who have power 
that is more likely to misuse it in their favour.198 The tribes increase the commercial 
risk as they commit illegal acts against foreigners in Yemen.199 Other factors that are 
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more likely to cause weakness of the national economy like decreasing production of 
the natural sources that Yemen depends on the oil and gas at a rate of 70%, as well as 
the increasing proportion of the population, coincides with the government’s failure to 
provide the basic needs like the supplement of electricity and water.200  
Currently, the tribal members involve in business which they have the business 
contract with other people.201 This means the tribal business members have business 
contracts with local and foreign businessmen which could adversely affect the 
arbitration system at the time of the enforcement of arbitral awards. Thus, the Yemeni 
government has to develop strategies to overcome such tribal impediments on the 
enforcement of IAA. 
4.10 Illegal Activities by the Tribes 
Regrettably, the tribes perform actions that distort the image of the country in order to 
coerce the government to execute their numerous requirements like providing services 
in their region, get employments for their tribal members, interest for the tribes, and 
so on.202 The tribes in Yemen do not recognize the principle of justice that all the 
people are equal before the law, so that it can notice some unlawful actions against the 
governmental institutions, social institutions, and the civil life as a whole.203 Also, 
kidnapping foreigners is increasingly widespread since 2000.204 For example, the 
German who was a diplomatic man and his family kidnapped for several days in 
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December 2005 as well as tourists who hold Italian nationality were kidnapped in 
Mareb governorates by a tribe in order to force the government to implement tribal 
interest.205  They usually look for their interest even to break the law so they often 
abuse the rights of others.206 The reason behind such abuse is that the tribes have more 
deadly weapon than the state.207 Hence, the Sheikhs fight the government soldiers with 
their own bodyguards to prevent the implementation of some government orders that 
conflict with tribal interest.208  
According to an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the weapon spread in 
the hands of people is estimated of fifteen to sixteen million pieces which most of it 
stocked in tribal warehouses.209 Tribes behave as that a sovereign state so they have 
their own prison to imprison their opponents even without trial, this is because the state 
does not have a sovereignty over all the land.210 Even though, article 48 that provides 
that none has the right to detain any citizen unless by an order from the judge or the 
prosecutor.211 Thus, if the tribes have the capacity to fight with government soldiers 
and break the law that means the court could not enforce IAA against tribal debtor 
parties and cannot even seek the help of the police to take coercive actions. Also, if 
the tribes have their own prison to detain their opponents so that the creditor party is 
more like to be imprisoned if he/she insist on the follow-up his/her rights.  
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The tribes are an obstacle to the democratic and civilized methods of political life as 
well as individual freedom to practice personal activities.212 They do not recognize the 
constitutional principle that all citizens are equal before the law.213 Therefore, the 
common rule that provides all the citizens are equal is not practiced in Yemen whereas 
some persons who have a power whatever such power comes from businessmen, tribal 
confederation, or political persons which they enjoy special privileges and protections 
other than normal citizens.214 Even though, all the Yemeni laws provide that all the 
citizens are equal before the laws,215 the people do not believe in the effectiveness of 
the rule of law.216  
The tribal men are ignorant and less educated.217 Hence, the phenomenon of revenge 
among the tribal members which they often kill in tribal conflicts and this even affects 
the innocent tribal men as far as they belong to that tribal enemy.218 The Sheikhs 
involve in many illegal activities such as enrolling ghost soldiers in the army to get the 
beneficial salaries back to their own interest as well as trading heavy weapons that 
supposedly to be in a position of the army only.219 Therefore, the tribes are less 
educated and perform such acts that are contrary to the law so that it is impossible to 
implement the court orders and to enforce the IAA against their own tribal debtor 
parties. So, Syed Hussein Alatas’s view is confirmed when he said that the tradition is 
one of the factors that lead to corruption while nepotism requires the tribe or the family 
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to protect each other.220 So, the traditional responsibility to the family members is an 
impediment towards fighting the corruption.221 
4.11 Interrelationship of the Tribal Customary Law and the Official Law 
The justice system in Yemen is merged system between the tribal law and the official 
law and sometimes, the courts refer to the Sheikhs to settle the dispute between the 
victim and the offender.222 Hence, the judiciary in Yemen applies formal system and 
customary system.223 The dominance of the tribal law is because the tribes control the 
rural areas where the government cooperates with tribal leaders to secure some areas 
that are out of the government control.224 People prefer to solve their disputes by 
TADRM because they consider the government institutions as weak and the 
government at the center does not have full control over all the state’s local territory.225 
It is commonly known that the urban prefer to settle their dispute by the formal system, 
especially commercial issues like commercial arbitration. However, Yemeni people 
prefer to refer their commercial disputes to tribal mechanism because the tribal 
mechanism is more effective than the formal system.226 As usually the tribal leader 
who is appointed as arbitrator takes an interim measures of protection such as arms or 
cars from the disputed parties to ensure the enforcement of the award.227 Studies have 
shown that 80% of disputes are solved by the customary law mechanism.228 But, the 
decisions by the tribal arbitrator can be appealed twice to two higher layers of tribal 
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justice if one or both of the disputed parties disagree.229 Furthermore, the judiciary in 
Yemen suffers from corruption and other factors so that the judges receive bribe, are 
unqualified, make ineffective judgements, the cost is high, and political interference 
can change the verdicts.  
Moreover, some judges and prosecutors, as well as lawyers, were threatened by local 
Sheikhs to release some cases in order to be settled by tribal laws or to hold a decision 
in their favour.230  This means that the judiciary is a weak institution.231 Even, in some 
cases found that judges unofficially advise the disputed parties to solve their dispute 
outside the court.232 The Yemeni law itself does not mind to settle disputes by other 
means of ADR.233 Section 45 provides that the arbitral tribunal has to settle the dispute 
based on the laws agreed by the disputed parties. If the disputed parties did not mention 
their preferred law then, the arbitral tribunal has to settle it based on the international 
law and the principles of justice and has to take into consideration the customary 
laws.234 This means the rendered award by the tribal customary law will be enforced 
as procedures and processes of the award rendered by the arbitral tribunal. The judge 
Yehya Al-Mawri who holds a position as Supreme Court member says that Yemeni 
Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992 strengthened tribal relationship with the state through 
the law.235 In addition, the Yemeni law is not sufficient, and as well ineffective, so that 
the official law is not the supreme law in the country which this is one of the main 
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reasons why the people prefer to settle their dispute by the tribal law.236 To sum up, 
the formal legal system does not strongly exist in Yemen.237 
According to United States Institute of Peace report from a survey of some provinces 
in 2013, 20% of the courts are closed because of insecurity and political instability and 
this rate is expected to increase in other urban provinces to 60% for the same 
reasons.238 For example, in Aden that is considered as a highest urban province, studies 
have shown that the cases brought in 2013 decreased to often 44% (from 12,239 to 
6,640) compared to 2010, while in Taez as the second urban state in the north around 
41% decreased (from 13,032 to 8,464).239 
As a result of the lack of the enforcement of the law, the people prefer to solve their 
disputes by customary law that are supervised and administered by Sheikhs as they 
have power. Also, the state does not fully extend its sovereignty over the territories 
mentioned above. Throughout the tribal mechanism arbitration, often Sheikhs take 
interim measures of protection of the disputed parties to make sure they enforce 
decisions. It is traditionally considered shameful if the debtor party rejects the Sheikh’s 
decision. Thus, the collapse of the judicial institution because the citizens don’t trust 
the formal court anymore. 
4.12  The Tribes Interference in the Judiciary 
The Judiciary has to be an independent branch which constitutionally authorized to 
settle disputes by provide fair solutions and protect rights and liberties stated in the 
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constitution and the law.240 The main objectives of the judiciary are to handle all 
brought cases to court fairly, work together with Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
to achieve the rights, duties mentioned in the constitution, and provide legal services 
to ensure the effective operation of the judicial system throughout the state.241 
Furthermore, it is responsible for supervising cases and the judicial system.242 The law 
protects the judicial members and the independence of the judiciary as a whole and 
criminalize any threat, violence, or any illegal action that impede the judicial 
operations punishable with imprisonment not less than three years and not more than 
ten years.243 Also, the punished with an imprisonment not less than three years against 
any person who supported and incited for non-implement of the laws.244 Furthermore, 
the law punished with an imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years against 
any civil servant or Sheikh who interfere at the judge or the court in favour of any of 
the disputed parties or harm any of the disputed parties through recommendation, 
order, or demand.245  
In addition, the judge shall be punished by an imprisonment not exceeding seven years 
if he/she deliberately make a judgement based on a recommendation, demand, or bias 
in favour of one of the disputed parties.246 However, in Yemen, the Sheikhs have a 
close tie with some judicial officers.247 They may observe together some dispute 
resolutions in the community.248 Even, sometimes the judge indirectly advise the 
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disputed parties to solve their dispute by tribal law.249 This means the government 
institutions are weak. As a result, the local protectionism exists.250 The tribes are one 
out of five who take advantage of a weak and corrupt institution.251 Thus, they misuse 
such weakness to protect their own tribal members from any court’s control or 
assistance to the tribunal to enforce arbitral awards. The arbitration will not succeed in 
Yemen as far as government institutions are ineffective and unable to force tribal 
debtor parties to pay their debts.252 So, IAA will face difficulties as the court control 
and assistance are major importance to enforce the arbitral awards and to make a 
success of the arbitration system as a whole.253  
Kinship could adversely affect auditor’s independence to in favour of his/her own 
kinsmen.254 The same is expected to have the same effect which the tribes have an 
effect on the judiciary independence because family relationship could lead the judge 
to bias in favour of his own tribal party. Tribalism in Arab culture is to protect the 
tribes’ interest as well as the tribal members’ interest255 and the tribal interrelationship 
adversely affect the judges’ independence.256 Similarity, the judges could not perform 
their functions because of the threat of Sheikhs against the judges.257 They pressure 
                                                     
249 Ibid. 
250 Robinson, “Yemen Corruption Assessment,” 13-14. 
251 Noman “Reforming the Yemen Security Sector,” 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Baabbad, “Tribalism and Perceived Auditor Independence,” 1306. 
255 Baabbad, “Tribalism and Perceived Auditor Independence,” 1306, quoted in Anthony, John Duke, 
“Saudi Arabia: from tribal society to nation-state,” International Research Center for Energy and 
Economic Development< Boulder, Colo.>: The International Research Center for Energy and 
Economic Development (1982): 93-98. 
256 Baabbad, “Tribalism and Perceived Auditor Independence,” 1306, quoted in Roszaini Haniffa, and 
Mohammad Hudaib, "Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: The case of Saudi 
Arabia,” Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 16.2 (2007): 179-206. 
257 Gaston, Dispute Resolution and Justice Provision in Yemen’s Transition, 6 
 
251 
them to abstain to give a judgement in some case or transfer it to tribal law or give a 
judgement in favour of the Sheikhs.258  
The family relationship could adversely affect the auditor’s independence through 
threat.259 Hence, the tribes could threaten the judges if taken any coercive actions 
towards the enforcement of IAA against the tribal debtor party.  For instance, in one 
case the Sheikh came to public prosecutor’s office and has threatened him if he released 
the detainee.260 Otherwise, such releasing will lead to a murder.261 The public 
prosecutor considered the interference as a threat against his life and the detainee’s 
life.262 In another type of interference, the punishment of transfer of judges because he 
issued a judgement against a prominent Sheikh.263 The same happened to a lawyer 
when they represented their clients before the court in regions that are controlled by 
tribes which such Sheikhs considered that as conflict with local tribal authority.264 The 
government itself does not will to enforce the court’s orders against tribal leaders 
which means the judiciary suffers from a lack of independence.265 The judicial body 
is not effective because of the existence of the tribal influence.266 Therefore, there is a 
high probability of failure of the enforcement of IAA in Yemen if the government does 
not prevent the tribe’s interventions in the affairs of the judiciary. Such impediment to 
enforce the arbitral award in Yemen because of the tribalism influence is confirmed 
through an interview with Court of Appeal judges. 
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Respondent 1 stated that “sometimes there are interventions by 
tribesmen when a tribal person is a party to the case. Sometimes 
there is a refusal to appear before the court”. Respondent 2 Said 
that “tribal intervention occurs”. Respondent 3 stated that “most 
interference in judge’s decisions is tribal interference”. 
At the outset, the government itself is not willing to rectify the tribalism impediment. 
All interviewees confirmed the theory that the government encourages the tribal 
rebellion against court decisions.  The researcher analysed that the tribes are classified 
as political ally of the executive branch so the executive ignores the tribal rebellion. 
On the other hand, the tribes are part of the executive, thus, they imitate the political 
interference in the judiciary. In reality, the tribal leader is seen as a higher authority 
than the judiciary and the government is silent to maintain the tribal power alliance. 
The interviewees’ confirmation of the tribal influence is to ensure the theory that 
confirms the tribal threat of the judges and lawyers. As a consequences, is it possible 
that the judge, lawyer, or arbitrator will risk his/her lives? Surely, such threat will 
negatively affect their good performance. Therefore, the   creditor party will face 
difficulties in enforcing the international arbitral award if the debtor party is tribal. 
Also, the independence of the judiciary and impartiality are very important to achieve 
justice, so the lack of such fundamental elements in Yemeni judiciary will lead to 
negative effects on justice. As the court control and assistance are major importance 
to enforce IAA, the enforcement against the tribal debtor party will fail. 
In the matter of the effectiveness of the tribal alternative dispute resolution mechanism 
on the arbitration system. The three Court of Appeal judges stated that: 
In order to improve the arbitration system in Yemen, they are all 
recommended the development of institutional arbitration and stay 
away from non-institutionalized arbitration like refer to TADRM 
because tribal men are not aware of legal procedures and pleading 
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which the court faces difficulties to implement the arbitral award 
and lead recourse the award.267 
I do concur the layman like tribal men won't matter the administer of common 
equity as a result of their ignorance of essential standards of guidelines. The 
natural of justice is more likely to be breached. As a result, the resisting party 
well make an application to set aside the tribal award.  However, the people’s 
autonomy who choose to refer the customary law instead of the court system. 
People do not fully trust the court system because of the tribalism impediment 
and corruption. So, the tribal leader award is credible and honest because of 
no such influences. Hence, the reforms of the judiciary is the only solution to 
overcome the TADRM. On the other hand, TADRM will not affect the 
enforcement of IAA because the foreign investor will not agree to arbitration 
clause that provides referring to TADRM to settle commercial dispute. This 
is because neither he/she nor his/her lawyers are aware of such type of 
alternative dispute resolution.  
Furthermore, regarding the effectiveness of the tribalism interference on the 
enforcement of international arbitral award. Respondent 4 confirmed that: 
The tribes are strong in the composition of the society and have the 
power to challenge any coercive actions that may be taken by the 
court to enforce the IAA against their tribal members.268 
Also, according to Respondent 5 said that: 
70% of Yemeni people are tribal, that the majority of citizens are 
from tribes. Besides, the high proportion of ignorance leads to 
indiscipline and disobedience of law and order. Tribal interventions 
major constraints that threaten the judiciary and contribute to 
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undermining. That's why the tribes don't understand the law. I 
personally imprisoned a tribal person accused during the trial. As a 
result, I received several calls from tribal leader asking for the 
release of the accused and other calls threatening me if I did not 
release him. To be an independent judiciary there has to be security 
protection of judges against any arbitrary act. Such threats will 
definitely affect us negatively and make us bias.  
In addition, the same question to the Respondent 14 confirmed that: 
The tribalism interference occurs to prevent the enforcement of the 
arbitral award in some cases. The tribal leaders interfere and 
influence judges’ operations to prevent them from taking coercive 
actions to enforce the arbitral award that judges usually take such 
as imprisonment, seizure of the lost party’s assets. The enforcement 
of the arbitral award is difficult when the lost party is a tribal person 
or his/her assets are in the tribal area, so the implementation is a bit 
difficult because the tribe controls the lands and enforcement is 
difficult on its territory as the tribes protect their own people.269  
The interviewees confirmed the tribalism impediment on enforcement of IAA. 
Undoubtedly, the judge will be afraid for his life, especially, the theories stated that 
the tribes use an illegal ways such as kidnapping to force their opponents to carry out 
their interests.  Moreover, the court will hesitate to take any coercive actions to enforce 
the arbitral award against the tribal debtor party as his/her own tribe will protect 
him/her. The tribes will use their power to protect their members as far as they care 
more about their own interest. Especially, the government has no sovereignty over all 
the land. The theories stated that numerous of soldiers killed in tribal areas because of 
entering the land without prior permission from the tribes. All in all, is it conceivable 
the police will catch up the court's requests to enforce IAA? Surely, none will put his 
life in risk, unless, General strategy of the state to strengthen the judiciary. All in all, 
the enforcement of IAA against the tribal debtor party will fail because the court 
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interference is major importance to implement IAA if the debtor party refused to 
enforce it voluntarily. 
4.13 The Strategies to Socialize the Tribes 
It is commonly known that the tribes are an important element of the Yemeni society. 
The tribes contribute in many positive ways. The major contribution is that the tribes 
have been involved in many battles against al-Qaeda.270 Some accounts say that the 
tribes do not cause underdevelopment while others say underdevelopment is caused 
by the tribes.271 However, to overcome such impediments there has to be a reform of 
government institutions to combat corruption, separation of power, improvement in 
education quality, and so on. The researcher believes that the law alone will not be 
effective if other reforms are not performed to check other impediments. Thus, this 
study examined the legal and social impediments. For instance, the legislators could 
make sufficient laws, but the enforcement will be a problem if the majority of people 
are not ready to respect the rule of law and the institutions are weak to enforce such 
laws.  
The tribes consider themselves as paramount inside the state sway which they do not 
permit the state to enter their domains without prior consent, so numerous officers 
slaughtered because of entering the tribal domains without giving a sensible avocation 
as well as disallowing the authorities to perform their obligations and hindering the 
state from extricating the characteristic sources. Tribes carry on as that an imperial 
state so they have their claim jail to detain their adversaries indeed without trial, this 
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is because the state does not have a sway over all the land.272 The central government 
is incapable of upholding its sway over all national domains.273 Thus, the state has to 
spread its sovereignty over the land to reform the national security. Thus, the national 
security forces have to be controlled by the state.274 The government has no sway over 
all land in arrange to expand its authority and guaranteeing the application of the law.  
Moreover, the government confronted challenges in actualizing its approaches since it 
is confronted with the tribal resistance in cases where such arrangements are against 
tribal intrigued. Hence, Pull the power out of the tribes and let them be aware that they 
are subject to government and the rule of law. This will help even the judiciary to carry 
out its operations in the tribal regions. Also, this will have positive effects on the 
arbitration system which the court could take coercive actions against the lost party in 
case refer to his/her tribe for protection.  
 
Education in Yemen is insufficient as over 50% of the populations are illiterate.275 The 
Ministry of Education stated that they do not have enough qualified teachers.276  It is 
commonly known that the rural people are less educated. This means the tribes who 
are mostly illiterate people live in the rural areas. Thus the government should have 
plans to improve the education system. The researcher believes that if Yemen got a 
good ruler through an election cannot reform the government institutions and develop 
the country unless overcome the illiteracy. It has to learn from the history that the tribes 
assassinated the former president Ibrahim Al-Hamdi when he tried to modernize the 
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state governance and prevent their influence on the executive.277 Therefore, the 
government must have plan for a term not less than ten years to have people who are 
conscious and have an understanding of dealing with modern state institutions. 
From an interview of experts on the rule of law, “they advised against the recognition 
of tribal customary laws. They consider tribal arbitrators as ignorant of the processes 
and proceedings of the tribal customary laws. The tribal customary law is more likely 
to be set aside because of breach of justice proceedings”. However, the experts 
criticized the role of tribal customary law, but failed to refer to the necessary reforms 
that have to be taken to improve the government institutions. Especially, to combat the 
rampant corruption in the judiciary. Sometimes, the tribes’ actions benefit the society. 
For example, the tribal customary law is the fundamental element that has kept Yemen 
stable. It is a well-known fact that after the Arab Spring, all government institution and 
security have collapsed. Nowadays, the tribal customary court is performing the 
functions of the government courts such as settling disputes among the citizens and 
maintaining security. The situation in Yemen is better than other Arab countries that 
are affected by Arab Spring and this is due to the maintenance of law and order through 
customary laws. Therefore, the government fizzled to allude to the fundamental 
changes that have to be taken to improve the judiciary. Particularly, to combat the 
rampant corruption in the judiciary. The government has to plan and implement the 
strategies towards fighting corruption.   
Yemen is a major consumer of small arms which the people do not use weapon for 
offence, hunting, defence but it is used for symbols status.278 The small arms in the 
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possession of the citizens are estimated of 50 million which is selling without 
restriction and regulation.279 Thus, the tribes have deadly weapons more than the 
government.280The tribal men have to always carry small arms along with them on 
street, market, wedding, and so on.281 This is an impediment towards the reform of the 
government institutions. The tribes feel they are sovereign over the state so they 
oppose government policies if such policies do not benefit them.  Also, FDI is 
impossible to be attracted in a state that has no sovereignty over its people. The foreign 
investor will highly expect impediments in unstable state. Therefore, the withdrawal 
of weapons from the citizens is a very important step to creating a strong state. 
4.14 Arbitral and Criminal Cases to Prove the Tribalism Impediment on 
Enforcement of IAA and the Judiciary as a whole 
Below are two cases that proof the influence of the tribes on the court: 
4.14.1 Arbitral Case 1 
Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen,282 in this case, the claimant in Desert 
Line Project L.L.C (hereinafter referred as D.L.P) which is a construction company 
established under Omani law, while the respondent is the Republic of Yemen (Yemen). 
As facts, the claimant entered into numerous contracts at different times with the 
respondent for construction, of asphalt roads in different places in Yemen. By late 
2003, the claimant had performed all works of the construction except for outstanding 
works under contracts 4 and 6. On 10 November, dispute arose between the parties in 
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matter evaluation of works done. Further, the D.L.P was prevented by the military 
personnel from demanding payment of outstanding invoices and threatened the 
D.L.P’S representative (Ahmad bin Farid AL-sorimah). The conflict with the army 
resulted in arrest three of the claimant’s personnel and some of the claimant’s 
equipment were stolen.  Also, Sheikh Mouthir El Chzil who is tribal member 
threatened D.L.P’s representative by shooting him with a deadly weapon on 30 June 
2006, demanding him to stop working on Al-Mahweet highway. The claimant 
immediately sent a letter to the president of Yemen to seek for protection and security.   
On 26 June 2004, the claimant represented by its chairman, and the respondent 
represented by the Minister of Public Works-Highways. They agreed to settle their 
dispute amicably and entered into an arbitration agreement that its award is deemed as 
enforceable and final, the arbitration proceedings were conducted by the Yemeni 
Arbitral Tribunal.  
On 9 August 2004, the tribunal issued the award in favour of D.L.P and entitled it to 
amount for works done YR18, 447,857,500 plus additional costs at an amount of YR 
1, 520,620929. However, on 22 September 2004, the Republic of Yemen applied to 
Yemen Courts to set aside the arbitration award. On 22 December 2004, the claimant 
filed a counterclaim action in Yemen Court, seeking a rejection of the respondent’s 
request to set aside the award, and claimed its enforcement. After disappointed hopes 
of the judiciary regarding the enforcement of the arbitration award. The Yemen Court 
of Appeal neither enforce the arbitral award not set it aside. 
It is clear from the case that the tribal influence on the FDI as well as the military 
power that most of the military members are tribal members too. It could be concluded 
there is no enforcement of the IAA, nor has judicial supervision taken any action 
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against the debtor party (the respondent) to enforce the IAA. It was noticeable from 
the facts, the respondent’s argument is not based on article 53 of YAA that give a right 
to refuse the award if the resisting party proves any of the grounds provides by the 
article. According to arbitration agreement signed by the disputing parties, the arbitral 
award is binding and no party has to appeal. Thus, what is the reason behind non-
enforcement granted by the competent court? Especially, the court has no jurisdiction 
to ignore the enforcement of the arbitral award without justification as stated in article 
53 of the Act.  
We can see the gap that YAA left extremely discretion to the competent court in the 
matter of the enforcement period of the arbitral award. The enforcement of the arbitral 
award is the main purpose of the arbitration. The fast procedures and processes are 
fundamental features in arbitration system. Then, leaving the enforcement without a 
limited period adversely affects such feature. Especially, if the lost party resist the 
enforcement nor has reasonable grounds to do so. As a result, the Yemen court 
procrastinated the enforcement. Especially, it could not determine any ground to set 
aside the arbitral award based on section 53 or 55 of YAA. This means that YAA has 
to be modernised by strong relevant provisions of the enforcement of IAA. It has to 
relate this case to the interview with Respondent 4, he stated his own experience in 
enforcing the arbitral awards by exercise effective monitoring as mentioned two 
arbitral cases which one creditor party forcibly referred to reconciliation after 
procrastination of the place of enforcement of the arbitral award while the second creditor 
party enforced it after long time of fighting for his rights of enforcement. The arbitral 
awards will be vain and the disputed parties are more likely to delay the procedures by 
procrastinations as well as procrastination in the enforcement of the arbitral award 
which will lead to losses on the creditor party and may lose other transaction because 
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of the lack of financial liquidity. Hence, YAA shall stipulate the period of time for the 
executive judge to grant the enforcement of the arbitral award. Therefore, the 
researcher analyses that the judicial institution is weak and the competent court has no 
power to enforce the award rendered by Arbitral Tribunal, especially, the court 
supervision has to enforce it against the resisting enforcement who are the army and 
the tribe and politicians. Thus, the competent court is incapable to take any coercive 
actions against the tribal party, the military party or the official party in order to enforce 
the IAA. 
4.14.2 Criminal Case 2: (about non-implementation of the law on the tribe)283 
It is necessary to have a case to support the claim that the tribe is above the law and 
the law can only be enforced against weak people but not against the tribes’ leaders 
and their members. The facts of the case are that the defendant is a tribal leader (Ali 
Abdo Rabo Al-Awadhi) and the plaintiffs are the parents of two dead persons at the 
age of nineteen. In this case, during ceremony marriage for Al-Awadhi family on 
14/05/2013 that held in Sana’a, the guardians of Sheikh Ali Al-Awadhi intercepted the 
two dead persons’ car and shoot them without apparent reason. The parents started to 
file an action in the court but the police did not take any investigated action of the 
incident. Till this moment, the case has not been tried. In this case the public prosecutor 
who is part of the court in criminal cases is supposed to instruct the police to investigate 
the incident and file the case alongside the dead boys’ parents. Undoubtedly, the tribal 
influence existed and prevented the police and the public prosecutor to investigate. 
This means that the whole system in Yemen is adversely influenced by the tribes, 
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particularly the judiciary. The same position of tribal impediments to carry out the 
judicial operations will occur, especially, the most important stage in arbitration 
system, that is, the enforcement of IAA. The enforcement will fail as the tribal debtor 
party will refer to his/her own tribe to protect him/her from the court legal actions. 
Particularly, if the tribal debtor party’s assets in tribal areas, the court will face 
difficulties to enforce the award as the tribal areas out of the state sovereignty. Surely, 
the tribal members will come as one person to protect their own member of the court 
orders. Therefore, the arbitration system will not succeed in a country that does not 
have full sovereignty over its land as well as the independence of the judiciary. 
The above mentioned two cases clarify that the Yemeni judiciary is not independent 
as far as the tribal influence is concerned. So the enforcement of international arbitral 
award is more likely to fail in cases where the debtor party is tribal. 
4.15 Conclusion 
Throughout the above discussion, information from interview respondents and the 
legal cases answered the research question two and achieved research objective three 
and confirmed the adverse impact of tribalism on the competency of the court of appeal 
towards the enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen. The tribes handle 
some disputes among the members of the community. Tribes have positive 
contributions to the community through TADRM. People resort to tribal Sheikhs to 
resolve their disputes because of the weakness of the judiciary, rampant corruption, 
and the interventions of the executive branch and the army in the judiciary. The 
arbitration system and the court system are interrelated. The government should reform 
the judiciary. Enforcement is the most important stage in arbitration system, 
commonly known that not all arbitral awards is voluntarily enforced. The court role is 
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necessary in case the lost party refused to implement the arbitral award. The court 
plays important role regarding the control and assistance. So, the arbitration system 
will not succeed without independent judiciary. The theories, cases, and interviewees 
have shown that the Yemeni judiciary lacks independence. The tribal leaders interfere 
in the judicial operations. As the tribes are powerful. They have influence over the 
main sources of income of the country. They have influence on the state policies and 
economy. YAA itself empowers them by recognizing the customary law. The tribal 
award is recognized as primary court decision. Moreover, the tribes breach the law and 
do illegal operations to force the government. Sometimes, the government fail to listen 
to their requirements. As a reaction, the tribes do kidnapping of foreigners, disruption 
of public interests, and the like. This is because the government has no sovereignty 
over all the land. Confirming such factors answered the research question that the 
tribes will impede the enforcement of IAA. The tribes will interfere to protect their 
own members from the court’s orders. The court’s order will not be implemented in 
some areas as that areas are under the control of the tribes. Also, the tribal leaders will 
influence the judges or the creditor party by threat to kidnap or harm him/her. It means 
that the arbitration system will not succeed in Yemen unless the government not only 
control the whole territory but must subjugate the tribes to the law. The constitutional 
principle of all citizens are equal before the law and should not only be practiced but 
must be enforced. 
This reflects negatively on the role of the arbitration system in Yemen which cannot 
succeed as far as the judiciary is not independent. The government should provide an 
appropriate environment for the judiciary to perform its operations without tribal 
interference. YAA has to be amended by repealing section 45 which provided that the 
recognition of the customary law. This section authorizes layman to be appointed as 
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arbitrator. This not only adversely affect the judicial operations because of setting 
aside the tribal awards that led to pile up of cases in the courts. However, such 
amendment of YAA has to follow up after the reforming of the judiciary. The current 
judiciary is incompetent to replace the customary law functions. As the customary law 
plays important role in settling issues among citizens at a rate of 80%. Most of the 
disputes in the country is settled by the customary law and not the court. If the 
government is really serious to improve the image of the country and attract FDI, as 
well as the success of the arbitration system, it must develop a strategic plan to refine 
the role of the tribes by reducing the excessive power of the tribes such as withdrawal 
of all types of weapons from citizens, control all state lands, not to allow the tribes to 
intervene in politics in order the dominate the state and its power remains the only one. 
Also, the real application of the constitutional principle that all the citizen are equal 
before the law is one of the most important pillars to stabilize the country and enforce 
IAA. In addition, educational strategy should be considered. It is the most important 
strategy that can socialize the tribes, it can refine their behavior without force. But, it 
has to go through a period of not less than ten years. 
As far as the lack of the independence of the judiciary, non-state capacity to control 
the whole state land, the strengthens and power of the tribes, and the traditional 
responsibility that imposes on the tribesmen to protect each other as a one group so 
that the enforcement of IAA will be impeded in Yemen. The two cases mentioned 
before confirmed the weaknesses of the judiciary and inability to take any coercive 
enforcement against tribal parties to disputes. So, the enforcement of IAA will face 
difficulties in Yemen because of the adverse tribal influence on the judiciary. These 
two cases confirmed that the arbitration system will not succeed in Yemen. The 
independence of the judiciary is very important as it supports control and assistance to 
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implement the arbitral procedures and processes. The tribal influence is an impediment 
towards the enforcement of IAA. The creditor party will face difficulties to enforce the 
arbitral award, especially when the debtor party is tribal member. He/she will refer to 
his own tribe to protect him/her against any court legal actions. The tribe will come as 
one group to protect their own members against outsiders whatever that official 
operations or unofficial. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CORRUPTION IN YEMEN 
5.1 Introduction 
Yemen is a member of the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery 
in International Commercial Transactions.1 The Yemeni national system criminalizes 
bribery given by nationals to a foreign public officer.2 The rampant corruption in state 
institutions is one of the main factors responsible for spreading the Arab Spring 
Revolution to Yemen in 2011.3 The demonstrators took to the streets looking for 
justice, dignity, rights of citizenship, and equality among citizens.4 Republic of Yemen 
has all the factors leading to corruption.5 The rampant corruption in the Yemen was 
not able to be overcome through simple strategies.6 Indeed, corruption has to be 
combated by those holding high levels of authority.7 Unfortunately, officials are 
corrupt because of their personal interests.8 
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5.2 Definition of Corruption 
According to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Corruption is an 
insidious plague that has a broad range of corrosive consequences on societies. It 
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to infringement of human rights, 
mutilates markets, disintegrates the first-class of ways of life and permits prepared 
wrongdoing, fear mongering and other dangers to human security to thrive.9 The 
signatory-states of the convention are concerned about the seriousness of problems and 
threats posed by using corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining 
institutions and values of democracy, moral values and justice and jeopardizing 
sustainable development and the rule of regulation.10 Further, the purpose of the 
convention is addressed in article 1(c) that provides fighting corruption in order to 
promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs, and public 
property. In domestic law, corruption is defined as the misuse of granted authority to 
pursue personal interests, abusing taxpayers’ money for personal interests, and any 
adverse impact on government institutions.11According to Syed Hussein Alatas, 
corruption is like a cancer.12 Official and government transactions become less 
powerful, when illegal transactions could be done through other means.13According to 
section 30 (3) of Yemeni Anti-Corruption, corruption involves abusing public powers 
for private interests.14 
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Undoubtedly, bribery adversely affects government activities, enforcement of the law, 
government officials’ operations, culture, and the morals.15 Any crime, including 
corruption, which adversely affects justice has a place in the Penal Code; in this case 
“bribery”.16 Bribery is a part of corruption.  The giver induces the public officer by 
gift in order to consider the giver’s interest.17 In other words, a person gives money or 
favors to violate the rights of others or to escape from duties. Bribery is one of the 
forms of corruption which includes money, kickbacks, bonuses, discounts, services, 
and wages, anything to make the procedures faster and avoid obstacles.18 Firms must 
pay bribes in order to have fewer taxes, get licenses, avoid the law, and prevent 
competitors’ operations.19 Thus, the firms need to pay bribes to the public officer to 
continually operate the business.20 The government’s orders as well as the law are 
unenforceable because of rampant corruption in the government institutions.21 Bribery 
is considered the main factor that leads to corrupt administrations, when the 
government employee often immediately asks for a bribe to proceed with an 
applicant’s request.22 Some businessmen use bribery to move applications faster or 
impede his competitor’s processes.23  Bribery must be paid to facilitate projects.24 
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Specifically, the judicial sector is the biggest institution involved in corruption.  Judges 
issue judgements in favour of the party who pays higher bribes. Bribery may be more 
powerful than evidence.25 The offending party could be released from prison to escape 
justice by paying a bribe.26 According to a study on bribery that was conducted by a 
Yemen Polling Center, 64% of the respondents agreed that the judiciary is the most 
corrupt institution.27 
The Court of Appeal judges provided information relating to the conducting trials of 
corruption cases.  
Respondent 1 said that “Anti-corruption laws are legislated to 
protect the corrupt persons because we have never heard any 
minister or senior officer having been held accountable or 
convicted”. Respondent 2 said that “There are issues related to 
judicial corruption,” while Respondent 3 said “There is no 
corruption in my department, but when I was a member in the 
Judicial Inspection Board (JIB) I have dealt with breach of duty 
issues by judges”.  
As a result of the interview, the above majority judge interviewees confirmed the 
above theory. This means that the debtor party in the arbitration system is more likely 
to pay a bribe to the court to impede the creditor party’s application that seeks the 
enforcement of the arbitral award as far as corruption is widespread in Yemeni 
government institutions. The individuals prefer to settle their disputes by the 
arbitration mechanism than the court system since the court may be debased as bribery 
will influence the result of the judgment. Be that as it may, the parties still cannot run 
away from the court particularly, on the off chance that the debtor party refused to 
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enforce the arbitral award voluntarily. The arbitral award will not be compelling 
without the court interference. Especially, the enforcement of the arbitral award is the 
most important stage in arbitration. Hence, in the event that the place of enforcement of 
the arbitral award is in a corrupt country such as Yemen the enforcement will be 
impeded. Bribery will hinder the implementation and the creditor party is expected to 
lose his rights. The debtor party is more likely to pay bribe to impede the enforcement 
of IAA. According to Gary, corruption in a few countries makes the commercial 
arbitration unsatisfactory.28 Hence, the corruption impediment will lead to non-
enforcement of IAA. 
Academicians of Yemeni universities provided information in the matter of the 
difficulties in enforcing international arbitral awards. Respondent 4 said that: 
There are difficulties such as the lack of implementation of the 
arbitral award by the parties, I was a representative of one of the 
parties of the arbitration, and the debtor party rejected enforcement 
of the arbitral award. Although the Court of Appeals held that the 
award is binding, no coercive action was taken. This forces us to 
enter into a reconciliation to reduce the amount held in the arbitral 
award. This indicates that the enforcement of IAA will face 
difficulties. 
Respondent 5 said that: 
Yes, especially the difficulties like political interventions, for me 
intervention of the Minister of Justice based on a complaint from the 
Minister of Finance, and because of my judgement to implement the 
arbitral award. I ordered the state to implement the arbitral award 
in the amount of $7 million. This arbitral award has been rendered 
by the legal Affairs, then the Ministry of Trade and Fund recourse 
against the arbitral award applied by the trader. As a result of my 
confirmation of the validity of the award, so the Minister of Finance 
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complained to the Minister of Justice against me. Then, the Minister 
of Justice insulted me by improper words. 
Therefore, the enforcement of international arbitral award will face difficulties in case 
the debtor party did not implement the award voluntarily. The creditor party must not 
rely on the court to take coercive actions to force the debtor to implement it. The 
researcher advises the creditor party to request interim measures of protection to ensure 
the enforcement of the award. This is because bribery and other interventions will 
adversely affect the enforcement of IAA. The interviewees confirmed that bribery 
could adversely affect the enforcement of IAA in Yemen because it is widespread in 
Yemeni government institutions. So, the arbitration system in Yemen will not succeed 
as long as bribery is widespread in the judiciary. The judiciary has to be serious in 
fighting corruption, so the anti-corruption agencies have to be effective to fight 
corruption in all government institutes. Respondent 4 stated his own experience as an 
arbitrator of the creditor party. The creditor party rights have been lost because the 
court failed to take coercive actions to enforce the arbitral award. This means that the 
debtor party used the behind door such as pay bribery to escape from the 
implementation of the arbitral award. While, respondent 5 stated his own experience 
as a judge. He was insulted because of enforcement of the arbitral award that was 
already rendered by the arbitral tribunal. It means that the judiciary is not independent 
from the executive branch. Thus, the creditor party is more likely to lose his right if 
the debtor party has good relationship with political persons. They are more likely to 
interfere to have adversely effect on integrity and independence of the judge or at least 
to disturb the judge’s good performance.  
According to Javorcik, when government corruption is low, FDI in the nation or 
national companies becomes more attractive. Widespread corruption is more likely 
 
272 
reduce the FDI.29 Bribery is adversely related to FDI because business operations 
become more expensive.30Also, the corruption rate is the true standard that affects the 
investors’ decision in order to invest in the host country.31 Corruption is one of the 
main impediments that face the growth of FDI and should be reformed.32  Failure to 
attract investment because of corruption is there.33 Foreign investors avoid investment 
in the host countries that have corruption because corruption leads to insecurity, 
increased costs of business, and ineffective operations.34 If the owner of the project 
needs to obtain an import license or otherwise, he/she shall only pay for the service, in 
order to facilitate the transaction, otherwise his/her project will remain stalled and will 
not be able to work correctly. Thus, the projects in corrupt countries are less successful. 
As illegal payments such as bribery gratification can greatly increase the cost of the 
projects so FDI reduces. Thus, reformers want to combat bribery, overcome 
corruption, and attract FDI to the country which will yield income to the government 
treasury.35  Bribery adversely affect the enforcement of the law and it is an obstacle to 
FDI.36 Judgements are not executed on time because of the malpractices that bribery 
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create.37 FDI is low because of the spread of bribery that the foreign investors have to 
pay to facilitate business procedures and operations as well.38 Bribery even penetrates 
the court system.39 According to the 2015 Transparency International statistic, Yemen 
is placed among the first eighteen most corrupt countries in the world.40 Thus, in nation 
such Yemen, the proprietor of the tasks will be compelled to pay off. Similarly, the 
creditor party will fail to implement the arbitral award as corruption is widespread in 
the judiciary. The arbitration system will not succeed unless, the creditor party paid 
bribe to the court. The court control and assistance is important in arbitration system.  
Especially, when the debtor party resists the enforcement of the arbitral award, so that 
without minimum intervention the arbitration system will not succeed.41 Therefore, the 
judiciary has to be reformed to improve the arbitration system in Yemen. 
 
Corruption is like cancer, it only gets worse and spreads unless drastic action is taken.42 
Any activity can be conducted through legal procedures or illegal procedures as long 
as a back door can be used to obtain illegal transactions.43 Corruption weakens service 
so the investors have to pay a bribe in order to get satisfactory service.44 As a result, 
bribery in Yemen is widespread because the laws that relates to combating corruption 
are not sufficiently enforced; the government officials break the law and practice 
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corruption.45 Thus, corruption is an impediment to enhancing governance in Yemen.46 
It is important to refer to the study carried out by Abdulhafez Al-Udeini (2006)47 which 
has shown that over 78% of the respondents agree that the bribery in government 
institutions is common. Moreover, 94% confirm that bribery is widespread in some 
government institutions, while only 0.3% of respondents agree that the government 
institutions are rarely affected by the bribery. The respondents could not ignore the 
truth because the adverse effect of corruption is clear. According to Syed Hussein 
Alatas, no officials can deny the prevalence of widespread corruption because its effect 
is painfully clear.48 
5.3.1 Forms of Bribery49 
It is important to state the most common form of bribery is gift giving; it adversely 
affects the receiver’s fair practices.50 According to Ibn Khaldun, the basis of corruption 
is emotion.51 The amount of the bribe paid depends on the advantage that would be 
gotten by the giver.52 A study conducted by Kim has shown that the purpose of bribery 
is to take advantage of government power to avoid duties and sanctions.53 This means 
the debtor party could pay a bribe to the judge of the appropriate court to impede the 
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enforcing of IAA. Bribery is widespread in the Yemeni government institutions so it 
is more likely to adversely affect the enforcement of IAA.  
Yemeni law explicitly prohibits bribery.  It criminalizes giving or receiving any forms 
of money or gifts in exchange for treatment that is in different from others. This could 
be seen in section 151 that provides that the public officer who receives, asks for, or 
promises bribery in order to do something or abstain from doing something which 
breaches his or her duties is punished with not more than ten years imprisonment; if 
that bribery does not breach his/her duties, the punishment is not more than three 
years.54 Even though the public officer received or asked for a bribe after the work is 
done and breached his/her duties, this is still considered as a bribe which is punished 
with not more than seven years.55 Also, the giver who proposed to give the public 
officer any money, gifts or the like in order to do something or to abstain something 
which breached his/her duties, is punished for a term not more than three years, and if 
that gift is given by the giver in order to get his/her rights, he is still punished with a 
term not more than one year.56 In addition, the mediator who helped the receiver or the 
giver to commit the bribery offence and has a knowledge of its purpose is punished 
with the same punishment for both the receiver and the giver.57 
5.3.2 Gift is Considered as Corruption  
A gift is considered as corruption if the recipient has a formal agreement, the given 
gift will affect the decision-maker, or the value of the gift is proportionate with the 
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purpose or goal.58 In addition, according to Syed Hussein Alatas, there are five 
approaches lead to corrupt officials such as giving money, providing a lavish lifestyle, 
food and drink, gifts, Entertainment, Concerts, and Birthday Parties.59 in bribery 
offence, the prosecutor have to prove prima facie.60 There should be strong evidence 
against the accused to be called to answer it.61 If the prima facie is made by the 
prosecutor, the, the accused must rebut it.62 On the other hand, if the prosecutor failed 
to satisfy the court by sufficient answer, then there is no prima facie and the accused 
has to be released.63 However, if there is prima facie, then the burden of proof shall be 
shifted to the accused to rebut it, if the accused failed to rebut it.64 The court will be 
adduced by the evidence that the facts of the bribery are existed.65 
At the time of acceptance of the bribery by the accused (decision-maker).66 It should 
be proven the gift was given and accepted as inducement or reward.67 Then, the 
decision-maker has to explain the facts in rebuttable that charge are true.68 Thus, the 
prosecutor shall prove the facts without reasonable facts. Otherwise, the accused will 
be entitled to an acquittal. The provided evidences by the prosecutor are subject to 
high standard of evaluation. 
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5.4 Corruption and the Economy 
Yemen is considered as the poorest country in the Arab world, chiefly because of 
corruption and increasing population with few available jobs.69 According to UNDP 
Human Development Index states that Yemen is ranked number 133 out of 169 
countries in the world, which means 50% of the population lives under the red line of 
poverty.70 Most of Yemeni people live in rural areas and rely on agriculture as a main 
source for their income. The U.S. Agency for International Development in its 2006 
Report about Yemen Corruption Assessment has shown that even with the efforts 
towards anti-corruption by the government, 30% of the government revenue was never 
deposited in government accounts.71 
The state depends on oil revenue at rate of 75%.72 However, oil is expected to dry up 
so Yemen has to find FDI to support the national economy. FDI could be achieved 
through combating the widespread corruption in the government institutions as well as 
improving the regulations and reforming the government institutions.73 The 
government made an effort towards the improvement of local and foreign investment 
such as a policy of standardized treatment and treating all investors equally.74 
Moreover, establishing the General Investment Authority in 1992 created cooperation 
with the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service in order to update 
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weaknesses in Yemeni laws that are related to investment.75 On the other hand, other 
parts of the law such as the enforcement of the labour law, regulation and tax laws, 
and investment law are not able to cope with international investment standard, so they 
have to be updated.76 In addition, the weak judicial institution, corruption, bribery, and 
low transparency have adverse effects on investment climate.77  Development depends 
on accountability, transparency, and integrity.  Corruption grows in the absence of 
these elements.78 As a result, corruption leads to the weakness of government’s 
institutions as well as serves as an impediment to the development of FDI.79 Yemen 
needs an appropriate environment for FDI along with less corruption, effective laws 
to protect rights of individuals and businesses, and transparency.80 
Corruption is considered as the main cause of poverty in Yemen as well as the currently 
depressed national economy.81According to the US Embassy Report 2006 that was 
written in Sana’a, the tribes and army are composed of two elite groups out of five 
who take advantage of rampant corruption in the country, and the lion’s share goes to 
the tribal leaders.  It is not surprising that they hold the state’s main military and 
security positions.82 
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The researcher conducted a survey with respondents of COCA to understand the 
military power and its capacity to interfere in the government affairs.  
The respondent 11 Said “Yes, I have dealt with one corruption case, 
army officers have pressured us to withdraw a case, but we refused,” 
respondent 12 Stated “military officers do not interfere in our 
branch, perhaps in some other provinces,” while respondent 13 
stated “Yes, we receive recommendations, and this depends on the 
head of COCA and his impartiality to accept or reject such 
recommendations. If he is honorable judge will reject any kind of 
interference that may affect his impartiality and fair-mindedness, but 
if he is looking for upgrading, without prejudice, he will accept such 
recommendation and interference”. 
Furthermore, according to respondents of PFP that the researcher met to investigate 
the interference in PFP affairs from the military.  
Respondent 8 Stated that: 
If a member of the military committed any offence, none can trace 
him if his military unit protects him. The military supposes to follow 
up our instructions without procrastination. 
Respondent 9 Said that: 
Yes, there is interference from the military such as receiving formal 
letters and calls to intervene in our operations. But, we do not 
accept. Similarly, such interferences do not affect our operations. 
While Respondent 10 Stated  
Yes, there is interference from the military, if someone says there is 
no intervention, he or she has no credibility. But the acceptance or 
rejection of the intervention depends on the integrity of the judge. 
Thus, the vast majority of the respondents of both COCA and PFPs confirmed the 
military interference, has ability to put pressure on COCA and PFP which adversely 
affect their operations. This means that the government institutes in Yemen suffer from 
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multiple outside interferers that adversely affect their performance and operations. As 
long as such interferers like military interferes in government institutions, they are 
more likely to interfere in the court to stop any coercive actions against the military 
member. Thus, the IAA is expected to face difficulties if the debtor is military. As The 
armed force is considered as a vital supporter of the economy. For event, there was 
commerce chamber named Yemeni Economic Corporation (YECO).83 This implies 
that the military individuals do commerce which in the event that there is a commercial 
dispute between the military party and non-native investor or even local, the 
enforcement of IAA may not be effected since the military party is more likely to resort 
to his own tribe to secure him/her from the competent court’s coercive actions as the 
most of the military individuals come from tribes.84 Corruption comes from the support 
of the patronage and alliance, particularly those who have control that is more likely 
to abuse it in their support.85 
Yemen needs more financial aid to support its depressed economy.86 However, the 
donors do not trust the corrupt government to receive assistance and employ it for the 
public interest.87 This leads to less aid from Western countries and Gulf Cooperation 
Countries (GCC).88 Also, FDI has been stunted as the investors are not confident to 
invest in an environment that lacks transparency and sufficient institutions.89 
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According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Yemen is one 
of the least transparent countries, which ranks number 161 out of 175.90 
Through an interview with respondents of COCA in the matter of the importance of 
independence, good integrity, and transparency in the Central Organization for Control 
and Auditing (COCA). Respondent 11stated: 
[With] Politicians, there is no transparency. There is exploitation because Yemeni 
Central Organization for Control and Auditing (Act No. 39) 1992 prevents 
communication with civil society organizations and the media. 
 Respondent 12 said that: 
Independence, integrity and transparency exercised 90% in our 
administrative actions. But unfortunately, we lack media, so 
citizens are unaware of the role of COCA because the law prevents 
us to declare any information to the society without the approval of 
the head of COCA. 
Respondent 12 added: 
We have found serious corruption issues that affect the public 
funds but when we referred the case to the Prosecutor's Office we 
were surprised he dismissed our case under the reason of no 
evidence.  Despite our awareness of its clarity, prosecutors rarely 
justify the reason behind the dismissal of the case. 
While Respondent 13 stated that: 
 Transparency is restricted. The laws prevent us to communicate 
with the media, as the media follows political parties, so they use 
the information for libel and political purposes.91 
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Furthermore, according to respondents of PFP that the researcher met to examine the 
importance of independence, good integrity, and transparency important value in the 
Public Funds Prosecution (PFP).  
Respondent 8 Stated “Yes, practicing transparency is valuable 
because without it may lead to incorrect procedures or breach of 
duty,” Respondent 9 Stated “We practice independence, good 
integrity, and transparency in PFP,” while Respondent 10 stated 
“Our department practices independence, good integrity, and 
transparency in our operations”.92 
In addition, According to respondents of the academicians that the researcher 
conducted to survey information on the independence, good integrity, and 
transparency practiced in the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies.  
Respondent 4 said “The practice is rare and whoever practices it 
faces difficulties such as transferring from office or creating 
problems for him or her”, while respondent 5 Stated “Such things 
are not practiced”. 
The interview from COCA shows the majority of the respondents confirmed the 
independence, good integrity, and transparency are restricted, especially Yemeni 
Central Organization for Control and Auditing (Act No. 39) 1992 which prevents the 
COCA department to communicate with the society in order to be aware of their 
operations. On the other hand, majority of respondents through interview from PFP 
confirmed the practice of independence, good integrity, and transparency. This 
estimates that independence, good integrity, and transparency are practiced in Yemen 
at rate of only 50%. However, the interview with the academicians is inconsistent with 
the view of PFP that independence, good integrity, and transparency are not practiced 
in Yemen. At best, this estimates that independence, good integrity, and transparency 
                                                     
92 Interview with Public Funds Prosecutions, December 6-23-27, 2016. 
 
283 
are practiced in Yemen not at rate of 50%, at 25%. This rate confirms what has been 
supported in the theory which considered Yemen as one of the lowest country in terms 
of independence, good integrity, and transparency in the government institutions, as 
well as accurate statistics is totally lacking. Independence, good integrity, and 
transparency are very important to be practiced in government institutes to have good 
performance. Therefore, lacking such importance elements will adversely affect the 
impartiality and independence of the judiciary and all other institutions. Lack of 
independence, integrity, and transparency will lead to unfair and unequal treatment 
among citizens.  
 
It is necessary to relate the institutional legal framework in charge of corruption to the 
enforcement of IAA in Yemen because the rampant corruption in COCA and PFP will 
not only have negative effects on such institutions. It adversely affect all the 
government institutions, including the judiciary. The researcher can support this 
argument by referring to Asian Institute of Management that has shown through 
studies that corruption leads to the weakness of government’s institutions as well as 
serves as an impediment to the development of FDI.93 Thus, the enforcement of IAA 
in Yemen will fail because the court interference to enforce IAA against the debtor 
party is a major problem. Hence, the corruption impediment will lead to failure to 
enforce IAA in Yemen. This argument is based on Gary’s theory, that is, corruption in 
some countries makes the arbitration of the international commercial issues 
unacceptable in the national courts of those corrupt countries.94 
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5.5 Anti-Corruption Laws and Agencies 
The Anti-Corruption Laws play an important function in combating corruption in 
government institutions because it is abundantly clear that the spread of corruption 
negatively affects the implementation of rules of law.95 Currently, Yemen has enacted 
some Anti-Corruption Laws to reduce or overcome rampant corruption such as Law 
No. (17) Of 2013, which amends some articles of Law No. (1) For the Year 2010 
Concerning Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and Law No. 
39 of 2006 on Anti-Corruption. Furthermore, it establishes organization for the 
purpose such as Central Organization for Control and Auditing, Public Funds 
Prosecution, and National Authority for Combating Corruption. However, these laws 
and organizations are not sufficiently effective as there is no enforcement, which will 
be discussed further in more detail.96 Moreover, the heads of the legal system are 
weak.97 The Parliament which has no ability to challenge the Executive body on the 
matters like corruption or the breach of the law because the legislature is influenced 
by the Executive Branch.98  Without separation of powers, it is hard to gain 
independence to make sufficient decisions based on sound decision making. 
The poor accountability of corrupt officials is confirmed through an interview of 
Respondent 1 stated that: 
Anti-Corruption Laws are legislated to protect the corrupt officials 
because we have never heard of any minister or senior official been 
held accountable or convicted. Because of granted immunity, there 
are a lot of corrupt officials transferred to the Consultative Council 
instead of being prosecuted.  
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The strict laws will help to prevent committing crimes such as interfering in the judicial 
operations. This will contribute to reform the judiciary. The independence of the 
judiciary will lead to positive effects on the enforcement of IAA. In this position the 
creditor party will enforce IAA without outside interferences or impediments. 
Especially, if creditor party made an application of the enforcement at the court with 
attach the requirements under section 60 of YAA as well as the debtor party has no 
defence based on the grounds provided in sections 53 and 55 of YAA. However, the 
Yemeni constitution provides the independence of the judiciary and the Penal Code 
punishes of that. The most function is that the laws must not only be written but, shall 
be practiced.  On the other hand, the laws have to be amended in order to reform all 
government institutions. It has to repeal all sections that exempt politicians from 
investigation or provide them immunity. Such as section 7 excluded the jurisdiction of 
COCA to take any action against the breaches committed by ministers, deputy 
ministers, and governors; they can only make a report about it to the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister.99 Such section encourages politicians to get involved 
in misuse of power and utilization of public funds as their own private property. This 
theory is confirmed by the scholar Syed Hussein Alatas that there are specific factors 
that cause corruption such as absence of accountability and absence of the Anti-
Corruption Agencies .100 
There are accusations related to corruption, but without trial because the accused 
persons are considered too powerful to be trialed. The Supreme Judicial Council has 
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no sufficient staff to deal with corruption cases.101 Yemen needs to increase 
transparency, accountability, anti-corruption laws, and independence of the judiciary. 
The government itself is unwilling to enforce the court’s orders against persons in 
authority, which means the judiciary lacks independence.102 
Fighting corruption in Yemen is ineffective because the Yemeni Government is 
unwilling to challenge the widespread corruption. This is confirmed by Respondent 6, 
who has stated “Fighting corruption needs good governance and a stronger political 
will. Otherwise, we will stay as camels wander in the desert”.103 The researcher notices 
that the government survives along with corruption so they misuse the delegated power 
to gain more allies. However, at the end, all persons in authority and citizens will lose 
like what happened in terms of destruction during the Arab Spring which also affected 
Yemen. In addition, the researcher analysed that the strategies of the states that help 
acts of neglect and don't mean to fight the corruption in order to keep alliance together 
with the powerful individuals. Often, separation of power does not exist in corrupt 
countries. Thus, the judiciary is considered as a part of executive in such corrupt 
countries. This could be seen in this study, the anti-corruption agencies have no power 
to investigate highly placed officers in corrupt case, particularly Yemeni Occupants of 
the Senior Posts Act 1995 (OSPA) which limits jurisdiction of the Supreme National 
Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) to investigate politicians unless two-
third of the parliament withdrew the immunity of such ministers, deputy ministers, 
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governors and the likes. This very complicated procedures is in place in order to 
protect the politicians from justice.  
In addition, the politicians in corrupt countries do not practice the principle of 
separation of power because the judiciary will set aside their illicit choices and will 
shield the investors from unfairness of the state and its revocation of its obligations. 
The researcher analysed that the politicians breached the contract with Desert Line 
Projects L.L.C because of corruption. Particularly, when the arbitral tribunal rendered 
the arbitral award in favour of the claimant, however, the court failed to enforce it. 
This means that there was high level behind non-enforcement of IAA. It is necessary 
to refer to the case of Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen,104 in this case 
the place seat of the arbitration was in Yemen. The arbitral tribunal rendered the 
international arbitral award in favour of the claimant, which was against the 
government. The respondent applied to set aside IAA while the claimant applied to 
enforce IAA. However, the Yemen court failed to enforce the international arbitral 
award. Especially, it could not determine any ground in the respondent’s defence to 
set aside the arbitral award based on section 53 or 55 of YAA. The court intentionally 
procrastinated the enforcement without giving any reasonable justification. 
There are four agencies are officially in charge of anti-corruption: 
1. The Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA): This agency 
was established according to the Republican Degree No 39/1992 on the Central 
Organization for Control and Auditing.105 The main function of COCA is to 
observe and audit public funds, observe and control the public management, 
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and investigate the corruption claims.106 This organization is responsible for 
financial supervision, supervision over performance, follow-up 
implementation of the plans, legal supervision, and evaluation of legal and 
regulatory conditions.107 It also has the right to file complaints to the judiciary 
against issues that can harm the public interest, after thirty days of informing 
the specific administration to take legal action to fix that problem.108 Thus, it 
observes the performance of the government administrations and 
institutions.109  
The law provides for independence of COCA. Article 22 provides that no 
authority has the right to interfere in the operations of COCA.110 Furthermore, 
the members COCA are not allowed to practice any kind of business which 
may adversely affect the independence of COCA whether in direct or indirect 
approaches.111 However, according to Laili al-Zwaini “COCA is considered as 
a part of the Executive Branch because its members are not held to a decision 
by a judge and do not release information to the public.  They only report such 
corruption cases to the Parliament and the serious ones to the President of the 
State who has power to make his own judgement, even to release the accused 
person without punishment”.112 Clearly, many cases are not prosecuted 
because of political interference.113 Furthermore, section 7 excluded the 
jurisdiction of COCA to take any action against the breaches committed by 
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ministers, deputy ministers, and governors; they can only make a report about 
it to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.114 
Regarding to the political interference on the COCA’s good performance. 
Respondent 11 stated that:  
Yes, there is interference. The local and central authority interfere 
by sending formal letters to withdraw corruption case files. I 
personally suffer from that interference either from the governors or 
the deputies or the ministers. 
Letters from officials sent to COCA, the prosecutor, and the court to acquit the 
accused, Respondent 12 stated: 
COCA is an independent regulatory body, but we are in a developing 
country so get the interventions effect on the COCA operations, we 
aspire to amend the constitution to provide for an independence of 
COCA. We are quite independence in the matter of employment by 
a rate of 75%. Interventions such as minister’s orders to perform 
particular task in his foundation while the orders of COCA supposed 
to come from the President or the Prime Minister, but as a branch 
accept the orders from the governor, and we as an independent are 
supposed to exercise our duties over the Executive Branch, including 
the Governor. There are many officials that order COCA to perform 
particular tasks which supposed to request only. 
While Respondent 13 stated that: 
According to Article (3) of COCA 1992 provides for the 
independence of COCA. The former head of COCA was appointed 
by President of the Republic, and this is a violation and interference 
in the affairs of COCA. The COCA follows the Office of the 
President, and the President belongs to a political party. So, there is 
a lack of independence. 
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All three respondents agreed that the independence of COCA is only in name, 
whereas the politicians interfere in COCA operations and issue orders to 
COCA to carry some tasks. This means that COCA is considered as a branch 
of the Executive Body. Thus, COCA lacks independence which leads to 
negative effects on its operations. 
2. Public Funds Prosecution (PFP): has jurisdiction to conduct the investigation 
relating to the public funds.115 It works as a mediator between COCA and the 
Public Funds Courts (PFCs).116 Whereas, the PFP usually receives the cases 
from COCA in order to file those cases to PFCs, but sometimes receives cases 
from the Attorney General’s office relating to departmental claims under its 
ministries.117 The PFP and COCA are inter-related in the matter of carrying out 
the investigation to find out the evidence.  However, public funds prosecutors 
are not qualified because they lack knowledge of accounting and auditing.118 
Also, their jurisdiction is limited, they cannot investigate against parliament 
members, ministers, deputy ministers, and governors.119 According to Glenn, 
the public funds prosecutors received bribes and there is no evidence of threats 
that force them to dismiss the cases.120 He said evidence have led to 31 cases 
in the last 10 to 15 years but only 18 cases were filed in the court, while 13 
cases were dismissed from trial.121 
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After indictment, the cases are referred to PFCs: this agency was established in 
1996 by residential order to combat the rampant corruption that appeared 
clearly after the Yemeni unification in 1990. Such agency constitutes of three 
judges and located in five provinces that are Sana’a, Aden, Ta’iz, Hadramout, 
and Hodeidah. The main function of PFCs is to combat bribery, fraud, forgery 
and fabricate of legal documents, etc. The operations are not well discharged 
because PFCs get financial support from the Executive Body. 122 
However, all the respondents whom are related to PFPs negate that theory 
through an interview in the matter of the sources of financing for Public Funds 
Prosecution (PFP). If an executive body provides the Public Funds Prosecution 
(PFP), it will lead to intervention in Public Funds Prosecution (PFP). 
Respondents stated that “sources of financing are independent and the 
executive does not interfere in the sources of financing. The only interference 
comes from the politician and the military.” This was confirmed by the 
majority of the three respondents about PFP judges. In short, the majority of 
respondents confirmed the political and military interference. Thus, the good 
performance of PFP will be negatively affected. 
3. The Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC): 
this agency was established according to Yemeni Anti-Corruption ( Act No. 
39) 2006. It was based on the national policy to combat the widespread 
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corruption in the country.123 The main jurisdiction of SNACC can be seen in 
section 8 as follows:124 
1- Receiving any reports or claims relating to corruption. 
2- Receive financial disclosure. 
3- Investigating the corruption matters and bringing them before the court. 
4- Make the public aware of the seriousness of corruption on the national 
economy. 
The SNACC has no authority to try any corruption cases or publish any 
information relating to the public without prior consent from the executive 
body.125 The studies have shown that SNACC does not have sufficient power 
to combat the rampant corruption in the country. It received over 500 claims 
but only investigated at most 25 claims.126 It seems that COCA and SNACC 
are not independent because the executive has absolute power over their 
jurisdiction. This will lead to interference in their performance.127 Such 
practice contravenes section 15 which provides that the SNACC is 
independent, and no any authority or person could interfere in its operations.128 
The punishment of contravening this article is an imprisonment not exceeding 
five years or a fine not exceeding five million riyals.129 For questions, SNACC 
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cooperated with Public Funds Prosecution and has mostly the same function of 
COCA.130 
Through an interview of Respondent 6 that the researcher conducted regarding 
to influence of politicians on SNACC’s good performance. Stated that “they 
do not intervene directly because the law prohibits it, but we are still suffering 
from pressures”. In addition, in the matter of interference in SNACC affairs 
from the military. Stated that: 
There is pressure put on us because of the intervention of the 
military. We are a part of a public system which all state institutions 
suffer from imbalances, wrong policies, and pressures. We fight such 
pressure and intervention, but this has adversely affected our 
performance and operations. Also, the politicians lack intention to 
eradicate or at least reduce corruption. 
Furthermore, the sources of financing for SNACC. If an executive body 
provides SNACC with resources, it will lead to intervention in SNACC. Stated 
that:  
We have an independent budget in name.  But, as our authority 
grants it, there is a lack of independent budgeting and that impact 
our operations. Such adverse effects exist like not paying expenses 
for the operations such as investigation. So, defaulting on payments 
of expenses makes anyone susceptible to temptation. Also, 
Occupants of the Senior Posts Act 1995 (OSPA) limit our 
jurisdiction to investigate politicians unless we grant the immunity. 
The above answers confirmed the theory that SNACC is not independent. The 
politicians and military interfere in its operations. Undoubtedly, such 
interference will adversely affect the SNACC operations and good 
performance to fight corruption. Also, regarding the sources of financing, 
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SNACC is not independent as far as the executive estimates the budget and 
grants it. This will lead SNACC to be a part of the Executive Branch. 
Moreover, OSPA violates the constitution because Article 41 provides all 
citizens are equal before the law. So, the laws have to be amended. 
4. Judicial Inspection Board (JIB): is a part of the Ministry of Justice. It was 
established based on sections 92 and 97 of the Law on Judicial Power 1991.131 
One of the functions of JIB is to review courts’ operations, judges’ 
performance, and complaints against judges.132 The JIB evaluates the judges 
and the Supreme Judicial Council has the jurisdiction of disciplinary action.133 
However, JIB operations seem to be ineffective as there are no published 
statistic about corruption cases.134 Its performance is considered weak because 
there no corruption issues have been addressed.135 This is especially true with 
regard to its role in the systematic inspection of courts.136 Even though there 
are some complaints of citizens against corrupt judges, no action is taken by 
JIB.137 
The researcher noticed such faults through an interview with a member 
respondent of JIB in providing statistics about number of judges, or court 
officers that have been prosecuted in the Supreme Judicial Council. The 
Judicial Inspection Board (respondent 7) stated that “there are no statistics”.138 
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This means that the JIB operations are completely ineffective and inefficiently 
administered, if they do not have any statistics about the corrupt judges or court 
officers who have been prosecuted in the Supreme Judicial Council. 
Moreover, the JIB is infiltrated by members of the intelligence service.139 
Politicians also interfere in the JIB operations.140 According to a respondent 7 
regarding to the political interference on the JIB’s good performance. Stated 
that: 
Most of the heads of PFP are intelligence service; this is the justice 
in Yemen. In 2011, the courts have been closed in a number of 
provinces and we met the President of the Republic of Yemen Abd 
Rabo.  We also claimed against three of the intelligence services 
work in the Supreme Judicial Council. We suffer from this 
interference if the President of the Republic until recently is a head 
of the Supreme Judicial Council, what do you expect? There is no 
evidence but that we practiced. The appointments of judges are taken 
in favour of the intelligence service. 
The interview of the JIB confirmed the theory that provides the JIB operation 
is weak as no response of the citizens’ complaints against the corrupt judges 
and the inspections over the courts are irregular. Also, the politicians clearly 
interfere in the judicial affairs. 
Anti-corruption efforts, which focused exclusively on launching traditional initiatives 
such as issuing another ineffective law, launching a new campaign, or setting up 
another authority for this purpose.141 It requires an integrated approach to governance 
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that tackles corruption systematically, and addresses networks of abuse and 
corruption.142 This approach must be characterized by a strong judiciary.143 It means 
that anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary are complementary to each other. 
Fighting corruption will not succeed without investigating the impediments on these 
government institutions. Thus, the researcher suggest that anti-corruption agencies 
should come out with solutions regarding the enforcement of IAA. This is because the 
researcher is aware that the same impediments which adversely affect the anti-
corruption agencies also adversely affect the judiciary as well. According to Asian 
Institute of Management, corruption leads to the weakness of government’s 
institutions as well as serves as an impediment to the development of FDI.144 Yemen 
needs an appropriate environment for FDI along with less corruption, effective laws 
to protect rights of individuals and businesses, and transparency.145 Therefore, as 
corruption negatively affects all the governments institutions, the impediments 
institutional legal framework in charge of corruption are adversely affect the 
enforcement of IAA through its negative effect on the court system. The study, thus, 
to improve the arbitration system in Yemen, particularly, the most important stage, 
that is, the enforcement of IAA. Throughout the interviews of the Central Organization 
for Control and Auditing (COCA), Public Funds Prosecution (PFP), the Supreme 
National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), Academicians, Arbitrator, 
Judicial Inspection Board (JIB), and the Court of Appeal judges, are confirmed that 
the impediments which adversely affect the anti-corruption agencies are the casual link 
that negatively affect the enforcement of IAA and the judicial operations as a whole. 
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According to Anselmo Reyes, if the judiciary is involved in the corruption, then 
arbitration reform will be difficult.146 Thus, this study reinforces the position by having 
probative value with precise and multiple evidence that corruption is one of the main 
impediments which led to failure of the enforcement of IAA in Yemen. It is argued 
that the arbitration system will succeed and improve in Yemen by eliminating on the 
corruption in all the government institutions.  
5.6 The Judiciary and the Enforcement of the Law  
Indeed, the judicial institution is a very important force in increasing foreign and local 
investments.147 This can be achieved through accountability, transparency, and 
integrity.148 However, the judiciary is not independent of the executive body so it is 
incapable of combating corruption as far as the executive body interferes in the affairs 
of the judiciary.149 The judiciary is not sufficient to conduct commercial disputes 
because of weak enforcement of the law.150 If the one of the disputed parties is 
political, the party who gives the judgement in his favour may lose his right if the 
second party is powerful or has a relationship with political man.151 Clearly, the 
principle of all citizens are equal before the law is not practiced.152 The Sheikh can 
interfere to release the offending tribal man from the prison153, and then the Sheikh 
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may apply his own tribal judgement.154 As a result, many claimants lose their rights 
because of corrupt practices by powerful people.155 This is confirmed by Syed Hussein 
Alatas, the society that suffers from corruption is adversely affected by unequal 
judicial performance.156 Business cases that are hard to settle are more encouraged to 
resort to tribal protection mechanisms. Prosecutors admit that the judicial system is 
affected by political interference and corruption and judgements are not enforceable, 
unless you are General People’s Congress member or belong to a tribe to protect your 
rights.157 The judicial systems weakness in matters of taking coercive actions to 
enforce others’ rights has negative effect toward attractiveness of FDI.158 Hence, the 
Yemenis prefer to settle their dispute by tribal law instead of the formal law because 
they do not fully trust the state enforcement as far as the corruption is widespread in 
government institutions.159  Corruption is notable in Yemen whereas 60% of the court 
judgements were not enforced.160 The studies Al-Zwaini have shown that 60% of 
judgements are not enforced.161 
According to a member respondent of JIB, in the matter of complaints come to him 
that related corrupt judge like receiving bribery. Said that: 
Sometimes the complaints are frivolous, so we ask the complainants 
to provide an authentication.  Most of the complaints are malicious 
as the complainants do not have evidence. We suffer from a lack of 
evidence. Sometimes the judge has a broker, and also suffer from a 
lack of accountability. We found issues with judges because of 
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corruption. I personally attended two cases against two judges who 
were convicted of corruption. 
The respondent confirmed the theory that bribery adversely affects justice in Yemen 
as far as there are some cases that have convicted the some corrupt judges. Hence, as 
long as bribery adversely affected the justice in Yemen so the enforcement of IAA will 
fail as the bribery will be an obstacle. The debtor party is more likely to pay bribe to 
the enforcement judge to escape from implementation. On the other hand, the creditor 
party has to pay more than the debtor party to enforce IAA. In reality, the party who 
pays more, is likely to win. Thus, the enforcement of IAA is usually procrastinated. 
According to Anselmo Reyes, the enforcement of the arbitral award faces difficulties 
in Indonesia. It often requires separate judicial order to force the debtor party to 
implement it.162 Such procrastination of non-enforcement is to give opportunity to the 
judges and court officials to receive bribery.163 
All in all, the enforcement of laws on commercial issues is insufficient as the judicial 
bias to the official persons, so the commercial private sector faces difficulties because 
of such widespread corruption.164 According to Gary, corruption in some countries 
makes the arbitration of the international commercial issues unacceptable in the 
national courts of those corrupt countries.165  
The Ministry of Human Rights is claiming to infringe others’ rights such as trespassing 
on properties, imprisoning people without trial, and non-enforcement of the court’s 
judgements.166 A study conducted in 2008 by WorldPublicOpinion.org Poll among 
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people in 19 countries show that 86% agreed that the people’s rights could be enforced 
based on the measure of power of the country.167 Therefore, the security and the orders 
implemented rely on the strong power of the state.168 Like Yemen, the inability of the 
military to control all regions of the country led to a fragile state.169 The studies have 
proved that Yemen is a fragile state based on various criteria such as ineffectiveness 
of the state, corruption, violence of some groups like tribes and Al-Qaeda, and less 
developed countries.170 Stable countries that have sovereignty over all its regions, have 
the ability to enforce the law and settle disputes according to the provided systematic 
rules.171 Thus, as far as the state is fragile it is more likely to enforce the IAA against 
the debtor party would not be implemented. Especially, in regions that are uncontrolled 
by the military or the regions the under the control of tribal men.  
5.7 The Independence of the Judiciary 
The effective legal system is a fundamental element to encourage the FDI as well as 
to protect the business environment so that the foreign investors could be assured of 
the protection of their property and rights as a whole.172 The constitution provides the 
independence of the judiciary.  Article 149 provides that the judges are only subject to 
the law and the judiciary body is independent of all other bodies, such as the executive 
body or legislative body. The same article states that interference in the judicial affairs 
is considered as a crime that must be punished. Also, section 187 of Yemeni Penal 
Code provides that those official persons and whoever are strictly prohibited to give 
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recommendations or interfere in judicial procedures and processes; doing so is 
punishable with not more than three years. However, the judiciary is constitutionally 
independent from other branches on paper, witch in reality there is no application of 
what is written in the constitution.173 The judiciary is considered as a part of the 
executive body.174 The President of the Republic is the Head of the Supreme Judicial 
Council so the executive interferes in the judicial administration.175 The appointments 
of judges more depend on the political alliances than qualifications.176 Thus, the 
executive is the authority that indirectly appoint and remove the judges.177 The judicial 
power is weakened as the judiciary loses control of overseeing the places of detention 
and investigation.178 So, the accountability is not effective because of the lack of 
independence of the judiciary and the impact of corruption on the judiciary’s good 
performance.179 
According to an interview conducted with the Court of Appeal Judges to survey the 
independence, good integrity, and transparency practiced in the Yemeni judiciary. 
 Respondent 1 stated that “Yes, [they are] practiced, but not in 
general because of the spread of corruption in the country,” 
Respondent 2 stated “There are violations such as attacks on judges, 
non-implementation of the judgements of the judiciary among 
government agencies, obstruction of some issues such as failing to 
cooperate with the judiciary to communicate with foreign diplomatic 
agencies and companies to implement judicial orders and 
judgements. This obstructs justice,” while Respondent (3), stated 
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“No, interventions exist as the conviction and sentence according to 
the law, with the trial held in public”. 
In addition, the researcher gained information from the same above respondents, 
regarding to the sources of financing for the judiciary. If the executive body provides 
the judiciary financially, it will lead to intervention in the judiciary.  
Respondent 1 stated that: 
There is supposed to be an independent judiciary according to the 
budget, but the executive branch funds the buildings and equipment. 
This leads to interference in the judiciary by the executive branch. 
Respondent 2, stated: 
The executive does not fund the judiciary, but the executive estimates 
the judicial budget to intervene in the judicial operation. This 
estimation goes through the Minister of Justice, who is the executive 
delegate to exercise broad powers in the judiciary's budget. This 
leads to interference to the judicial affairs. Sometimes, the executive 
branch refuses to give the judiciary its completed budget as a result 
of plans make by the executive. Resulting in failure of the judiciary 
to set up courts and operating expenses”, while Respondent (3), 
stated that “the judiciary has an independent budget, the executive 
does not fund the judiciary. 
Thus, the majority of the respondents of the Court of Appeal judges at the rate of two 
out of three confirmed the theories that demonstrate political interference, and a lack 
of independence, good integrity, transparency, and an independent budget. The 
independence of the judiciary and impartiality are fundamental elements to achieve 
justice. Therefore, the creditor party will lose his rights to enforce the arbitral award 
in Yemen because the judiciary lack of independence and impartiality. This argument 
matches with This argument is based on Gary’s theory, that is, corruption in some 
countries makes the arbitration of the international commercial issues unacceptable in 
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the national courts of those corrupt countries.180 Also, Anselmo Reyes stated that if the 
judiciary is involved in corruption, then arbitration reform will be difficult.181 Hence, 
the arbitration system, particularly, the enforcement of IAA will not succeed in 
Yemen, unless it overcomes the corruption in all government institutions, including 
the judiciary.  
According to Syed Hussein Alatas, fighting corruption is only successful if the 
government cooperates with the anti-corruption commission in the investigation of the 
serious corruption issues.182 The investigation covers issues in policy, economy, 
administration, and culture.183 Furthermore, the studies have shown that the law alone 
is inefficient to fight the corruption if the politicians are corrupt.184 Thus, fighting 
corruption must be a joint cooperation between the legislative, judicial and the 
executive branches. 
Lack of accountability means the country is unstable.185 According to Garry, some 
national courts are incompetent to settle international commercial issues because of 
the lack of judiciary independence.186 The judiciary is the first institute that must be 
reformed to combat corruption so the judges have to an appointment based on precise 
criteria of qualifications.187 Unfortunately, respondent 1, respondent 5, and respondent 
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7,188 suggested that “to reform the judiciary must separate it from any appointments 
and interventions of any intelligence service”. 
FDI can be attracted by a secure environment, an official system without tribal 
interference, and a police system that supports the court judgements beyond the local 
power.189 Also, Yemen is insecure, which adversely affects judicial independence as 
Al-Qaeda terrorists exist in Yemen.  Many terrorist attack on several vital areas show 
this is true.190  Terrorism is a serious issue that threatens the security and the stability 
of Yemen.191 Terrorists thrive because the military is weak as well as the government 
fails to overcome the political and economic problems.192 Indeed, the situation became 
worse after the Revolution of 2011, so Yemen has a big challenge to become more 
secure.193 The stability could be achieved through improvement on the military and 
separating it from the ruling family control, the tribes, and the political parties. The 
neutrality of the army could contribute to reviving trade as security is a main factor to 
attract FDI.194  
5.8 The Politicians’ Interference in the Judiciary 
The judiciary is an extension of the Executive body; the Executive supervises and 
administers the Supreme Judicial Council, so the judicial system is dependent on it. 
Moreover, the judiciary staff is employed according to party affiliations.195 According 
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to an interview of the Court of Appeal judges that the researcher conducted to gain any 
interference from politicians on the judge’s function. 
Respondent 1 stated “Some interference exists from politicians,” 
Respondent 2 stated “at the private level politicians did not interfere 
in my work, but on a general level, political interference in the 
judiciary happens”, Respondent 3 stated “There is no interference”. 
The majority of the respondents confirmed the theory that the politicians interfere in 
the judiciary.  Even if there was rampant interference, many people would be reluctant 
to admit it, for fear of retaliation. Thus, if the debtor party has good relationship with 
politicians, they will interfere to in the judge’s operations to stop any coercive actions 
towards the enforcement of international arbitral award. The independence of the 
judiciary is vital to have effective arbitration system in Yemen. Particularly, the 
enforcement of IAA is the vital stage in the arbitration, so if the politicians will 
interfere at the last stage to impede the enforcement of IAA, at that point, the 
arbitration system is vain. 
The major barrier to challenge the improvement of the judiciary is the political 
interference as well as tribalism which replace the official law in solving some 
disputes.196 Even though, the law punishes with a term not more than three years or a 
big fine for those who misuse their position and breach the law for their personal 
benefit or on behalf of another.197 The judiciary cannot enforce the law because of 
executive interference whereas the judges are not protected from arbitrary actions that 
are more likely to be taken by authorized persons in case the commercial court judges 
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did not listen to them or give a judgement against them for such actions like 
transferring the judges from higher level court to lower level court as a punishment.198 
The researcher has found one case of arbitrary dismissal through an interview to 
examine the protection of judges against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or 
transfer. Respondent 1 stated that: 
I have been removed from office because of my opinion in case I was 
member of a committee, until the Relieving the Head of the Supreme 
Judicial Council from office, which a new official issued a sentence 
to cancel the previous decision by Supreme Judicial Council 
decision. 
So, the judge is not protected against any aggressive actions that may punish him for 
taking a decision against politicians’ favour. Therefore, the creditor party will lose his 
rights to enforce the arbitral award in Yemen if the debtor has good relationship with 
political man. Indeed, even the judge will inclination for the gathering who has great 
association with government officials if there should be an occurrence of political 
obstruction. The judge won't manage a ruling against government officials. Politicians 
will probably rebuff such judge by aggressive actions. Consequently, the 
implementation of IAA will fail in Yemen as a result of political obstruction. 
5.9 The Importance of Separation of Power 
The government has to rule the country by the law.199 This means the government 
jurisdiction is subject to the law. The separated jurisdiction between the executive and 
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the judiciary is very important for reform and to fight corruption.200 The independence 
of the judiciary should be assured by a judicial committee that appoints the judges 
based on their experience and merit.201 The power must be separated among the three 
authorities. The absence of the separation of power leads to interference by the 
executive in the judiciary.202 The independence of the judiciary must not only be 
written on paper but should be seen to be applied.203 The independence of the judiciary 
is not enough to protect the rule of the law but such independence has to be 
practiced.204 The judiciary has to reassure the people that their rights are reserved by 
the law.205 The investor or the individual has to refer to the court if his/her rights 
infringed as the court is the guardian of the rule of the law.206 The judiciary is the last 
authority for the victim to refer to for protection of the rights.207 As in the arbitration 
system the court assistance and control is very important to make the arbitration system 
succeed.  Thus, the creditor party has to refer to the court in case the lost party refused 
to comply with IAA voluntarily. The people will not trust the settlement of their 
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disputes by the court if the independence of the judiciary is not enforced. As a result, 
people will refer to other mechanisms to settle their disputes. According to Omar 
Bawazir, Yemeni people do not fuly trust the court system because of the multiple 
factors that adversely affect its operations such as non-enforcement of the laws, 
political interference, corruption, and so on.208 Hence, Yemeni people prefer to settle 
their disputes through the TADRM than formal court.  
The non-independence of the judiciary and the weakness of the judiciary will make 
the laws vain.209 Such things will infringe on the individual rights, it has to make 
effective judicial review to ensure the executive is administered subject to the rule of 
law.210 The judiciary is the last tool to ensure the achievement of the justice. The 
judiciary should have control and supervision over the prisons to prevent any illegal 
detention and ensure the enforcement of the law.211 Such control and supervision will 
protect individual rights constitute a check on politicians if they wish to breach the 
law.212 In non-democratic countries, the rule of law is not practiced, it has to take 
consideration of the supporters’ recommendation.213 This does not mean that the rule 
of law does not practiced at all among people but it is rarely supported by the state. 
Therefore, fairness and justice will not be achieved unless the judiciary operates under 
full autonomy as provided by the constitution and the law. The politicians must 
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practice their authority subject to the law. Exceeding their authority by interfering in 
the judiciary will adversely affect the independence of the judiciary and the justice. 
The separation of power has to operate alongside with the government’ cooperation 
and strong state by spread the state sovereignty over that all territory. Handing over 
the security of some areas to the tribes or other powerful groups will not help the 
judiciary to perform its operations. As court takes coercive actions against the lost 
party so has to give the order to the police to arrest the lost party or seize his/her assets.  
In addition, the absence of corruption, the enforcement of the law, and security prevent 
the government from misuse of power.214 
5.10 The Military Interference in the Judiciary 
The Yemeni law prohibits any interference in the judiciary from the military.215 Any 
attempt to influence the judge to decide in favour of any party whatever either by oral 
intervention, act, or/and any way is considered as insulting to the judiciary and the 
punishment is imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or a fine.216 
Furthermore, any government servant who interferes with a judge or the court in favour 
of any of the disputed parties or harms any of the disputed parties through 
recommendation, order, or demand, it punishes with imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three years.217 Also, the judge shall be punished by an imprisonment not 
exceeding seven years if he deliberately made a judgement based on a 
recommendation, demand, or bias in favour of one of the disputed parties.218 However, 
it is clear that this dysfunctional practice is still happening, rampantly, the military 
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plays an important role in determining the path of the judiciary; it is one of the main 
factors that negatively affect the independence of the judiciary.219 The military not 
only controls half to two-third of the seats of the Supreme Judicial Council but also 
gives recommendation on the judges’ appointments and transfer.220  Moreover, the 
high military officers often function as judges; they have their own prisons and can 
imprison their opponents without trial.221 As a consequence of the military interference 
the FDI inflows is very low in Yemen222 because of such interference leads to 
instability in the country.223 
According to an interview of the Court of Appeal judges that the researcher conducted 
to provide information regarding to the interference by military on the judge’s good 
function. 
Respondent 1, stated that “sometimes there are interventions of army 
officers when the accused from military unite. Sometimes the army 
officers rejected our orders which leads us to contact those higher 
than him/her or we raise the issue to JIB to communicate with the 
Ministry of Defense in this regard", Respondent (2) stated that 
“military intervenes often,” while Respondent (3) stated that “no 
military interference happens”.  
Hence, the majority of the respondents of the Court of Appeal Judges confirmed the 
theory that the military interferes in the judiciary operations.  Given the power of the 
military, it is wise to presume that there are even more untold stories that people are 
afraid to come forward with. Hence, the debtor is more likely to refer to his/her military 
unit to protect him/her against any court legal actions. As a consequences, the 
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enforcement of IAA will fail in Yemen because of the military interference and 
disobedience of the court system. The court assistance is major importance to enforce 
IAA in case the debtor party refused to enforce it voluntarily. This argument is based 
on Gary’s theory, that is, corruption in some countries makes the arbitration of the 
international commercial issues unacceptable in the national courts of those corrupt 
countries.224 
Regrettably, the soldiers who are descendants from tribes have loyalty to their own 
tribes more than the national interest.225 This could be seen with Arab Spring, when 
those supporting Sheikhs of 2011 Revolution among the soldiers withdraw from 
military barracks and joined their own tribes.226 Also, the military is not neutral as it 
is involved in the corruption, political, and tribal alliances through looking for 
beneficiaries from some traders and allegiance to some official persons.227 According 
to an interview with an official, “we aware that the military is not neutral but we could 
not oppose that or even try to reform the problem.228 Otherwise, we would be 
dismissed from our jobs and no one wants to violate his/her rights.229 Additionally, a 
lot of ghost soldiers are enrolled in the military and receiving monthly salaries.230 
Hence, any attempt to layoff such ghost without compensation will lead to chaos.”231 
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At the end of the chapter, the researcher answered research question three and achieved 
research objective four. Primary data of the interviews and the secondary data, found 
that the influence of corruption does impede the formation and function of competent 
courts towards the enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen. It is 
commonly known that the court is the most fundamental element to enforce the IAA. 
Thus, the judiciary in the enforcing state has to be independent and impartial. 
However, the research found that some violation in the Yemeni Judiciary and the 
public system occurs as follows: 
The vast majority of the respondents confirmed that the independence of COCA, PFP, 
SNACC, and JIB is only ink on paper. The politicians and the military interfere in their 
operations.  We can notice from interviews from COCA, PFP, SNACC, and JIB that 
the majority of the respondents confirmed functional independence, good integrity, 
and transparency are rarely practiced. The politicians and military are adversely affect 
their operations. Also, the sources of financing SNACC is not independent as far as 
the Executive estimates the budget and grants it. Moreover, bribery adversely affects 
the justice system. In addition, the researcher has found some cases of arbitrary 
dismissal against judges because of judgements not in favour of the government. 
Therefore, the judicial system can be considered as a branch of the Executive Body. 
Furthermore, the researcher has found out other adverse effects on the enforcement of 
IAA that are fighting corruption in Yemen is ineffective because the Yemeni 
government is weak. Not only regulations and stricter laws are very important to fight 
the corruption but practice is. In Yemen there is a law which protects the corrupt 
persons such as OSPA. Even though Article (41) of the Constitution provides that all 
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citizens are equal before the law, it does not happen in practice. Also, the fragility of 
the state makes it less likely that IAA would be implemented. This is especially true, 
in the regions that are not controlled by the military or the regions that under the control 
of tribal men. In addition, the intelligence service penetrates the judiciary. 
Anti-corruption agencies receiving complaints. However, it appears that no actions are 
taken. So the people are sceptical whether anti-corruption agencies are serious in 
fighting corruption. These issues debilitate their activities, for example, no reaction to 
the citizens’ complaints against the degenerate judges, and unpredictable reviews over 
the courts. Also, non-enforcement of the law, particularly, non-implementation of 
IAA. 
The solution to all these problems are threefold.  Firstly, there is need to be a willing 
to change, especially on the part of tribal leaders, the military, and other government 
officials. Secondly, the legislative and judicial system need to have complete 
separation of powers, to be able to manage their affairs without interferences.  Thirdly, 
there needs to make economic arguments that a Yemen government that plays by the 
rules could attract more foreign direct investment, and hence a better economy and 
quality of life, than the current system.  How to achieve this is another, much more 





This study set out to investigate the inadequacy of YAA. It contributes to improving 
the arbitration system in Yemen to cope with international arbitration system. 
Especially, the enforcement of IAA. The enforcement of IAA is the most fundamental 
element in the arbitration. The study finds that more efforts from the legislators and 
experts in this field to overcome the inadequacy in YAA. YAA is inadequate so the 
enforcement of IAA will face difficulties to deal with international level of the 
arbitration. 
More importantly, Yemen is non-signatory state to NYC, it is the most fundamental 
agreement with respect to the enforcement of IAA. This study calls the legislators for 
great efforts to rethink about the positive effects that Republic of Yemen will lose 
because of non-ratifying the NYC. 
Furthermore, it contributes to the overall literature on the influence of tribalism on the 
enforcement of IAA. The government is responsible to plan strategies to weaken and 
prevent tribalism in judicial operations and the public system as a whole. In addition, 
the impediment of corruption in the enforcement of IAA is more essential as it 
adversely affect the arbitration system and justice too.  
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Based on international conventions, rules, agreements, and law which found that YAA 
is not able to cope with issues that are related to the enforcement of IAA. YAA failed 
to include some articles that are related to the proceedings and processes of the 
enforcement of IAA which are important guidelines to the disputing parties, the 
tribunal, and the competent courts in order to treat the disputing parties equally and 
give justice to all. Such missed articles are as follows: 
1) Allowing appeal under section 28 to the court against the tribunal decision over 
the agreement validity is inappropriate as the arbitral tribunal understands its 
jurisdiction and has capability to deal with such dispute more than the court may 
do; 
2) Section 53 is insufficient. It lacks paragraphs to provide sections as right for the 
debtor party to resist the enforcement of the arbitral award based on the proper 
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and the arbitral proceedings to each of 
the disputed party as well as the effectiveness of the arbitral award in case of the 
award is not yet binding; 
3) Section 53 of YAA needs to be amended, especially, paragraph (b) which provides 
that the award cannot be enforced if any of the parties is incompetent, such 
paragraph is repeating the same thing as paragraph (a) which provides that the 
resisting party who was an incompetent person at the time of signing the arbitral 
agreement can challenge the arbitral award; 
4) The YAA is silent on the power of the tribunal to impose sanction on the debtor 




5) The right of the disputed parties to exclude or limit the right to appeal or challenge 
the arbitral award as far as UNCITRAL did not oppose the disputed parties’ rights 
to agree on such terms; 
6) What the procedures are, especially the requirements of the appeal against the 
arbitral award before the competent court; 
7) The right of the debtor party to resist enforcement based on the arbitrator’s bias; 
8) The enforcement proceeding, how many days the enforcement takes, the allowed 
time period of the debtor party to appeal against the enforcement of the arbitral 
award, the proceedings to be taken for the enforcement in case of resisting 
enforcement; 
9) What the effectiveness is of the vacated award by the state of the place seat; 
10) What procedures and proceedings are in case of an application to vacate the arbitral 
award in the place seat of the arbitration; 
11) What the effect is in the matter of discovering credible evidence that may change 
the award or the evidence which the award is based on was forged, 
misrepresentation, fraud, or false testimony, and the allowed period to appeal; 
12) The YAA shall include an article which provides the jurisdiction of the foreign 
tribunal to request the Yemeni competent court to take coercive actions to perform 
the award of interim measures of protection; 
13) There should be a re-arbitration in order to correct the minor mistakes instead of 
setting aside the award; 
14) YAA shall mention the allowed period of the debtor party to recourse against the 
award; 
15) YAA shall stipulate the period of time for the enforcement judge to grant the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. 
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As far as the enforcement of the arbitral award is concerned, the researcher examined 
the provisions relating to the enforcement of arbitration laws such as Yemeni 
Arbitration (Act No. 22) 1992, Yemeni Procedure and the Implementation (Act No. 
40) 2002 and international conventions such as Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Riyadh 
Convention for Judicial Cooperation, international laws and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties to identify the inadequacies in YAA. Throughout the discussion of chapter 
three the researcher has found YAA is ineffective and incapable of coping with 
international arbitration and one of the cause of ineffectiveness of arbitration in the 
Middle East, including Yemen, is the lack of sufficient laws of arbitration.1 
Yemen is non-signatory state to the convention. Therefore, non-ratifying the 
convention by Yemen will lead to putting it under exceptional ground of reciprocity 
reservation that provides the right of the signatory-states to refuse the recognition and 
the enforcement of arbitral award that are provided in NYC. The same effect, if the 
arbitral award is rendered outside Yemen the enforcement of the award will base on 
Yemeni Civil Procedure and Implementation (Act No. 40) 2002 that requires some 
requirements to enforce the foreign judgements and awards. Especially, section 4942 
which provides that to enforce foreign decisions, it must be based on the reciprocity 
reservation. Hence, the signatory- states to NYC will not enforce IAA that rendered in 
Yemen. Also, Yemen will recognize and enforce the judgements and awards that are 
rendered in the countries that recognize and enforce awards and judgements rendered 
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in Yemen as well as will not recognize and enforce court judgements and arbitral 
awards are rendered in the countries that do not recognize and enforce judgements and 
awards are rendered in Yemen.  
Non-ratifying the convention is not an immunity for Yemen as well as Yemeni 
businessmen to escape from an execution of agreements. The foreign award will be 
enforced against Yemen based on other laws. The arbitral award made outside Yemen 
can still be enforced against Yemen even though Yemen is non-signatory state to NYC. 
So, based on the previous discussion, Yemen will be the losing party in the following 
situations. First situation Yemen is the losing party of non-ratifying the convention 
because the arbitral award can be enforced against the debtor party outside Yemen. 
Another situation based on Article I (3) that arbitral award made in Yemen cannot be 
enforced in the contracting states of NYC. 
The international law is considered as more superior than the domestic law as it is 
dominant among states over the world. Thus, a state when breaching any rule of 
international law can’t rely on its own domestic laws and sovereignty principle, the 
international law must prevail.3 To be more understanding must refer to article 3 that 
provides international wrongful acts committed by a state must be subject to 
international law.4 Article 27 provides when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility 
towards international agreement can’t justify such failure by its own municipal law,5 
as well as the state can’t claim that its ratification of the treaty led to contravention of 
its own municipal law in order to justify its failure to fulfill its responsibility.6 
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Furthermore, the jurisdictional immunity is not anymore applicable to exempt the state 
activities from execution in the matter of commercial transaction.7 The international 
law replaced extreme state immunity by limited state immunity, which the foreign state 
actions cannot litigate in the court of another foreign state if the matter is relating to 
government action that may lead to negative effects but the foreign state is liable for 
commercial actions and the immunity will not apply in commercial issues.8. 
Moreover, the states that engage in trades with other states, mostly do BITs in order to 
protect the national investors’ rights in case of expropriation of their investment 
rights.9 Such agreements tries to protect the investors of place seat in case of violation 
of the international law, investment rights, enforcement of arbitral awards, whereas the 
legal action could be taken by the original state of the investors against the place seat 
of the investment.10 The disputing parties could refer to the ICSID mechanism if there 
are BITs between the disputed parties, the ICSID mechanism could also apply to settle 
the investment disputes even when one of the disputing parties is not a signatory state 
or not a national of a signatory state.11  
Based on the above international law, treaties, and cases, could mean that Yemen is 
obligated to enforce the IAA whatever it is signatory-state of NYC or not, it cannot 
disappear under an umbrella to escape from commitment and execution whereas the 
sovereign immunity cannot apply as a shield to avoid its consent of entering arbitration 
agreements under argument of violation of the municipal law or non-ratifying NYC. 
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Thus, in the case of non-enforcement of IAA as a result of the adverse effects of 
insufficient YAA, tribalism, corruption, or the like so that the foreign investor could 
refer to his/her original state to take an action of expropriation on behalf. Whereas, 
Yemen has signed 47 Bilateral Investment Treaties with various states around the 
world which stipulates the condition of settlement disputes of the investment among 
the states,12 this means Yemen has no open gate to escape from the execution of IAA. 
Therefore, the researcher could see non-ratifying of the NYC by Republic of Yemen 
leads to negative effects on the Yemeni businessmen and the national economy as a 
whole. 
The tribes are a major constituents of Yemeni society.13 According to Tribalism Index 
Scores (TIS), 2009 Republic of Yemen is ranked at number 7 out of 160 countries in 
the world, figure 1 is considered as the highest rate, while figure 160 is considered as 
the lowest rate.14  Number 7 is a high rate, so this rate is considered as a negative as 
tribes are one of the factors that adversely affect the growing of the Yemeni national 
economy as well as the good performance of the government institutions and they 
perform various illegal acts, such facts are cited by clear evidence in this research. TIS 
classification of highly tribal countries is based on failed states, weak center, 
instability, poverty, violence, and create problems.15 The tribes have influence over 
the society and dominate the positions of government institutions more than the state 
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even though such influence is unofficial.16 Therefore, the government has no 
sovereignty over all land in order to extend its authority and ensuring the application 
of the law.17 Furthermore, the government faced difficulties in implementing its 
policies because it faced with the tribal resistance in case such policies are against the 
tribes’ interest.18 Especially, the tribes that are located in the north of Yemen.19  
Based on Hofstede’ theory, under tribalism there is the cultural dimension of 
collectivism. The cultural dimension exists where there is a huge number of families 
with strong loyalty to protect each other as one group.20 As far as the tribes influence 
the executive body, the enforcement of IAA will fail because of the tribal interference 
to protect their own tribal members against any court coercive enforcement. Therefore, 
Hofstede’ theory is relevant to the problem which the tribal debtor party will refer to 
his/her tribe to secure him/her against the court legal actions. Also, the court lacks 
control over the tribal districts. Undoubtedly, the judicial operations face difficulties 
as long as the government has no sovereignty over all the land. 
Based on Primary data of the interviews and the secondary data, it was found that the 
influence of corruption does impede the formation and function of competent courts 
in the enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen. It is commonly known 
that the court is the most fundamental element to enforce the IAA. Thus, the judiciary 
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Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy (April 2016): 9. 
17 Elham M. Manea, “Yemen, the Tribe and the State,”, This paper was presented to the International 
Colloquium on Islam and Social Change at the University of Lausanne (October 11, 1996), accessed 
May 6, 2017, http://al-bab.com/albab-orig/albab/yemen/soc/manea1.htm. 
18 Peterson, “Tribes and Politics in Yemen,” 7. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind, Vol. 2. 




in the enforcing state has to be independent and impartial. However, the research found 
that some violation in the Yemeni Judiciary and the public system occurs as follows: 
The vast majority of the respondents confirmed that the independence of COCA, PFP, 
SNACC, and JIB is only ink on paper. The politicians and the military interfere in their 
operations.  It can be noticed from interview findings from COCA, PFP, SNACC, and 
JIB that the majority of the respondents confirmed functional independence, good 
integrity, and transparency are rarely practiced. Also, the sources of financing SNACC 
is not independent as far as the Executive estimates the budget and grants it. Moreover, 
bribery adversely affects the justice system. In addition, the researcher has found some 
cases of arbitrary dismissal against judges because of judgements not in favour of the 
government. Therefore, the judicial system can be considered as a branch of the 
Executive Body. 
Furthermore, the researcher has found out other adverse effects on the enforcement of 
IAA: 
1- Fighting corruption in Yemen is ineffective because the Yemeni government 
is weak. Regulations and stricter laws are very important to fight the 
corruption, but in Yemen there are laws which provide protections to the 
corrupt persons such as Yemeni Occupants of the Senior Posts Act 1995 
(OSPA). Even though Article 41 of the Constitution provides that all citizens 
are equal before the law, it does not happen in practice. 
2- The fragile state makes it less likely the enforcement of IAA would not be 
implemented. This is especially true, in the regions that are not controlled by the 
military or the regions that under the control of tribal men. 
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3- The intelligence service penetrates the judiciary. 
These reasons lead to weak their operations such as no response of the citizens’ 
complaints against the corrupt judges, and irregular inspections over the courts. Also, 
it makes it ineffective in fighting corruption, non-enforcement of the law, especially, 
non-implementation of IAA. 
The solution to all these problems remains threefold.  First, there needs to be a 
willingness to change, especially on the part of tribal leaders, the military, and other 
government officials.  Secondly, the legislative and judicial system need to have 
complete separation of powers, to be able to manage their affairs without interferences.  
Thirdly, there needs to be economic arguments made to prove that a Yemen 
government that plays by the rules could attract more FDI, and hence a better economy 
and quality of life, than the current system.  Just how to achieve this is another, much 
more complicated set of questions and answers. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, many recommendations have been concluded. First of all, the 
researcher strongly recommend amendment of YAA as it is insufficient.  The 
recommendation is based on the fact that YAA is found to be insufficient due to lack 
of important sections and paragraphs as mentioned before in the findings. The current 
YAA will impede the enforcement of IAA. Thus, YAA has to be amended to cope 
with international arbitration system. 
Secondly, the researcher strongly advises the Yemeni government to ratify NYC which 
could lead to positive effects on investment and the economy, Yemen cannot be more 
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reserved and careful than 156 states who have ratified NYC. Furthermore, Yemen is a 
signatory state in ICSID, Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, international 
law, BITs. This means that Yemen is obligated under such international conventions, 
international law, and agreements so what is the rationale of non-ratification of NYC? 
Thirdly, to improving the enforcement of IAA in Yemen will reduce the adverse tribal 
influence on the judiciary and the public system as a whole. The government should 
stop giving facilities to the Sheikhs such as monthly salaries, houses, lands, and guards 
or any kind facilities that amounts to misuse of public fund. All citizens must be treated 
equally. The legislature should make strong laws to prevent any interference in the 
judiciary, and must criminalize such interference. The independence of the judiciary 
must not only be in theory but should be seen practically. Last but not the least, the 
government should have plans to socialize the tribes. 
Fourthly, a very important step to be taken in order to improve the enforcement of 
IAA, the judiciary, and anti-corruption agencies is that the state must have a sincere 
intention to fight corruption as well as real application of what the constitution 
provides in terms of the independence of the judiciary from the executive and the 
legislative arm. Also, the parliament should repeal OSPA which limits the jurisdiction 
of COCA and SNACC to investigate politicians. This Act protects the corrupt 
politicians. 
6.3 Opportunities for Future Studies 
Based on the findings of the studies, several recommendations have been made by the 
researcher. Firstly, the advantages and disadvantages of non-ratifying NYC by Yemen. 
The researcher has not found any reasons for Yemen unwillingness to ratify the 
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convention. Especially as the convention allowed the national court of the signatory-
states to refuse to recognize and enforce the award based on reciprocity reservation in 
article 1 (3). Besides, an article V (2) (b) if the award is contradicted with the public 
policy of the country where the recognition and enforcement is sought. 
Secondly, Instability of the country or the weaknesses of the public system are more 
likely to affect on the arbitration system in Yemen and the judiciary as well. This 
recommendation is based on United States Institute of Peace report through a survey 
of some provinces in 2013 which found that 20% of the courts are closed because of 
insecurity and political instability and this rate is expected to increase in other urban 
provinces to 60% for the same reasons.21   
Thirdly, throughout the interviews, the respondents state that the judiciary is 
dominated by the intelligence service. Hence, the study recommends to eliminate the 
influence of the intelligence service on the independence of the judiciary. 
Fourthly, it was found that the Tribal Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
(TADRM) adversely affect the formal arbitration system in Yemen. 
Finally, another challenge facing the enforcement of IAA in Yemen is the lack of 
knowledge and inadequate staff of the Court of Appeal judges and arbitrators to deal 
with international arbitration. 
 
                                                     
21 Gaston, Dispute Resolution and Justice Provision in Yemen’s Transition, 9. 
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Appendix A: The Interview from the Central Organization for Control and 
Auditing (COCA) 
 
Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
College of Law, Government and International Studies (Section A) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 






Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
I. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
II.Would you like to tell me something about your work and your responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
III. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
IV. What is your area of interest?  
 
V. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on the judiciary and 
tribunals. 
1- Can you tell me whether politicians do interfere on the COCA’s good 
performance? 
2- Is there interference in COCA from the military?  
3- Is there interference in COCA from the tribes?  
4- How far important of independence, good integrity, and transparency in 
COCA?  
5-  Is independence of COCA protected by the law? 
6- Are officers of the Central Organization for Control and Auditing COCA 
protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or transfer? 
7- What are the sources of financing for COCA? If the executive body provides 
the judiciary financially, is it lead to intervention in COCA? 
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8- Do you have any suggestions or recommendations will be useful and helpful 
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Appendix B: The Interview from Public Funds Prosecution (PFP) 
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Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 




SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 




Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
 
347 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
VI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
VII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
VIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
IX. What is your area of interest?  
 
X. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption influence on the judiciary 
and tribunals. 
9- Can you tell me whether politicians do interfere on PFP’s good performance? 
10- Is there interference in PFP from the military?  
11- Is there interference in PFP from the tribes?  
12- How far important of independence, good integrity, and transparency 
important value in PFP?  
13-  Is independence of PFP protected by the law? 
14- Are officers of PFP protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or 
transfer? 
15- What are the sources of financing for PFP? If executive body provides PFP, 
is it lead to intervention in PFP? 
16- Do you have any suggestions or recommendations will be useful and helpful 
for this study? 
RESPONDENT     
     ……………………… 
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Appendix C: The Interview from the Supreme National Authority for 
Combating Corruption (SNACC) 
Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
College of Law, Government and International Studies (Section A) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 




Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
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This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
XI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
XII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
XIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
XIV. What is your area of interest?  
 
XV. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on the judiciary and 
arbitration. 
17- Are cases of corruption involving judges, court officials, and lawyers normally 
prosecuted in the courts? 
18- Do you have any statistic about number of judges, court officers, or lawyers 
that have been prosecuted in the court? 
19- What are sanctions impose on the judges, court officer, and lawyers found to 
have committed corrupt practice? 
20- Can you tell me whether politicians interfere on the SNACC’s good 
performance? 
21- Is there interference in SNACC affairs from the military?  
22- Is there interference in SNACC affairs from the tribes?  
23- How far important of independence, good integrity, and transparency 
important value in SNACC?  




25- Are SNACC protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or 
transfer? 
26- What are the sources of financing for SNACC? If executive body provides 
the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption SNACC, is it lead 
to intervention in SNACC? 
27- Do you have any suggestions or recommendations will be useful and helpful 
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Appendix D: The Interview for the Academicians 
Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
College of Law, Government and International Studies (Section A) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 








Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
XVI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
XVII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
XVIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
XIX. What is your area of interest?  
 
XX. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on international 
arbitral award. In addition, this section intends to come up with the 
findings of the interview specifying the difficulties and obstacles which 
both parties may face i.e. either the disputed parties or the arbitrators. 
1- In your experience as an academic lecturer have you any information 
relating to the difficulties in enforcing international arbitral award? 
2- If your answer to question (1) is yes, please elaborate what kind of 
difficulties? 
3- Do you have any information about corruption case relating to the 
arbitration or judiciary? 
4- If your answer is NO to question (3), have you ever heard another an 
academic lecturer has information about corruption case relating to the 
arbitration or judiciary? 
5- If judges or arbitrators are found guilty of corruption charge, what is the 
punishment imposed by the court? 
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6- Do you have any information on interference from politicians regarding 
the arbitration or the judiciary or anti-corruption agencies? 
7- Do you have any information on interference from the military against the 
arbitration or the judiciary or anti-corruption agencies?  
8- Whether the tribalism interference affect the enforcement of international 
arbitral award? 
9- Whether the tribal alternative dispute resolution mechanism affect the 
arbitration system? 
10- Do you think that independence, good integrity, and transparency 
important values in the operations of the arbitration or the judiciary or the 
anti-corruption agencies?  
11- How far practiced of independence, good integrity, and transparency in 
the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies? 
 
12- Do you think that the independence of arbitral tribunals or the judiciary or 
anti-corruption is protected by the law? 
13- Do you think the arbitrators or judges or the members of anti-corruption 
agencies are protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or 
transfer? 
14- Do you know what are the sources of financing the judiciary and arbitral 
tribunals or anti-corruption agencies?  
15- If executive body supports the arbitration or the judiciary or the anti-
corruption agencies financially, do you think it leads to intervention in the 
arbitration or the judiciary or the anti-corruption agencies? 
Section III: EXPERT VIEWS 
Examine the processes and the procedures followed by the tribunal and the 
competent court to enforce the international arbitral awards. 
1- In case where the applicant requests the other party (i.e. the defendant) to 
deposit some amount of money in order to avoid financial damage to the 
applicant (i.e. the defendant) does not comply with the final arbitral awards, 
how does the Tribunal and the competent court deals with this? 
2- What are the remedies available to the applicant (i.e. the seeking party) if the 
defendant fails to comply with the international arbitral awards? 
3- In case if the defendant fails to comply with the IAA and the applicant 
incurred no damage suffered by the plaintiff, will the defendant still be 
punished? Why? 
4- In relation to the arbitral awards issued by the Tribunal or the National Court 
outside Yemen such as to freeze the defendant`s assets in Yemen, what is the 
mechanism followed in this case?  
5- Does the competent court have the power to issue interim measures in 
arbitration taking place outside Yemen to ensure the enforcement of the 
international awards if requested by the applicant of the tribunal? 
6- What are the requirements to request interim measure of protections? 
7- Could the competent court gives assistance to the Tribunal in case of the 
applicant or the tribunal requested interim measure of protections before 
issuing the final awards? 
8- Does the judiciary exercise effective monitoring on the enforcement of the 
international arbitral awards? 
9- Do judges ensure the timely enforcement of international arbitral awards? 
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10- Do you have any suggestions or recommendations that will be useful and 
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Appendix E: The Interview from the Arbitrator 
Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
College of Law, Government and International Studies (Section A) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 







Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
XXI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
XXII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
XXIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
XXIV. What is your area of interest?  
 
XXV. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on international 
arbitral awards. In addition, this section intends to come up with the 
findings of the interview specifying the difficulties and obstacles faced by 
the disputed parties or the arbitrators. 
16- Whether the provisions relating to the enforcement of arbitration laws in 
Yemen are adequate? 
17- In your experience as an arbitrator have you faced difficulties in enforcing 
international arbitral awards? 
18- If your answer to question (1) is yes, please elaborate as to what kind of 
difficulties are? 
19- Is there any interference from politicians on the arbitrator’s good 
function? 
20- Is there any interference from military on the arbitrator’s good function?  




22- Whether the tribal alternative dispute resolution mechanism affect the 
arbitration system? 
23- How far important are independence, good integrity, and transparency to 
the arbitration?  
24- Is arbitration processes independently protected by the law? 
25- Do you believe the arbitration processes in Yemen are protected against 
arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or transfer? 
26- What are the sources of financing for the arbitration? If the executive 
body provides the arbitration financially, is it led to intervention in the 
arbitration processes? 
Section III: EXPERT VIEWS 
Examine the processes and the procedures followed by the tribunal and the 
competent court to enforce the international arbitral awards. 
11- In case where the applicant requests the other party (i.e. the defendant) to 
deposit some amount of money in order to avoid financial damage to the 
applicant (i.e. the defendant) does not comply with the final arbitral awards, 
how does the Tribunal and the competent court deals with this? 
12- What are the remedies available to the applicant (i.e. the seeking party) if the 
defendant fails to comply with the international arbitral awards? 
13- In case if the defendant fails to comply with the IAA and the applicant 
incurred no damage suffered by the plaintiff, will the defendant still be 
punished? Why? 
14- In relation to the arbitral awards issued by the Tribunal or the National Court 
outside Yemen such as to freeze the defendant`s assets in Yemen, what is the 
mechanism followed in this case?  
15- Does the competent court have the power to issue interim measures in 
arbitration taking place outside Yemen to ensure the enforcement of the 
international awards if requested by the applicant of the tribunal? 
16- What are the requirements to request interim measure of protections? 
17- Could the competent court gives assistance to the Tribunal in case of the 
applicant or the tribunal requested interim measure of protections before 
issuing the final awards? 
18- Does the judiciary exercise effective monitoring on the enforcement of the 
international arbitral awards? 
19- Do judges ensure the timely enforcement of international arbitral awards? 
20- Do you have any suggestions or recommendations that will be useful and 
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Appendix F: The Interview from the Judicial Inspection Board (JIB) 
Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
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Universiti Utara Malaysia 
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Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 




Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
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questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
XXVI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
XXVII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
XXVIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
XXIX. What is your area of interest?  
 
XXX. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on the judiciary and 
arbitration. 
28- Are cases of corruption involving judges and court officials normally 
prosecuted in the courts? 
29- Do you have any statistic about number of judges or court officers that have 
been prosecuted in the court? 
30- What are sanctions impose on the judges and court officer found to have 
committed corrupt practice? 
31- Are there complaints come to you that related to corrupt judge like receiving 
bribery? 
32- Can you tell me whether politicians interfere on the judge’s good performance? 
33- Is there interference in judicial affairs from the military?  
34- Whether the tribalism interference affect the enforcement of international 
arbitral award? 
35- How far important are independence, good integrity, and transparency 
important value in JIB?  
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36- Do you Exercise Independence, Integrity and Transparency in the Judicial 
Inspection Abroad? 
37-  Is independence of JIB protected by safeguards of due process in disciplinary 
proceedings? 
38- Is JIB protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or transfer? 
39- What are the sources of financing for JIB? If executive body provides JIB, is 
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Appendix G: The interview from the Court of Appeal judges 
The Interview from the Judicial Inspection Board (JIB) 
 Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir 
PhD Candidate in Law 
School of Law 
College of Law, Government and International Studies (Section A) 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Thank you for your willingness to answer the questions of the interview with regard 
to the study concerns about the Impediments Faced by Yemen in Enforcing 
International Arbitral Awards: a Legal Analysis. The purpose of this research is to 
get a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in law from Universiti Utara Malaysia.  
I assure that all information will be used for the research only and they will be kept 
confidential and will not be treated otherwise. I hope that you would help to 






(Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) 
PhD Candidate in Law 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES INTERVIEW: 
Place of Interview: 
 







Section I: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
This section is to gather information about the experts and contains general 
questions including respondent’s background, their qualifications (trainings or 
experiences), and their field of education. 
What is your post/position? 
 
XXXI. How long have you been in this current post/position?  
 
XXXII. Would you like to tell me something about your work and your 
responsibilities?  
(Please comment on how far your responsibilities extend throughout the organization).  
 
 
XXXIII. How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experience?  
 
XXXIV. What is your area of interest?  
 
XXXV. Other than your official duty, have you become a member in any other 
professional bodies involving arbitration matters? If yes, what was it? 
 
 
Section II: EXPERT VIEWS 
This section is to examine the influence of corruption on the judiciary and 
arbitration. 
40- Are cases of corruption involving judges and court officials normally 
prosecuted in the courts? 
41- Do you have any statistic about number of judges or court officers that have 
been prosecuted in the court? 
42- What are sanctions impose on the judges and court officer found to have 
committed corrupt practice? 
43- Are there complaints come to you that related to corrupt judge like receiving 
bribery? 
44- Can you tell me whether politicians interfere on the judge’s good performance? 
45- Is there interference in judicial affairs from the military?  




47- How far important are independence, good integrity, and transparency 
important value in JIB?  
48- Do you Exercise Independence, Integrity and Transparency in the Judicial 
Inspection Abroad? 
49-  Is independence of JIB protected by safeguards of due process in disciplinary 
proceedings? 
50- Is JIB protected against arbitrary dismissal, salary reduction, or transfer? 
51- What are the sources of financing for JIB? If executive body provides JIB, is 
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Appendix H: Consent Form 
Dear participant 
My name is Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir; I am a PhD candidate at the University 
Utara Malaysia. 
You are invited to participate in this research study which aims at studying titled the 
impediments faced by Yemen in enforcing international arbitral awards: a legal 
analysis. The following points will highlight the role of the participant and other 
important issues. 
 
1- You will be kindly asked to participate in an interview with the researcher. 
Your participation in this study is absolutely voluntary. At the interview you 
(i.e. the participant) will have the freedom to express your opinions, prior 
experiences and perceptions regarding whatever the impediments of 
inadequacy of Yemeni Arbitration Act, tribalism, and corruption on the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards in Yemen. 
2- The participant has the right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
worrying about any penalties or consequences.  
3- The interview location and timing will be decided by the participant to assure 
his/her convenience. The interview will last for approximately 30 minutes. 
4- The participant’s identity will be kept confidential, will not be disclosed to any 
third party and will not be mentioned within the study’s body or the final report. 
A coding procedure will be used to replace the participant’s name in order to 
ensure his/her identity confidentiality. However, the results of the study can be 
published but without declaring the names of the participants.  
5- The interview will be digitally recorded in order to be transcribed later for the 
purpose of analysis and information extraction. The interview material will be 
stored securely for a period of two years; after that it will be destroyed. 
 
After clarifying all the important points regarding this study and the participants’ role 
and rights, if you have any further inquiries you may contact the researcher on the 
following contact information; the researcher’s e-mail (bawazeer_uum@yahoo.com) 
and mobile No. (0060173109496).  
Thanks for your participation, your time and efforts are truly appreciated.     
 
Name of Expert:  
Title:  
Place of Job:  
Current Position:  
Contact Information 
Frequently Used E-Mail:  
Official E-Mail (if any)…………………………………………………………….. 
Phone No.:  
Signature of the interviewee ---------------------------------, Date: …………….. 
 
Researcher Information 
PhD Candidate (Omar Saleh Abdullah Bawazir) Studying at University Utara 
Malaysia, College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS). 
Place of Job:   student at University Utara Malaysia. 
Phone No:  1101713710400 
E-Mail:  bawazeer_uum@yahoo.com 
